Law Commons^™

Slaughtering Slaughter-House: An Assessment Of 14th Amendment Privileges Or Immunities Jurisprudence, Caleb Webb

Senior Honors Theses

In 1872, the Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases, which applied a narrow interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14^th Amendment that effectually eroded the clause from the Constitution. Following Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court compensated by utilizing elastic interpretations of the Due Process Clause in its substantive due process jurisprudence to cover the rights that would have otherwise been protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In more recent years, the Court has heard arguments favoring alternative interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause but has yet to evaluate them thoroughly. By applying the …

Does The Discourse On 303 Creative Portend A Standing Realignment?, Richard M. Re

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Perhaps the most surprising feature of the last Supreme Court Term was the extraordinary public discourse on 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. According to many commentators, the Court decided what was really a “fake” or “made-up” case brought by someone who asserted standing merely because “she worries.” As a doctrinal matter, these criticisms are unfounded. But what makes this episode interesting is that the criticisms came from the legal Left, which has long been associated with expansive principles of standing. Doubts about standing in 303 Creative may therefore portend a broader standing realignment, in which liberal Justices become jurisdictionally hawkish. …

An Originalist Approach To Prospective Overruling, John O. Mcginnis, Michael Rappaport

Notre Dame Law Review

Originalism has become a dominant jurisprudential theory on the Supreme Court. But a large number of precedents are inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning and overturning them risks creating enormous disruption to the legal order. This article defends a prospective overruling approach that would harmonize precedent with originalism’s rise and reduce the disruption from overrulings. Under prospective overruling, the Court declares that an existing statute violates the original meaning but will continue to be enforced because declaring it unconstitutional would produce enormous costs; however, future statutes of this type will be voided as unconstitutional. Under our approach, the Court would …

Symposium On Transformative Gender Law: A Roger Williams Law Review Event 11-3-2023, Roger Williams University School Of Law

School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events

No abstract provided.

The Evolution Of Sodomy Decriminalization Jurisprudence In Transnational And Comparative Constitutional Perspective, Ayodeji Kamau Perrin

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

In this Article, I demonstrate that legal mobilization by activist litigants combined with a comparative methodological jurisprudence has been central to the “transnational legal process” of the generation and diffusion of the sodomy decriminalization norm since the 1950s. My analysis of the transnational comparative jurisprudence relies on a comprehensive legal survey of seven decades of decriminalization jurisprudence (1954–2022), primarily using successful cases. Although the scholarship on the well-known Dudgeon, Toonen, and NCGLE cases often asserts the influence that these cases had on subsequent domestic court constitutional jurisprudence, I suggest that it is the domestic privacy jurisprudence of lobbyists, …

Where To Place The “Nones” In The Church And State Debate? Empirical Evidence From Establishment Clause Cases In Federal Court, Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise

St. John's Law Review

In this third iteration of our ongoing empirical examination of religious liberty decisions in the lower federal courts, we studied all digested Establishment Clause decisions by federal circuit and district court judges from 2006 through 2015. The first clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution directs that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” That provision has generated decades of controversy regarding the appropriate role of religion in public life.

Holding key variables constant, we found that Catholic judges approved Establishment Clause claims at a 29.6% rate, compared with a 41.5% rate before non-Catholic …

Kritik Terhadap Struktur Ilmu Hukum Menurut Paul Scholten, E. Fernando M. Manullang, E. Fernando M. Manullang

Jurnal Hukum & Pembangunan

Paul Scholten, a prominent Dutch legal scholar, explains some thoughts in one of his chief article: De Structuur der recthwetenshcap. Essentially it describes some accounts on how legal relations may exist, which he thinks such relations can be both logic and illogical. Scholten even furthermore reiterates such paradigm, the dualism of logic and illogical, also underlies the scientific nature of legal science (jurisprudence). Finally, he also explores on the relations between language and jurisprudence. His all accounts leave some critical notes, as it has some internal contradictions in connection of, as what critical legal theory says, the presence of reifications …

