Law Commons^™

#Believewomen And The Presumption Of Innocence: Clarifying The Questions For Law And Life, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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The presumption of innocence and #BelieveWomen both embody compelling considerations, and we may wonder how to reconcile them. My project does not aim to reconcile the positions, but rather, it is prior to it. My goal in this paper is to better explicate the claims that underlie both #BelieveWomen and the presumption of innocence in law and life, as well as to identify instances in which cross-pollination, between our everyday evaluations and the legal system, is contaminating our thinking.

First, I begin with #BelieveWomen and sort through various ways to interpret this demand (though my survey is not exhaustive). I …

Criminal Law And Common Sense: An Essay On The Perils And Promise Of Neuroscience, Stephen J. Morse

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This article is based on the author’s Barrock Lecture in Criminal Law presented at the Marquette University Law School. The central thesis is that the folk psychology that underpins criminal responsibility is correct and that our commonsense understanding of agency and responsibility and the legitimacy of criminal justice generally are not imperiled by contemporary discoveries in the various sciences, including neuroscience and genetics. These sciences will not revolutionize criminal law, at least not anytime soon, and at most they may make modest contributions to legal doctrine, practice, and policy. Until there are conceptual or scientific breakthroughs, this is my story …

Some Skepticism About Skepticism: A Comment On Katz, Mitchell N. Berman

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Several different, if related, questions are swirling about in this fascinating and wide‐ranging symposium. One question asks whether “law” is “autonomous.” A second inquires into the “determinacy” of “legal doctrine.” Yet a third concerns whether there are ever legally correct answers to legal questions. I take this third question to be equivalent to asking whether legal propositions are truth‐apt and, if so, whether any are true.

If I read him correctly, this third question is the focus of Professor Leo Katz's characteristically inventive and thought‐provoking contribution, Nine Takes on Indeterminacy, with Special Emphasis on the Criminal Law. What Professor Katz …

Neuroscience, Free Will, And Criminal Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse

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This chapter argues that the folk-psychological model of the person and responsibility is not challenged by determinism in general or by neurodeterminism in particular. Until science conclusively demonstrates that human beings cannot be guided by reasons and that mental states play no role in explaining behavior, the folk-psychological model of responsibility is justified. This chapter discusses the motivations to turn to science to solve the hard normative problems the law addresses, as well as the law's psychology and its concepts of the person and responsibility. Then it considers the general relation of neuroscience to law, which I characterize as the …

The Problem With Consenting To Insider Trading, Leo Katz

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No abstract provided.

Plotting Premeditation's Demise, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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Theorists have consistently critiqued premeditation as being both over and under inclusive in capturing the worst killers. It is over inclusive because it covers a mercy killer, who emotionally deliberates about putting a loved one out of his misery. It is under inclusive because it does not include hot blooded, angry attacks that reveal deep indifference to the value of human life.

This symposium contribution argues that the problem is that premeditation can only partially capture the most culpable choices. Culpability is complex. Culpability assessments include the analysis of risks imposed; the reasons why they were imposed; the defendant’s thoughts …

The Unsolved Mysteries Of Causation And Responsibility, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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This article is part of a symposium on Michael Moore's Causation and Responsibility. In Causation and Responsibility, Moore adopts a scalar approach to factual causation, with counterfactual dependency serving as an independent desert basis. Moore’s theory of causation does not include proximate causation. The problem with Moore's argument is that the problems with which proximate causation dealt - how and when to limit cause in fact - remain unresolved. In this paper, I focus on two sets of problems. The first set is the “fit” or categorization problems within the criminal law. I focus on three matches: (1) the fit …

Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray

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How central should hedonic adaptation be to the establishment of sentencing policy?

In earlier work, Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur (BBM) drew some normative significance from the psychological studies of adaptability for punishment policy. In particular, they argued that retributivists and utilitarians alike are obliged on pain of inconsistency to take account of the fact that most prisoners, most of the time, adapt to imprisonment in fairly short order, and therefore suffer much less than most of us would expect. They also argued that ex-prisoners don't adapt well upon re-entry to society and that social planners should consider their post-release …

Self-Defense And The State, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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This article is a contribution to a symposium honoring Sandy Kadish. This article seeks to explore whether and to what extent our understanding of self-defense depends upon a citizen's relationship with the state. Part II begins by setting forth Professor Kadish's claim that self-defense is "a right to resist aggression" that is held by a citizen against the state. After contending that such an account is insufficient to justify self-defense, the remainder of the article seeks to explore the relationship between the state and self-defense. Part III argues that self-defense is a pre-political moral right, as opposed to a political …

