Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
-
- Seattle University School of Law (4)
- Selected Works (4)
- Texas A&M University School of Law (4)
- University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School (4)
- University of Michigan Law School (3)
-
- Chicago-Kent College of Law (2)
- University of Colorado Law School (2)
- Vanderbilt University Law School (2)
- BLR (1)
- Georgetown University Law Center (1)
- Pepperdine University (1)
- SelectedWorks (1)
- The Peter A. Allard School of Law (1)
- University of Kentucky (1)
- University of Miami Law School (1)
- University of San Diego (1)
- Publication Year
- Publication
-
- All Faculty Scholarship (4)
- Faculty Scholarship (4)
- Seattle University Law Review (4)
- Articles (3)
- Robert B. Ahdieh (3)
-
- Chicago-Kent Law Review (2)
- Publications (2)
- Vanderbilt Law Review (2)
- All Faculty Publications (1)
- ExpressO (1)
- Federico M. Mucciarelli (1)
- Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works (1)
- Law Faculty Scholarly Articles (1)
- Michigan Law Review (1)
- Pepperdine Law Review (1)
- San Diego Law Review (1)
- Steven Davidoff Solomon (1)
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 30 of 33
Full-Text Articles in Law
A History Of Corporate Law Federalism In The Twentieth Century, William W. Bratton
A History Of Corporate Law Federalism In The Twentieth Century, William W. Bratton
Seattle University Law Review
This Article describes the emergence of corporate law federalism across a long twentieth century. The period begins with New Jersey’s successful initiation of charter competition in 1888 and ends with the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. The federalism in question describes the interrelation of state and federal regulation of corporate internal affairs. This Article takes a positive approach, pursuing no normative bottom line. It makes six observations: (1) the federalism describes a division of subject matter, with internal affairs regulated by the states and securities issuance and trading regulated by the federal government; (2) the federalism is an …
Shareholder Primacy Versus Shareholder Accountability, William Wilson Bratton
Shareholder Primacy Versus Shareholder Accountability, William Wilson Bratton
Articles
When corporations inflict injuries in the course of business, shareholders wielding environmental, social, and governance ("ESG") principles can, and now sometimes do, intervene to correct the matter. In the emerging fact pattern, corporate social accountability expands out of its historic collectivized frame to become an internal subject matter-a corporate governance topic. As a result, shareholder accountability surfaces as a policy question for the first time. The Big Three index fund managers, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, responded to the accountability question with ESG activism. In so doing, they defected against corporate legal theory's central tenet, shareholder primacy. Shareholder primacy builds …
The Race To The Middle, William Magnuson
The Race To The Middle, William Magnuson
Faculty Scholarship
How does federalism affect the quality of law? It is one of the fundamental questions of our constitutional system. Scholars of federalism generally fall into one of two camps on the question. One camp argues that regulatory competition between states leads to a “race to the bottom,” in which states adopt progressively worse laws in order to pander to powerful constituencies. The other camp, conversely, argues that regulatory competition leads to a “race to the top,” incentivizing states to adopt progressively better laws in the search for more desirable outcomes for their constituencies. Despite their apparent differences, however, both the …
Collected Lectures And Talks On Corporate Law, Legal Theory, History, Finance, And Governance, William W. Bratton
Collected Lectures And Talks On Corporate Law, Legal Theory, History, Finance, And Governance, William W. Bratton
Seattle University Law Review
A collection of eighteen speeches and lectures, from 2003 to 2018, discussing and expanding on the writings and theories of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means.