The State Secrets Privilege: An Institutional Process Approach, Alexandra B. Dakich

Northwestern University Law Review

It is no secret that since September 11, 2001, the Executive Branch has acted at variance with laws otherwise restraining its conduct under the guise of national security. Among other doctrines that make up the new national security canon, state secrets privilege assertions have narrowed the scope of redressability for parties alleging official misconduct in national security cases. For parties such as the Muslim American community surveilled by the FBI in Orange County, California, or Abu Zubaydah, who was subjected to confirmed torture tactics by the U.S. government, success in the courts hinges on the government’s unbridled ability to assert …

Levels Of Free Speech Scrutiny, Alexander Tsesis

Indiana Law Journal

Inconsistencies abound throughout current exacting, strict, and most exacting scrutiny doctrines. Formalism also runs throughout recent cases that have opportunistically relied on the First Amendment in matters peripherally concerned with core principles of free speech. Jurisprudence that relies on the exacting scrutiny standard remains significantly under-theorized. The uncertainty creates doctrinal flux that shifts from case-to-case. The same unexplained malleability appears in the most exacting scrutiny jurisprudence. The Court, moreover, sometimes refers to these two standards as equivalent to strict scrutiny. On the other hand, during the last decade, and most recently in 2021, various opinions have also used exacting scrutiny …

The Constitution As A Source Of Remedial Law, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Equity’s Constitutional Source, Owen W. Gallogly argues that Article III is the source of a constitutional default rule for equitable remedies—specifically, that Article III’s vesting of the “judicial Power” “in Equity” empowers federal courts to afford the remedies traditionally afforded by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the Founding, and to develop such remedies in an incremental fashion. This Response questions the current plausibility of locating such a default rule in Article III, since remedies having their source in Article III would be available in federal but not state courts and would apply to state-law …

Sola Scriptura: Slavery, Federalism And The Textual Power To Provide For The General Welfare, Calvin H. Johnson

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

This Article argues specifically that under the text of the Constitution, Congress has the general power to provide for the welfare through tax and any other necessary and appropriate means. Clause 1 of the description of powers of Congress in Article I, Section 8, gives Congress the power to tax and spend to provide for the common defense and general welfare. Common defense and domestic welfare are parallel in the text and equally plenary, subject only to restrictions protecting individual rights. The final clause of Section 8 then allows Congress to reach the goal of general welfare by any necessary …

No Sense Of Decency, Kathryn E. Miller

Washington Law Review

For nearly seventy years, the Court has assessed Eighth Amendment claims by evaluating “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” In this Article, I examine the evolving standards of decency test, which has long been a punching bag for critics on both the right and the left. Criticism of the doctrine has been fierce but largely academic until recent years. Some fault the test for being too majoritarian, while others argue that it provides few constraints on the Justices’ discretion, permitting their personal predilections to rule the day. For many, the test is seen …

Jazz Improvisation And The Law: Constrained Choice, Sequence, And Strategic Movement Within Rules, William W. Buzbee

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article argues that a richer understanding of the nature of law is possible through comparative, analogical examination of legal work and the art of jazz improvisation. This exploration illuminates a middle ground between rule of law aspirations emphasizing stability and determinate meanings and contrasting claims that the untenable alternative is pervasive discretionary or politicized law. In both the law and jazz improvisation settings, the work involves constraining rules, others’ unpredictable actions, and strategic choosing with attention to where a collective creation is going. One expects change and creativity in improvisation, but the many analogous characteristics of law illuminate why …

Textualism In Practice, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

It is by now axiomatic to note that textualism has won the statutory interpretation wars. But contrary to what textualists long have promised, the widespread embrace of textualism as an interpretive methodology has not resulted in any real clarity or predictability about the interpretive path—or even the specific interpretive tools—that courts will invoke in a particular case. Part of the reason for this lack of predictability is that textualism-in-practice often differs significantly from the approach that textualism-in-theory advertises; and part of the reason is that textualism-in-theory is sometimes in tension with itself. In light of textualism’s ascendance—and now dominance—on the …

