Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor
Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor
ExpressO
No abstract provided.
Do Institutions Really Matter? Assessing The Impact Of State Judicial Structures On Citizen Litigiousness, Jeff L. Yates, Paul Brace, Holley Tankersley
Do Institutions Really Matter? Assessing The Impact Of State Judicial Structures On Citizen Litigiousness, Jeff L. Yates, Paul Brace, Holley Tankersley
ExpressO
No abstract provided.
Standards Of The Supreme Court, John Cornyn
Standards Of The Supreme Court, John Cornyn
University of Richmond Law Review
No abstract provided.
Debunking Double Standards, John Cornyn
Debunking Double Standards, John Cornyn
University of Richmond Law Review
No abstract provided.
Agenda Setting, Issue Priorities, And Organizational Maintenance: The U.S. Supreme Court, 1955 To 1994, Jeff L. Yates, Andrew B. Whitford, William Gillespie
Agenda Setting, Issue Priorities, And Organizational Maintenance: The U.S. Supreme Court, 1955 To 1994, Jeff L. Yates, Andrew B. Whitford, William Gillespie
Jeff L Yates
In this study, we examine agenda setting by the U.S. Supreme Court, and ask the question of why the Court allocates more or less of its valuable agenda space to one policy issue over others. Our study environment is the policy issue composition of the Court's docket: the Court's attention to criminal justice policy issues relative to other issues. We model the Court's allocation of this agenda space as a function of internal organizational demands and external political signals. We find that this agenda responds to the issue priorities of the other branches of the federal government and the public. …
Appointing Federal Judges: The President, The Senate, And The Prisoner's Dilemma, David S. Law
Appointing Federal Judges: The President, The Senate, And The Prisoner's Dilemma, David S. Law
David S. Law
This article argues that the expansion of the White House's role in judicial appointments since the late 1970s, at the expense of the Senate, has contributed to heightened levels of ideological conflict and gridlock over the appointment of federal appeals court judges, by making a cooperative equilibrium difficult to sustain. Presidents have greater electoral incentive to behave ideologically, and less incentive to cooperate with other players in the appointments process, than do senators, who are disciplined to a greater extent in their dealings with each other by the prospect of retaliation over repeat play. The possibility of divided government exacerbates …