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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Internet Is The New Public Forum: Why Riley V. California Supports Net Neutrality, Adam Lamparello Oct 2014

The Internet Is The New Public Forum: Why Riley V. California Supports Net Neutrality, Adam Lamparello

Adam Lamparello

Technology has ushered civil liberties into the virtual world, and the law must adapt by providing legal protections to individuals who speak, assemble, and associate in that world. The original purposes of the First Amendment, which from time immemorial have protected civil liberties and preserved the free, open, and robust exchange of information, support net neutrality. After all, laws or practices that violate cherished freedoms in the physical world also violate those freedoms in the virtual world. The battle over net neutrality is “is absolutely the First Amendment issue of our time,” just as warrantless searches of cell phones were …


How To Create American Manufacturing Jobs, John D. Gleissner Esquire Jul 2013

How To Create American Manufacturing Jobs, John D. Gleissner Esquire

John D Gleissner Esquire

No abstract provided.


Costs Of Codification, Dru Stevenson Feb 2013

Costs Of Codification, Dru Stevenson

Dru Stevenson

Between the Civil War and World War II, every state and the federal government shifted toward codified versions of their statutes. Academia has so far ignored the systemic effects of this dramatic change. For example, the consensus view in the academic literature about rules and standards has been that precise rules present higher enactment costs for legislatures than would general standards, while vague standards present higher information costs for courts and citizens than do rules. Systematic codification – featuring hierarchical format and numbering, topical arrangement, and cross-references – inverts this relationship, lowering transaction costs for legislatures and increasing information costs …


Reducing The Drug War's Damage To Government Budgets, David B. Kopel, Trevor Burrus Jan 2012

Reducing The Drug War's Damage To Government Budgets, David B. Kopel, Trevor Burrus

David B Kopel

This Article examines ways that governments can mitigate the economic damage caused by the drug war. Part I details four specific legal reforms enacted in Colorado, which aim to reduce the problems of over-criminalization: Requiring a fiscal note for the creation of new statutory crimes; reducing drug possession from a felony to a misdemeanor; narrowing the scope of 'three strikes' laws, and; adjusting old sentences in light of new laws.

Part II explores the fiscal benefits of ending prohibition, such as reduced law enforcement costs and substantially increased tax revenues.

Part III analyzes the conflict between congressionally-imposed prohibition, and state …


Economics Of Plea Bargaining, Richard Adelstein Dec 2006

Economics Of Plea Bargaining, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A short summary of earlier work for a sociological audience.


Toward A Comparative Economics Of Plea Bargaining (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein Dec 2000

Toward A Comparative Economics Of Plea Bargaining (With Thomas Miceli), Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A comparison of adversarial and inquisitorial approaches to criminal adjudication and its implications for plea bargaining.


Victims As Cost Bearers, Richard Adelstein Dec 1998

Victims As Cost Bearers, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A brief recasting of the price exaction model.


Four Entries, Richard Adelstein Dec 1997

Four Entries, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

Four entries: "American Institutional Economics and the Legal System" (I: 61-66); "John Rogers Commons" (I: 324-327); Richard Theodore Ely" (II: 28-29); and "Plea Bargaining: A Comparative Approach"


The Plea Bargain In England And America: A Comparative Institutional Approach, Richard Adelstein Dec 1980

The Plea Bargain In England And America: A Comparative Institutional Approach, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A comparative view of adjudication by guilty plea in the US and the UK.


Institutional Function And Evolution In The Criminal Process, Richard Adelstein Dec 1980

Institutional Function And Evolution In The Criminal Process, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

An extended development of the foundations of the price exaction model of the criminal process.


The Moral Costs Of Crime: Prices, Information And Organization, Richard Adelstein Dec 1978

The Moral Costs Of Crime: Prices, Information And Organization, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

More on price exaction, and punishments as conveyors of cost information in the criminal process.


Informational Paradox And The Pricing Of Crime: Capital Sentencing Standards In Economic Perspective, Richard Adelstein Dec 1978

Informational Paradox And The Pricing Of Crime: Capital Sentencing Standards In Economic Perspective, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

A further development of the price exaction model and an application to the problem of sentencing standards.


The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework For Analysis, Richard Adelstein Dec 1977

The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework For Analysis, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

An early exposition of the price exaction framework and the place of plea bargaining in it.


The Plea Bargain In Theory Dec 1977

The Plea Bargain In Theory

Richard Adelstein

A formal dynamic model of plea bargains.


The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework For Analysis, Richard Adelstein Dec 1974

The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework For Analysis, Richard Adelstein

Richard Adelstein

My dissertation of 1975, published by Garland Publishing in their series Outstanding Dissertations in Economics, 1984