The Common Law As Statutory Backdrop, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Amidst the whirl of commentary about how the U.S. Supreme Court has become increasingly textualist and what precise shape modern textualism should take, the Court’s continued reliance on one decidedly atextual interpretive tool has gone largely unnoticed — the common law. Indeed, the common law has played an underappreciated, often dispositive, gap-filling role in statutory interpretation for decades, even as the textualist revolution has sidelined other non-text-focused interpretive tools. But despite the persistent role that the common law has played in statutory interpretation cases, the use of common law rules and definitions as an interpretive resource is surprisingly understudied and …

Shakespeare And The Supreme Court: How The Justices Reveal Their Ideologies By Referencing His Works, Rachel Anderson

Honors Projects

The works of William Shakespeare have been referenced many times throughout history, even by Supreme Court justices. Building off of an observation of a mock trial by James Shapiro, this project puts the utilization of Shakespeare from three Court opinions in relation to its context within the play and the opinion to examine what the reference reveals about the authoring justices' ideology. In doing so, this project concludes that the justices utilize Shakespeare's works in their opinions for various reasons, including to infuse their beliefs into their argument. This implies that Supreme Court justices do not base their opinions on …

The Case For A Liberal Communitarian Jurisprudence, Amitai Etzioni

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

This article seeks to show that courts face difficulties without a principled, constitutional anchoring for the conception of the common good. Courts could divine the common good from the penumbra of the Fourth Amendment in the same way the Supreme Court created a right to privacy. In addition to creating a “common good” constitutional principle, the judicial branch should establish criteria to determine when this principle should take precedence over individual rights expressly preserved in the Constitution.

Rewriting Whren V. United States, Jonathan Feingold, Devon Carbado

Faculty Scholarship

In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Whren v. United States—a unanimous opinion in which the Court effectively constitutionalized racial profiling. Despite its enduring consequences, Whren remains good law today. This Article rewrites the opinion. We do so, in part, to demonstrate how one might incorporate racial justice concerns into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a body of law that has long elided and marginalized the racialized dimensions of policing. A separate aim is to reveal the “false necessity” of the Whren outcome. The fact that Whren was unanimous, and that even progressive Justices signed on, might lead one to conclude that …

Deep-State Constitutionalism, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this review, I explain how "Common Good Constitutionalism" taps into a deficiency of the conservative legal movement: namely, its exclusive focus on the law "as it is" at the expense of the underlying abstract normative principles that justify the positive law of our written Constitution. Due to this deficiency, the conservative legal movement gives short shrift to the Declaration of Independence and the Ninth Amendment and the natural rights to which both refer. This deficiency is in need of correction. But any such correction does not justify the jettisoning of originalism as Vermeule proposes. Nor does Vermeule defend his …

Nonparty Jurisdiction, Aaron D. Simowitz, Linda J. Silberman

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

The Supreme Court's recent decisions on personal jurisdiction, including its 2021 decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, have all focused on the adjudication of plenary claims. In seven years, the Court has decided six major cases on personal jurisdiction in that context. However, these precedents also appear to guide lower courts in areas outside the traditional focus of personal jurisdiction doctrine but where personal jurisdiction is nonetheless necessary. For example, a court must have personal jurisdiction over a nonparty witness in order to compel the witness to testify or to produce documents. A court must …

The Living Rules Of Evidence, G. Alexander Nunn

Faculty Scholarship

The jurisprudential evolution of evidence law is dead. At least, that’s what we’re expected to believe. Ushered in on the wings of a growing positivist movement, the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence purported to quell judicial authority over evidence law. Instead, committees, conferences, and members of Congress would regulate any change to our evidentiary regime, thereby capturing the evolution of evidence law in a single, transparent code.

