Law Commons^™

Notes On Borrowing And Convergence, Robert L. Tsai, Nelson Tebbe

Faculty Scholarship

This is a response to Jennifer E. Laurin, "Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence," 111 Colum. L. Rev. 670 (2011), which analyzes the Supreme Court's resort to tort-based concepts to limit the reach of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. We press three points. First, there are differences between a general and specific critique of constitutional borrowing. Second, the idea of convergence as a distinct phenomenon from borrowing has explanatory potential and should be further explored. Third, to the extent convergence occurs, it matters whether concerns of judicial administration or political reconstruction are driving doctrinal changes.

Bad News For Professor Koppelman: The Incidental Unconstitutionality Of The Individual Mandate, Gary S. Lawson, David Kopel

Faculty Scholarship

In "Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform," Professor Andrew Koppelman concludes that the individual mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is constitutionally authorized as a law "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" other aspects of the PPACA. However, the Necessary and Proper Clause rather plainly does not authorize the individual mandate.

The Necessary and Proper Clause incorporates basic norms drawn from eighteenth-century agency law, administrative law, and corporate law. From agency law, the clause embodies the venerable doctrine of principals and incidents: a law enacted under the clause must …

A Short History Of Sex And Citizenship: The Historians' Amicus Brief In Flores-Villar V. United States, Kristin Collins

Faculty Scholarship

The historians’ amicus brief that accompanies this essay was submitted to the Supreme Court in Flores-Villar v. United States, an equal protection challenge to federal statutes that regulate the citizenship status of foreign-born children of American parents. When the parents of such children are unmarried, federal law encumbers the ability of American fathers to secure citizenship for their children, while providing American mothers with a nearly unfettered ability to do the same. The general question before the Court in Flores-Villar – and a question that the Court has addressed in sum and substance on two other occasions during the last …

Optimal Specificity In The Law Of Separation Of Powers: The Numerous Clauses Principle, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In this response to Professor John Manning’s Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, Professor Gary Lawson agrees with Manning’s argument that there is no overarching constitutional principle of “optimal specificity.” Lawson argues, however, that there are other overarching principles that are fairly derivable from the text, such as a principle of “decisional independence.” Moreover, Lawson suggests a bigger potential problem with Manning’s argument: when judges apply functionalist or formalist reasoning to decide cases, they may be engaging in a qualitatively different activity than Manning assumes, and his careful interpretative analysis may therefore be largely beside the point.

Rebel Without A Clause: The Irrelevance Of Article Vi To Constitutional Supremecy, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

With Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 1 Jonathan Mitchell has produced what I think is the most interesting and creative textual defense2 (or at least partial defense) to date of the use of horizontal precedent in federal constitutional cases.3 Mitchell’s careful analysis of the Supremacy Clause is fascinating and instructive, and he does an impeccable job of drawing out the implications of his premise that the Supremacy Clause prescribes only a very limited choice-of-law rule—a rule that does not, by its own terms, specifically elevate the Constitution above federal statutes and treaties. His innovative and intriguing framework yields four distinct …

The Freedom Of Health, Abigail Moncrieff

Faculty Scholarship

What would have happened if the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) really had authorized government “death panels” that would decide whether an elderly patient could get treatment? Leaving aside commerce clause and other constraints particular to Congress, would that kind of direct healthcare rationing be a constitutional exercise of governmental power in the United States? I think not. I argue here that an emergent substantive due process constraint would invalidate such an exercise; direct rationing of that kind would violate a constitutional “freedom of health” that is nascent in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Based on that logic, I argue …