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The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Grove
The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Grove
Tara L. Grove
Scholars have long viewed the Exceptions Clause of Article III as a serious threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional function: establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. In this Article, I argue that the Clause has been fundamentally misunderstood. The Exceptions Clause, as employed by Congress, serves primarily to facilitate, not to undermine, the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. Drawing on recent social science research, I assert that Congress has a strong incentive to use its control over federal jurisdiction to promote the Court’s role in settling disputed federal questions. Notably, this argument has considerable historical support. When the …
The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Grove
The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Grove
Tara L. Grove
Scholars have long viewed the Exceptions Clause of Article III as a serious threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional function: establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. In this Article, I argue that the Clause has been fundamentally misunderstood. The Exceptions Clause, as employed by Congress, serves primarily to facilitate, not to undermine, the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. Drawing on recent social science research, I assert that Congress has a strong incentive to use its control over federal jurisdiction to promote the Court’s role in settling disputed federal questions. Notably, this argument has considerable historical support. When the …
The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Grove
The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Grove
Tara L. Grove
Scholars have long viewed the Exceptions Clause of Article III as a serious threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional function: establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. In this Article, I argue that the Clause has been fundamentally misunderstood. The Exceptions Clause, as employed by Congress, serves primarily to facilitate, not to undermine, the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. Drawing on recent social science research, I assert that Congress has a strong incentive to use its control over federal jurisdiction to promote the Court’s role in settling disputed federal questions. Notably, this argument has considerable historical support. When the …
The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Grove
The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Grove
Tara L. Grove
Scholars have long viewed the Exceptions Clause of Article III as a serious threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional function: establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. In this Article, I argue that the Clause has been fundamentally misunderstood. The Exceptions Clause, as employed by Congress, serves primarily to facilitate, not to undermine, the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. Drawing on recent social science research, I assert that Congress has a strong incentive to use its control over federal jurisdiction to promote the Court’s role in settling disputed federal questions. Notably, this argument has considerable historical support. When the …
The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Grove
The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Grove
Tara L. Grove
Scholars have long viewed the Exceptions Clause of Article III as a serious threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional function: establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. In this Article, I argue that the Clause has been fundamentally misunderstood. The Exceptions Clause, as employed by Congress, serves primarily to facilitate, not to undermine, the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. Drawing on recent social science research, I assert that Congress has a strong incentive to use its control over federal jurisdiction to promote the Court’s role in settling disputed federal questions. Notably, this argument has considerable historical support. When the …
The Article Ii Safeguards Of Federal Jurisdiction, Tara L. Grove
The Article Ii Safeguards Of Federal Jurisdiction, Tara L. Grove
Tara L. Grove
Jurisdiction stripping has long been treated as a battle between Congress and the federal judiciary. Scholars have thus overlooked the important (and surprising) role that the executive branch has played in these jurisdictional struggles. I seek to fill that void. Drawing on two strands of social science research, I argue that the executive branch has a strong incentive to use its constitutional authority over the enactment and enforcement of federal law to oppose jurisdiction-stripping measures. Notably, this structural argument has considerable historical support. The executive branch has repeatedly opposed jurisdiction-stripping proposals in Congress. That has been true even when the …
The Article Ii Safeguards Of Federal Jurisdiction, Tara L. Grove
The Article Ii Safeguards Of Federal Jurisdiction, Tara L. Grove
Tara L. Grove
Jurisdiction stripping has long been treated as a battle between Congress and the federal judiciary. Scholars have thus overlooked the important (and surprising) role that the executive branch has played in these jurisdictional struggles. I seek to fill that void. Drawing on two strands of social science research, I argue that the executive branch has a strong incentive to use its constitutional authority over the enactment and enforcement of federal law to oppose jurisdiction-stripping measures. Notably, this structural argument has considerable historical support. The executive branch has repeatedly opposed jurisdiction-stripping proposals in Congress. That has been true even when the …
The Structural Safeguards Of Federal Jurisdiction, Tara L. Grove
The Structural Safeguards Of Federal Jurisdiction, Tara L. Grove
Tara L. Grove
Scholars have long debated Congress’s power to curb federal jurisdiction and have consistently assumed that the constitutional limits on Congress’s authority (if any) must be judicially enforceable and found in the text and structure of Article III. In this Article, I challenge that fundamental assumption. I argue that the primary constitutional protection for the federal judiciary lies instead in the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I. These Article I lawmaking procedures give competing political factions (even political minorities) considerable power to “veto” legislation. Drawing on recent social science and legal scholarship, I argue that political factions are particularly likely …