The codification of evidence law, though, has proven problematic. The arrival of the Federal Rules of Evidence has given rise to a historically anomalous era of relative stagnation in the doctrinal …

Reassociating Student Rights: Giving It The Ole College Try, Tyler Mlakar

Arkansas Law Review

At the beginning of 2020, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) declared Coronavirus disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) a “public health emergency of international concern.” Governments around the world began instituting citywide and even nationwide “lockdowns.” In the United States, the approach was far more splintered. While there was no nationwide lockdown, states across the country instituted varying measures ranging from “shelter-in-place” and “stay at home” orders, to school closures, limits on the size of public gatherings, “mask mandates,” and even some states allowing restaurants and bars to remain open. Across the United States, these measures have resulted in the most pervasive governmental …

Slavery And The History Of Congress's Enumerated Powers, Jeffrey Schmitt

Arkansas Law Review

In his first inaugural address, President Abraham Lincoln declared, “I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.” Like virtually all Americans before the Civil War, Lincoln believed in what historians call the “national consensus” on slavery. According to this consensus, Congress’s enumerated powers were not broad enough to justify any regulation of slavery within the states. Legal scholars who support the modern reach of federal powers have thus conventionally argued …

Keeping Our Distinctions Straight: A Response To “Originalism: Standard And Procedure”, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

For half a century, moral philosophers have distinguished between a “standard” that makes acts right and a “decision procedure” by which agents can determine whether any given contemplated act is right, which is to say whether it satisfies the standard. In “Originalism: Standard and Procedure,” Stephen Sachs argues that the same distinction applies to the constitutional domain and that clear grasp of the difference strengthens the case for originalism because theorists who emphasize the infirmities of originalism as a decision procedure frequently but mistakenly infer that those flaws also cast doubt on originalism as a standard. This invited response agrees …

How Practices Make Principles, And How Principles Make Rules, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

The most fundamental question in general jurisprudence concerns what makes it the case that the law has the content that it does. This article offers a novel answer. According to the theory it christens “principled positivism,” legal practices ground legal principles, and legal principles determine legal rules. This two-level account of the determination of legal content differs from Hart’s celebrated theory in two essential respects: in relaxing Hart’s requirement that fundamental legal notions depend for their existence on judicial consensus; and in assigning weighted contributory legal norms—“principles”—an essential role in the determination of legal rights, duties, powers, and permissions. Drawing …

Compelled Speech And Proportionality, Alexander Tsesis

Faculty Publications & Other Works

This Article argues for a proportional First Amendment approach to compelled speech jurisprudence. It discusses the evolution of doctrine and how it led to recent opinions finding unconstitutional consumer protection, health disclosure, and collective bargaining statutes. In place of the currently formalistic approach, the Article argues for a transparent balancing of interests to avoid litigants’ opportunistic reliance on categorical First Amendment doctrines. Missing from the recent decisions that relied on the compelled speech doctrine is any systematic or contextual weighing of private and public concerns about disclosure regulations. The Roberts Court has been rather formalistic and categorical in its compelled …

Judges As Superheroes: The Danger Of Confusing Constitutional Decisions With Cosmic Battles, H. Jefferson Powell

South Carolina Law Review

No abstract provided.

Robert Jackson's Critique Of Trump V. Hawaii, William R. Casto

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Over seventy years ago, United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson accurately predicted the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii. As he foresaw, the Court rubberstamped a President’s purposeful discrimination against a minority religion. This brief Essay explains Trump using Jackson’s critique of judicial review in national-security cases. The Essay also uses Trump to examine a flaw—probably structural—in the constitutional theory of process jurisprudence. The Trump case involved the Court’s construction of congressional legislation apparently limiting the President’s authority, but the present Essay does not address that aspect of the opinion.

Incitement, Insurrection, Impeachment: Inside The Second Trump Impeachment, Roger Williams University School Of Law, Michael M. Bowden

School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events

No abstract provided.

Law School News: Whitehouse, Cicilline To Offer 'Inside View' Of 2nd Trump Impeachment Trial 02-17-2021, Michael M. Bowden

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.