Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Law
Anti-Modalities, David E. Pozen, Adam Samaha
Anti-Modalities, David E. Pozen, Adam Samaha
Faculty Scholarship
Constitutional argument runs on the rails of “modalities.” These are the accepted categories of reasoning used to make claims about the content of supreme law. Some of the modalities, such as ethical and prudential arguments, seem strikingly open ended at first sight. Their contours come into clearer view, however, when we attend to the kinds of claims that are not made by constitutional interpreters – the analytical and rhetorical moves that are familiar in debates over public policy and political morality but are considered out of bounds in debates over constitutional meaning. In this Article, we seek to identify the …
Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins
Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
Members of Congress largely acquiesce to judicial supremacy both on constitutional and statutory interpretation questions. Lawmakers, however, do not formally embrace judicial supremacy; they rarely think about the courts when enacting legislation. This Article explains why this is so, focusing on why lawmakers have both strong incentive to acquiesce to judicial power and little incentive to advance a coherent view of congressional power. In particular, lawmakers are interested in advancing favored policies, winning reelection, and gaining personal power within Congress. Abstract questions of institutional power do not interest lawmakers and judicial defeats are seen as opportunities to find some other …
Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins
Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins
William & Mary Law Review
Members of Congress largely acquiesce to judicial supremacy both on constitutional and statutory interpretation questions. Lawmakers, however, do not formally embrace judicial supremacy; they rarely think about the courts when enacting legislation. This Article explains why this is so, focusing on why lawmakers have both strong incentive to acquiesce to judicial power and little incentive to advance a coherent view of congressional power. In particular, lawmakers are interested in advancing favored policies, winning reelection, and gaining personal power within Congress. Abstract questions of institutional power do not interest lawmakers and judicial defeats are seen as opportunities to find some other …
Judicial Supremacy Revisited: Independent Constitutional Authority In American Constitutional Law And Practice, Mark A. Graber
Judicial Supremacy Revisited: Independent Constitutional Authority In American Constitutional Law And Practice, Mark A. Graber
William & Mary Law Review
The Supreme Court exercises far less constitutional authority in American law and practice than one would gather from reading judicial opinions, presidential speeches, or the standard tomes for and against judicial supremacy. Lower federal court judges, state court justices, federal and state elected officials, persons charged with administering the law, and ordinary citizens often have the final say on particular constitutional controversies or exercise temporary constitutional authority in ways that have more influence on the parties to that controversy than the eventual Supreme Court decision. In many instances, Supreme Court doctrine sanctions or facilitates the exercise of independent constitutional authority …
Keeping Pace: The U.S. Supreme Court And Evolving Technology, Brian Thomas
Keeping Pace: The U.S. Supreme Court And Evolving Technology, Brian Thomas
Politics Summer Fellows
Contemporary mainstream discussions of the Supreme Court are often qualified with the warning that the nine justices are out of touch with everyday American life, especially when it comes to the newest and most popular technologies. For instance, during oral argument for City of Ontario v. Quon, a 2010 case that dealt with sexting on government-issued devices, Chief Justice John Roberts famously asked what the difference was “between email and a pager,” and Justice Antonin Scalia wondered if the “spicy little conversations” held via text message could be printed and distributed. While these comments have garnered a great deal of …
Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow
Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow
Donald J. Kochan
Conflicts created by concurrences and pluralities in court decisions create confusion in law and lower court interpretation. Rule of law values require that individuals be able to identify controlling legal principles. That task is complicated when pluralities and concurrences contribute to the vagueness or uncertainty that leaves us wondering what the controlling rule is or attempting to predict what it will evolve to become. The rule of law is at least handicapped when continuity or confidence or confusion infuse our understanding of the applicable rules. This Article uses the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States to …
The Radical Possibility Of Limited Community-Based Interpretation Of The Constitution, Mark D. Rosen
The Radical Possibility Of Limited Community-Based Interpretation Of The Constitution, Mark D. Rosen
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
Federalism And Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power To "Define And Punish...Offenses Against The Law Of Nations", Beth Stephens
Federalism And Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power To "Define And Punish...Offenses Against The Law Of Nations", Beth Stephens
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Left, The Right, And Certainty In Constitutional Law, Gene R. Nichol
The Left, The Right, And Certainty In Constitutional Law, Gene R. Nichol
William & Mary Law Review
No abstract provided.