Beyond Intention, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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The conventional view is that a result is intended if it is motivationally significant - i.e., if it is why the person acted. However, inseparable effects cases place pressure on this conventional view for we intuitively reject the claim that, for instance, one can intend to decapitate without intending to kill. These cases therefore threaten an important border in both law and morality - the distinction between what we intend and what we foresee. In resolving the problem of inseparable effects, this article challenges the conventional view that intentions are co-extensive with motivational significance. Drawing on philosophy of mind literature, …

Holistic Culpability, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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There are two competing conceptions of mens rea. The first conception is descriptive. We look to a person's mental state to determine if the mental state element is satisfied. This is a question of fact. Alternatively, there is the normative conception of mens rea. This is the question of whether the defendant is blameworthy. The term, mens rea, or "culpability," can therefore refer to the descriptive usage (did the defendant have the requisite mental state, i.e, purpose or knowledge?) or to the normative usage (is the defendant blameworthy, wicked, indifferent?). The tension between descriptive and normative terminology was first identified …

Murder After The Merger: A Commentary On Finkelstein, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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Critics have long sought the abolition of the felony murder rule, arguing that it is a form of strict liability. Despite widespread criticism, the rule remains firmly entrenched in many states' criminal statutes. In "Merger and Felony Murder," Professor Claire Finkelstein reconciles herself to the current state of affairs, and seeks to make "an incremental improvement" to the doctrine. She offers a new test for felony murder's merger limitation, which she believes will make merger less "mysterious" and its application "substantially clearer." Briefly put, Finkelstein claims that to understand merger, we must recognize that it is an analytically necessary part …

A Reckless Response To Rape: A Reply To Ayres And Baker, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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In a recent article in the University of Chicago Law Review, Professors Ian Ayres and Katharine Baker propose the crime of "reckless sexual conduct," criminalizing unprotected first-encounter sexual intercourse. The goals of this proposal are to combat the epidemic of sexually transmitted diseases by requiring condom use and to reduce acquaintance rape by "forcing" communication. While the goals are admirable, the proposal is deeply flawed. As public health legislation, it is overinclusive, thereby punishing the morally innocent, and its conception of consent as an affirmative defense fundamentally misunderstands criminal responsibility. As rape reform, which is arguably the true aim of …

Defending Imminence: From Battered Women To Iraq, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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The war against Iraq and nonconfrontational killings by battered women are two recent examples of a more general theoretical problem. The underlying question is when may a defender act in self-defense. While some nineteenth century common law cases vested the rights in the defender, arguing that it was unfair to force her to live in fear, contemporary domestic and international law cast the balance decidedly on the side of the aggressor, by forcing the defender to wait until the aggressor's attack is imminent. The Bush Administration and the battered woman simply ask whether the pendulum swung too far in the …

Before And After: Temporal Anomalies In Legal Doctrine, Leo Katz

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Legal doctrine exhibits some striking temporal anomalies, previously not much adverted to. Wrongdoing looked at before it has occurred, and after is has occurred, is apt to look very different. I take up the two key components of wrongdoing seriatim, the harm-portion and the misconduct-portion: the "damage" part and the "liability" part. We tend to look at harm in a harm-agnifying way before it has occurred, and in a harm-inimizing way afterwards. We thus tend to think about negligence and the harm it wreaks in seemingly inconsistent ways. I examine and reject some possible explanations of this. Misconduct too looks …

Don't Abandon The Model Penal Code Yet! Thinking Through Simons's Rethinking, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

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No abstract provided.

Justice, Liability, And Blame: Community Views And The Criminal Law, Paul H. Robinson, John M. Darley

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This book reports empirical studies on 18 different areas of substantive criminal law in which the study results showing ordinary people’s judgments of justice are compared to the governing legal doctrine to highlight points of agreement and disagreement. The book also identifies trends and patterns in agreement and disagreement and discusses the implications for the formulation of criminal law. The chapters include:

Chapter 1. Community Views and the Criminal Law (Introduction; An Overview; Why Community Views Should Matter; Research Methods)

Chapter 2. Doctrines of Criminalization: What Conduct Should Be Criminal? (Objective Requirements of Attempt (Study 1); Creating a Criminal Risk …