Corporate Disobedience, Elizabeth Pollman
Corporate Disobedience, Elizabeth Pollman
All Faculty Scholarship
Corporate law has long taken a dim view of corporate lawbreaking. Corporations can be chartered only for lawful activity. Contemporary case law characterizes intentional violations of law as a breach of the fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty. While recognizing that rule breaking raises significant social and moral concerns, this Article suggests that corporate law and academic debate have overlooked important aspects of corporate disobedience. This Article provides an overview of corporate disobedience and illuminates the role that it has played in entrepreneurship and legal change. Corporations violate laws for a variety of reasons, including as part of efforts …
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to …
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
In this Reply, I respond to comments by Bill Bratton, Larry Cunningham, and Todd Henderson on my recent paper - Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for Corporate Governance. I begin by reiterating my basic thesis - that state competition should be understood to have little consequence for corporate governance, if (as charter competition's advocates assume) capital-market-driven managerial competition is also at work. I then consider some of the thoughtful critiques of this claim, before suggesting ways in which the comments highlight just the kind of comparative institutional analysis my paper counsels. Rather than a stark choice …
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
Since the very moment of its adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been subject to a litany of critiques, many of them seemingly well-placed. The almost universal condemnation of the Act for its asserted 'federalization' of corporate law, by contrast, deserves short shrift. Though widely invoked - and blithely accepted - dissection of this argument against the legislation shows it to rely either on flawed assumptions or on normative preferences not ordinarily acknowledged (or perhaps even accepted) by those who criticize Sarbanes-Oxley for its federalization of state corporate law.
Once we appreciate as much, we can begin by replacing …
Federalism Of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement Plans, William A. Birdthistle
Federalism Of Personal Finance: State & Federal Retirement Plans, William A. Birdthistle
Seattle University Law Review
In this Article, I consider possible approaches that attempt to improve the plans through which millions of Americans tend to their life savings. I begin by considering the inadequacies of our current system of defined contribution accounts and then address two possible alternatives: the first being a federal account universally available to Americans based largely on the model of the Thrift Savings Plan; the second being a system of statebased retirement accounts like those that have already been developed in a handful of states. Though I conclude that a single, federal plan would be superior, either alternative approach would be …
Progressive Era Conceptions Of The Corporation And The Failure Of The Federal Chartering Movement, Camden Hutchison
Progressive Era Conceptions Of The Corporation And The Failure Of The Federal Chartering Movement, Camden Hutchison
All Faculty Publications
Despite the economic integration of the several states and the broad regulatory authority of the federal government, the internal affairs of business corporations remain primarily governed by state law. The origins of this system are closely tied to the decentralized history of the United States, but the reasons for its continued persistence—in the face of significant federalization pressures—are not obvious. Indeed, federalization of corporate law was a major political goal during the Progressive Era, a period which witnessed significant expansion of federal involvement in the national economy. By examining the historical record of Progressive Era policy debates, this Article bridges …
Fragmented Oversight Of Nonprofits In The United States: Does It Work? Can It Work?, Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer
Fragmented Oversight Of Nonprofits In The United States: Does It Work? Can It Work?, Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer
Chicago-Kent Law Review
The United States is well known for its distinctive, although not unique, division of political authority between the federal government and the various states. This division is particularly evident when it comes to oversight of nonprofit organizations. The historical focus of federal government oversight has been limited primarily to qualification for tax exemption and other tax benefits, with more plenary power resting with state authorities. Over time, however, the federal government’s role has come to overlap significantly with that of the states, and many nonprofits have become subject to regulation by multiple states as their operations and donor bases expand …
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven M. Davidoff
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven M. Davidoff
All Faculty Scholarship
Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result …
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven M. Davidoff
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven M. Davidoff
Steven Davidoff Solomon
Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result …
When Does Sleaze Become A Crime? Redefining Honest Services Fraud After Skilling V. United States, Teresa M. Becvar
When Does Sleaze Become A Crime? Redefining Honest Services Fraud After Skilling V. United States, Teresa M. Becvar
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Honest services fraud, which is defined as a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of “honest services,” is just one tool in the federal government’s extensive arsenal used to prosecute public corruption and private corporate fraud. The Supreme Court curtailed the expansion of this versatile theory twice in the past three decades, most recently in June 2010 in Skilling v. United States. In Skilling, the Court held, inter alia, that the federal honest services statute covers only bribery and kickback schemes and not undisclosed self-dealing. Months later, members of Congress proposed the Honest Services …
Level Up: Employing The Commerce Clause To Federalize The Sale Of Goods, Jennifer Camero
Level Up: Employing The Commerce Clause To Federalize The Sale Of Goods, Jennifer Camero
San Diego Law Review
This Article argues that rather than wait until the defects become insurmountable, we should act now to address the defects in the law of sales and enact a federal sales act to supplant Article 2 using congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Part II details the defects of Article 2 that are in need of repair, which include creating inconsistent results across the states, failing to adapt to changing trends in our modern commercial environment, and utilizing a private drafting process that fails to balance the competing interests of businesses and consumers. Part II then demonstrates that the current uniform …
Antitrust’S State Action Doctrine And The Ordinary Powers Of Corporations, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust’S State Action Doctrine And The Ordinary Powers Of Corporations, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court has now agreed to review the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Phoebe-Putney, which held that a state statute permitting a hospital authority to acquire hospitals implicitly authorized such acquisitions when they were anticompetitive – in this particular case very likely facilitating a merger to monopoly. Under antitrust law’s “state action” doctrine a state may in fact authorize such an acquisition, provided that it “clearly articulates” its desire to approve an action that would otherwise constitute an antitrust violation and also “actively supervises” any private conduct that might fall under the state’s regulatory scheme.
