Law Commons^™

Can Administrative Regulations Interpret Rights Enforceable Under Section 1983?: Why Chevron Deference Survives Sandoval And Gonzaga, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

There is a split in the circuits regarding whether and when agency regulations may establish rights enforceable through 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. In 1987, in Wright v. City of Roanoke, the Supreme Court held that a statute and regulations interpreting the statute could create enforceable rights under Section 1983, but left unclear to what extent it had relied on the regulations alone to reach this conclusion. The District of Columbia Circuit and Sixth Circuit have held that at least some valid federal regulations may create rights enforceable through Section 1983. Concluding that only Congress by enacting a statute may create …

Transmission Siting In Deregulated Wholesale Power Markets: Re-Imagining The Role Of Courts In Resolving Federal-State Siting Impasses, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

During most of the twentieth century, state and local regulatory bodies coordinated the siting or power plants and transmission lines. These bodies focused on two important issues: 1) the determination of need, so as to avoid unnecessary economic duplication of costly infrastructure; and 2) environmental protection, so as to provide local land use and other environmental concerns input on the placement of necessary generation and transmission facilities. With the rise of a deregulated wholesale power market, the issue of need is increasingly determined by the market, not regulators. Environmental concerns with siting, however, frequently remain contested - especially locally - …

Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect The Environment, Michael P. Vandenbergh

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article tackles a leading problem confronting norms theorists and regulators: how can the law induce changes in behavior when the material costs to the individual outweigh the benefits and there is no close-knit community to impose sanctions for failure to change? Because private individuals and households are now surprisingly large contributors to environmental problems ranging from toxic pollution to climate change, environmental policy makers face compelling examples of these negative-payoff, loose-knit group situations. This Article suggests that internalized personal norms, rather than social norms, are the most important initial target of opportunity for influencing this kind of behavior.

Drawing …