Law Commons^™

Designing Nonrecognition Rules Under The Internal Revenue Code, Fred B. Brown

All Faculty Scholarship

Nonrecognition rules are a prominent feature of the income tax laws and are a source of considerable complexity and tax planning. Included among the nonrecognition rules contained in the Internal Revenue Code are provisions applying to like kind exchanges, corporate formations, corporate reorganizations, parent-subsidiary liquidations, and partnership formations and distributions. The policies that arguably support the nonrecognition rules include the familiar trio of tax policy concerns—efficiency, equity, and tax administration. None of these policies, however, provide a strong basis for most of the nonrecognition rules as currently formulated. The efficiency case generally lacks evidentiary support. The equity case is complicated …

Can Simple Mechanism Design Results Be Used To Implement The Proportionality Standard In Discovery?, Jonah B. Gelbach

All Faculty Scholarship

I point out that the Coase theorem suggests there should not be wasteful discovery, in the sense that the value to the requester is less than the cost to the responder. I use a toy model to show that a sufficiently informed court could design a mechanism under which the Coasean prediction is borne out. I then suggest that the actual information available to courts is too little to effect this mechanism, and I consider alternatives. In discussing mechanisms intended to avoid wasteful discovery where courts have limited information, I emphasize the role of normative considerations.

The Debilitating Effect Of Exclusive Rights: Patents And Productive Inefficiency, William Hubbard

All Faculty Scholarship

Are we underestimating the costs of patent protection? Scholars have long recognized that patent law is a double-edged sword. While patents promote innovation, they also limit the number of people who can benefit from new inventions. In the past, policy makers striving to balance the costs and benefits of patents have analyzed patent law through the lens of traditional, neoclassical economics. This Article argues that this approach is fundamentally flawed because traditional economics rely on an inaccurate oversimplification: that individuals and firms always maximize profits. In actuality, so-called "productive inefficiencies" often prevent profit maximization. For example, cognitive biases, bounded rationality, …

Framing A Purpose For Corporate Law, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

This article seeks to frame a short statement of purpose for corporate law on which all reasonable observers can agree. The statement, in order to succeed at its intended purpose, must satisfy two strict conditions: first, it must have enough content to be meaningful; second, it must be completely uncontroversial, both descriptively and normatively. The exercise, thus described, involves avoiding the issues that occupy center stage in discussions about corporate law while at the same time highlighting the discussants’ generally held presuppositions. Three closely interconnected issues arise. First, whether the statement of the purpose of corporate law should speak in …

Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

United States antitrust policy is said to promote some version of economic welfare. Antitrust promotes allocative efficiency by ensuring that markets are as competitive as they can practicably be, and that firms do not face unreasonable roadblocks to attaining productive efficiency, which refers to both cost minimization and innovation. One important welfare debate is whether antitrust should adopt a “consumer welfare” principle rather than a more general “total welfare” principle.

The simple version of the consumer welfare test is not a balancing test. If consumers are harmed by reduced output or higher prices resulting from the exercise of market power, …

Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics: The Life Of The Parties, Jonah B. Gelbach

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Distributive Justice And Consumer Welfare In Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The dominant view of antitrust policy in the United States is that it is intended to promote some version of economic welfare. More specifically, antitrust promotes allocative efficiency by ensuring that markets are as competitive as they can practicably be, and that firms do not face unreasonable roadblocks to attaining productive efficiency, which refers to both cost minimization and innovation.

The distribution concern that has dominated debates over United States antitrust policy over the last several decades is whether antitrust should adopt a “consumer welfare” principle rather than a more general neoclassical “total welfare” principle. In The Antitrust Paradox Robert …

Robert Bork's Controversial Legacy, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Judge Robert Bork was undeniably one of the towering figures in antitrust history. He advanced the field positively in many respects, articulating a serious critique of excesses of an earlier social-political approach to antitrust. But as one of the conservative movement’s intellectual godfathers he also shares responsibility for many of their own excesses that have transformed our nation in harmful ways. This short essay explores some of the effects of his overall approach to antitrust: his preoccupation with economic efficiency.

The Machinery Of Criminal Justice, Stephanos Bibas

All Faculty Scholarship

Two centuries ago, the American criminal justice was run primarily by laymen. Jury trials passed moral judgment on crimes, vindicated victims and innocent defendants, and denounced the guilty. But over the last two centuries, lawyers have taken over the process, silencing victims and defendants and, in many cases, substituting a plea-bargaining system for the voice of the jury. The public sees little of how this assembly-line justice works, and victims and defendants have largely lost their day in court. As a result, victims rarely hear defendants express remorse and apologize, and defendants rarely receive forgiveness. This lawyerized machinery has purchased …

Tiered Originality And The Dualism Of Copyright Incentives, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

All Faculty Scholarship

Professor Balganesh responds to Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1505 (2009), arguing that their proposal can perhaps be accommodated under current copyright doctrine.

