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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Rehnquist Court And The Groundwork For Greater First Amendment Scrutiny Of Intellectual Property, Mark P. Mckenna
The Rehnquist Court And The Groundwork For Greater First Amendment Scrutiny Of Intellectual Property, Mark P. Mckenna
Mark P. McKenna
This contribution to the Washington University School of Law conference on the Rehnquist Court and the First Amendment addresses the Rehnquist Court's view of the role of the First Amendment in intellectual property cases. It argues that, while the Rehnquist Court was not eager to find a conflict between intellectual property laws and the First Amendment, there is reason to believe that it set the stage for greater First Amendment scrutiny of intellectual property protections. At the very least, the Court left that road open to future courts, which might be inclined to view intellectual property more skeptically.
Judicial Review, Local Values, And Pluralism, Richard W. Garnett
Judicial Review, Local Values, And Pluralism, Richard W. Garnett
Richard W Garnett
At the Federalist Society's 2008 National Student Symposium, a panel of scholars was asked to consider the question, does pervasive judicial review threaten to destroy local identity by homogenizing community norms? The answer to this question is yes, pervasive judicial review certainly does threaten local identity, because such review can homogenize[e] community norms, either by dragging them into conformity with national, constitutional standards or (more controversially) by subordinating them to the reviewers' own commitments. It is important to recall, however, that while it is true that an important feature of our federalism is local variation in laws and values, it …
Chief Justice Rehnquist's Enduring Democratic Constitution, Richard W. Garnett
Chief Justice Rehnquist's Enduring Democratic Constitution, Richard W. Garnett
Richard W Garnett
William H. Rehnquist's essay, The Notion of a Living Constitution, was delivered as the Will E. Orgain Lecture and then published thirty years ago, back when Rehnquist was still a relatively junior Associate Justice. The piece provides a clear and coherent statement of Rehnquist's judicial philosophy, and the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy and the Texas Law Review deserve thanks for their initiative and generosity in reproducing it, in memory of his life and work.
This introduction to Rehnquist's essay highlights his view that the Notion of a Living Constitution was to be resisted, not out of pious …
Rehnquist's Fourth Amendment: Be Reasonable, Craig M. Bradley
Rehnquist's Fourth Amendment: Be Reasonable, Craig M. Bradley
Articles by Maurer Faculty
"The Fourth Amendment: Be Reasonable," is a chapter in a book, The Rehnquist Legacy, published by Cambridge University Press in 2006. The book is a comprehensive legal biography of the Chief Justice in which leading scholars examine his legacy in diverse areas of constitutional law, including criminal procedure. This chapter examines Rehnquist's voluminous Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. While Rehnquist has not authored any single path-breaking case in this area, the chapter shows his success, across the board, in achieving his stated goal of calling a halt to the pro-defendant rulings of the Warren Court in the criminal procedure area. However, Rehnquist …
Oasis Or Mirage: The Supreme Court's Thirst For Dictionaries In The Rehnquist And Roberts Eras, James J. Brudney, Lawrence Baum
Oasis Or Mirage: The Supreme Court's Thirst For Dictionaries In The Rehnquist And Roberts Eras, James J. Brudney, Lawrence Baum
Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries, virtually non-existent before 1987, has dramatically increased during the Rehnquist and Roberts Court eras to the point where as many as one-third of statutory decisions invoke dictionary definitions. The increase is linked to the rise of textualism and its intense focus on ordinary meaning. This Article explores the Court’s new dictionary culture in depth from empirical and doctrinal perspectives. We find that while textualist justices are heavy dictionary users, purposivist justices invoke dictionary definitions with comparable frequency. Further, dictionary use overall is strikingly ad hoc and subjective. We demonstrate how the Court’s patterns of …