Law Commons^™

Debacle: How The Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law And How Justice Sotomayor Might Help Fix It, Frank O. Bowman

Frank O. Bowman III

This Article argues that the line of Supreme Court Sixth Amendment jury right cases that began with McMillan v. Pennsylvania in 1986, crescendoed in Blakely v. Washington and United States v. Booker in 2004-2005, and continues in 2009 in cases such as Oregon v. Ice, has been a colossal judicial failure. First, the Court has failed to provide a logically coherent, constitutionally based answer to the fundamental question of what limits the Constitution places on the roles played by the institutional actors in the criminal justice system. It failed to recognize that defining, adjudicating and punishing crimes implicates both the …

“I’M Dying To Tell You What Happened”: The Admissibility Of Testimonial Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, Peter Nicolas

Peter Nicolas

In Crawford v. Washington and its progeny, the U.S. Supreme Court has re-theorized the relationship between hearsay evidence and the Confrontation Clause. Post-Crawford, hearsay statements that are “testimonial” in nature are, as a general rule, inadmissible when offered against the accused in a criminal case. Yet in footnote 6 of Crawford, the Supreme Court suggested that an exception to the general rule may exist for dying declarations. This manuscript builds on the dictum set forth in footnote 6 of Crawford, the meaning of which the lower courts are just beginning to explore. In the manuscript, I first demonstrate that the …

Preface: Reclaiming Criminal Procedure, Jeffrey L. Fisher

Jeffrey L Fisher

The key to making sense of Crawford is to appreciate that the decision turned the right to confrontation from an evidentiary principle back into a criminal procedure right. As the Court ultimately put it, the Confrontation Clause "commands . . . that reliability be assessed in a particular manner by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause Thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined.

This way of conceptualizing a constitutional right is unique to criminal procedure. Instead …