Originality, Gideon Parchomovsky, Alex Stein

All Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay we introduce a model of copyright law that calibrates authors’ rights and liabilities to the level of originality in their works. We advocate this model as a substitute for the extant regime that unjustly and inefficiently grants equal protection to all works satisfying the “modicum of creativity” standard. Under our model, highly original works will receive enhanced protection and their authors will also be sheltered from suits by owners of preexisting works. Conversely, authors of less original works will receive diminished protection and incur greater exposure to copyright liability. We operationalize this proposal by designing separate rules …

Miscalculating Welfare, Michael B. Dorff, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

All Faculty Scholarship

In their quest to maximize efficiency, law and economics scholars often produce novel, creative, and counterintuitive legal rules. Indeed, legal economists have argued for baby selling, against anti-discrimination laws in the workplace, and for insider trading. In this essay, we discuss some concerns about this form of legal scholarship that privileges the creative and counterintuitive over the fair, mundane, and intuitive. Drawing on a range of empirical evidence, this essay argues that the failure to include, and to give sufficient weight to, fairness preferences undermines legal economists' policy recommendations. Specifically, after setting forth three examples of this phenomenon, in the …

The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Chicago School antitrust policy rests on the premise that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote economic efficiency. That foundation is flawed. The fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.

This essay defines the relevant economic concepts, summarizes the legislative histories, and analyzes recent case law. All these factors indicate that the ultimate goal of antitrust is not to increase the total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that deprives them of the benefits of competition and transfers their wealth to firms with market power. When conduct presents a conflict between the welfare …

Of Equal Wrongs And Half Rights, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman, Steven Thel

All Faculty Scholarship

With a tiny handful of exceptions, common law jurisprudence is predicated on a “winner-take-all” principle: the plaintiff either gets the entire entitlement at issue or collects nothing at all. Cases that split an entitlement between the two parties are exceedingly rare. While there may be sound reasons for this all-or-nothing rule, we argue in this Article that the law should prefer equal division of an entitlement in a limited but important set of property, tort and contracts cases. The common element in such cases is a windfall, a gain or loss that occurs despite the fact that no ex ante …

Communicating Entitlements: Property And The Internet, William Hubbard

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Legalizing Merger To Monopoly And Higher Prices: The Canadian Competition Tribunal Gets It Wrong, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Stephen F. Ross

All Faculty Scholarship

This article analyzes the Canadian Superior Propane decision, apparently the first merger decision in world history to consider explicitly what to do when a merger was predicted to lead to both higher consumer prices and to net efficiencies. The article advocates analyzing the merger under a "price to consumers" or "consumer welfare" standard, rather than a total efficiency standard, and advocates that the enforcers and the courts block such mergers.

Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory Of Antitrust And Consumer Protection Law, Neil W. Averitt, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article is about the relationship between antitrust and consumer protection law. Its purpose is to define each area of law, to delineate the boundary between them, to show how they interact with each other, and to show how they ultimately support one another as the two component parts of an overarching unity: effective consumer choice (also called consumer sovereignty).

Consumer choice only is effective when two fundamental conditions are present. There must be a range of consumer options made possible through competition, and consumers must be able to choose effectively among these options. The antitrust laws are intended to …

Black And White Thinking In The Gray Areas Of Antitrust: The Dismantling Of Vertical Restraints Regulation, Barbara Ann White

All Faculty Scholarship

In this Article I present a two-pronged analysis of vertical restraints, one in law and one in economics. By tracing the checkered legal history of vertical restraints, I show the marked changes recent antitrust decisions have wrought, in particular, by comparing the legal standards expressed by the Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. with those in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp and Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO) v. USA Petroleum Co. If through the latter two cases the Court has, for all practical purposes, created a category of per se legality for vertical price restraints, which …

The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law And Economics Meet The Real World, Michael I. Meyerson

All Faculty Scholarship

"Law and economics" has been hailed by its supporters as the only intellectually valid means for analyzing legal issues. Its critics have dismissed law and economics as amoral and biased against the poor. Ironically, each side in this frequently acrimonious debate has much to offer those in the opposing camp. This Article reflects a modest attempt to bridge the chasm.

One need not believe that money is everything in order to believe that the effect a given legal rule has on total societal wealth is relevant in decisionmaking. But this admission does not consign one to a legal world where …

Afterword: Could A Merger Lead To Both A Monopoly And A Lower Price?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande, Walter Vandaele

All Faculty Scholarship

This article demonstrates that significant net efficiencies from a merger could cause prices to decrease, even if the merger results in a monopoly. The article also shows that a price focus would require substantially more efficiencies to justify an otherwise anticompetitive merger than would an efficiency focus (in other words, it re-does the Williamsonian merger tradeoff, using price to consumers instead of net efficiencies as its focus). We demonstrate this by calculating how large the necessary efficiency gains would have to be to prevent price increases under different market conditions.

Efficiency Considerations In Merger Enforcement, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This is one of the first articles to demonstrate that the primary goal of antitrust is neither exclusively to enhance economic efficiency, nor to address any social or political factor. Rather, the overriding intent behind the merger laws was to prevent prices to purchasers from rising due to mergers (a wealth transfer concern). This is the first article to show how to analyze mergers with this goal in mind. Doing so challenges the fundamental underpinnings of Williamsonian merger analysis (which assumes mergers should be evaluated only in terms of net efficiency effects).

In this and three related articles we re-do …