“Authorization” in the context of …
Federalism And Preemption In October Term 1999, Jonathan D. Varat
Federalism And Preemption In October Term 1999, Jonathan D. Varat
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Freedom Of Reincorporation And The Scope Of Corporate Law In The U.S. And The E.U., Federico Mucciarelli
Freedom Of Reincorporation And The Scope Of Corporate Law In The U.S. And The E.U., Federico Mucciarelli
Federico M. Mucciarelli
In the U.S. corporations can be incorporated in any of the 50 states and can “reincorporate” afterwards in any other state. In the E.U. such freedoms are a recent achievement: In the last decade, first the European Court of Justice has liberalized initial incorporations and only in 2005 the cross-border directive has open the doors to freedom of midstream reincorporation from one member state to another. Midstream reincorporations, however, in the E.U. have a much different impact than on the other side of the Atlantic. In the U.S., indeed, the competence of the state where a company is incorporated is …
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
In this Reply, I respond to comments by Bill Bratton, Larry Cunningham, and Todd Henderson on my recent paper - Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for Corporate Governance. I begin by reiterating my basic thesis - that state competition should be understood to have little consequence for corporate governance, if (as charter competition's advocates assume) capital-market-driven managerial competition is also at work. I then consider some of the thoughtful critiques of this claim, before suggesting ways in which the comments highlight just the kind of comparative institutional analysis my paper counsels. Rather than a stark choice …
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to …
Before Competition: Origins Of The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Frederick Tung
Before Competition: Origins Of The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Frederick Tung
ExpressO
To the modern corporate scholar and lawyer, the internal affairs doctrine seems in the natural order of things. Corporate law is state law. Each corporation is formed under the law of its chosen state of incorporation. To ensure consistency and predictability, that law must govern the corporation’s internal affairs. Yet the origin of such a doctrine is puzzling. Respecting the firm’s choice of corporate law, the doctrine forces state legislatures into competition to attract incorporations. But how did legislatures come to concede their traditional territorial regulatory authority, and instead agree to compete? This Article solves this puzzle, offering the first …
Federalism In Corporate/Securities Law: Reflections On Delaware, California, And State Regulation Of Insider Trading, Donald C. Langevoort
Federalism In Corporate/Securities Law: Reflections On Delaware, California, And State Regulation Of Insider Trading, Donald C. Langevoort
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this brief Essay, I offer some thoughts on both the theory and the politics underlying the federalism question. My comments will touch on some of the controversies and also look at a somewhat quieter question, the state regulation of insider trading. Over the course of the last few years, judges in California and Delaware have traveled markedly different routes on questions involving the states' role in regulating insider trading. A California court of appeal has recently expanded the reach of the state insider trading statute to cover a claim alleging misconduct in California by an executive of a Delaware …
Symbiotic Federalism And The Structure Of Corporate Law, Marcel Kahan, Edward Rock
Symbiotic Federalism And The Structure Of Corporate Law, Marcel Kahan, Edward Rock
Vanderbilt Law Review
Enron. Worldcom. Adelphia. Global Crossing. Tyco. Corporate scandals have made the front pages. Congress has gotten in the act. Members have held numerous hearings, given speeches, and, ultimately, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has been busy writing regulations and leaning on the stock exchanges to modify their listing requirements, all in order to restore "investor confidence." Federal prosecutors have indicted executives of Enron, Worldcom, and Adelphia and their minions in the auditing and investment banking industries. State officials have also been active. Several states have passed statutes that resemble or go beyond the strictures of …
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
Since the very moment of its adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been subject to a litany of critiques, many of them seemingly well-placed. The almost universal condemnation of the Act for its asserted 'federalization' of corporate law, by contrast, deserves short shrift. Though widely invoked - and blithely accepted - dissection of this argument against the legislation shows it to rely either on flawed assumptions or on normative preferences not ordinarily acknowledged (or perhaps even accepted) by those who criticize Sarbanes-Oxley for its federalization of state corporate law.
Once we appreciate as much, we can begin by replacing …
The Use Of Hiring Preferences By Alaska Native Corporations After Malabed V. North Slope Borough, James P. Mills
The Use Of Hiring Preferences By Alaska Native Corporations After Malabed V. North Slope Borough, James P. Mills
Seattle University Law Review
This article argues that Native corporations can provide employment preferences for Alaska Natives, so long as they are appropriately tailored to provide employment preferences to that corporation's shareholders or those closely related to the shareholders. Moreover, a hiring preference based on shareholder status is not a preference based on race and, as such, does not violate Alaska state law.24 But even if the Alaska Supreme Court found that these hiring preferences did violate the state constitution, given the federal government's unique relationship with Native corporations 25 and Congress's clear intent for Native corporations to favor Alaska Natives in their hiring …
The Supreme Court, Rule 10b-5, And The Federalization Of Corporate Law, Mark J. Loewenstein
The Supreme Court, Rule 10b-5, And The Federalization Of Corporate Law, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
This Article examines Supreme Court jurisprudence since 1997 under the federal securities laws in light of the Court's earlier securities law decisions and in light of its recent decisions construing the Constitution and federal statutes as they relate to the regulation of business. These post-1977 cases strongly suggest that the much-heralded new federalism philosophy of the Supreme Court is not a factor in securities law cases or in business cases generally. Indeed, the opposite seems to be the case. In this context, new federalism cases appear to be an anomaly, with the reality being that the Court is still as …
Our Corporate Federalism And The Shape Of Corporate Law, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Our Corporate Federalism And The Shape Of Corporate Law, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
In the public debate sparked by the corporate scandals of the last years, Delaware has been strikingly absent. In contrast to the high profile activity of Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the stock exchanges, federal prosecutors, and even state law enforcement officials, Delaware has been largely mute: no legislation; no rule-making; no criminal investigations; few headlines. In this Article, we use Delaware's relative passivity during this latest episode of corporate law-making as a starting point in the analysis of the shape of American corporate federalism and Delaware's place within it. We argue that Delaware long ago opted for what …
Delaware As Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary's Polemic, Mark J. Loewenstein
Delaware As Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary's Polemic, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
No abstract provided.
The Impact Of Nsmia On Small Issuers, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.
The Impact Of Nsmia On Small Issuers, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
Small businesses may account for 40% of the business activities in this country, but capital formation rules always have discriminated against small businesses and imposed rules that make it unreasonably difficult for small companies to exploit external sources of capital. NSMIA, through its broad statutory delegation to the SEC of the right to expand the preemption of state blue sky laws, provides a unique opportunity for the Commission to deliver much-needed and much-deserved help to small issuers engaged in capital formation and to finally break the hegemonic hold states have over the rules governing capital formation by small businesses. Society …
An Analysis Of The Myths That Bolster Efforts To Rewrite Rico And The Various Proposals For Reform:"Mother Of God-Is This The End Of Rico?", G. Robert Blakey, Thomas A. Perry
An Analysis Of The Myths That Bolster Efforts To Rewrite Rico And The Various Proposals For Reform:"Mother Of God-Is This The End Of Rico?", G. Robert Blakey, Thomas A. Perry
Vanderbilt Law Review
In 1970 Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act, Title IX of which is known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO. Congress enacted the 1970 Act to "strengthen[]the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, [to] establish[] new penal prohibitions, and [to] provid[e] enhanced sanctions and new remedies .,, RICO covers violence, the provision of illegal goods and services, corruption in labor or management relations, corruption in government, and commercial fraud. Congress found in 1970 that the sanctions and remedies available to combat these crimes under the law then in force were unnecessarily limited in scope and …