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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Consensual Relationships And The Constitution: A Case Of Liberty Denied, Gary E. Elliot
Consensual Relationships And The Constitution: A Case Of Liberty Denied, Gary E. Elliot
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law
On many university and college campuses, there exists an anti-civil-libertarian spirit reminiscent of the McCarthy period. During the 1940s and early 1950s, regents, trustees, academic administrations, and the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), although each for a different reason, persuaded the Academy to repress personal liberty. It is difficult to pinpoint precisely when constitutionally and statutorily protected liberties and rights became secondary to insulating educational institutions from damage suits in their pursuit of a selective social and political agenda.
Beyond The Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation As Litigation, Margo Schlanger
Beyond The Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation As Litigation, Margo Schlanger
Reviews
In 1955, in its second decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court suggested that federal courts might be called upon to engage in long-term oversight of once-segregated schools. Through the 1960s, southern resistance pushed federal district and appellate judges to turn that possibility into a reality. The impact of this saga on litigation practice extended beyond school desegregation, and even beyond the struggle for African-American equality; through implementation of Brown, the nation’s litigants, lawyers, and judges grew accustomed both to issuance of permanent injunctions against state and local public institutions, and to extended court oversight of compliance. …
Customary International Law And Human Rights Treaties Are Law Of The United States, Jordan J. Paust
Customary International Law And Human Rights Treaties Are Law Of The United States, Jordan J. Paust
Michigan Journal of International Law
The Founders clearly expected that the customary law of nations was binding, was supreme law, created (among others) private rights and duties, and would be applicable in United States federal courts. For example, at the time of the formation of the Constitution John Jay had written: "Under the national government… the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense… [and there is] wisdom… in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government...” In 1792, the supremacy of the customary law of nations within the United States was …
Constitutions And Spontaneous Orders: A Response To Professor Mcginnis, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki
Constitutions And Spontaneous Orders: A Response To Professor Mcginnis, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki
Articles
Professor John McGinnis has written a perceptive and provocative comment on our economic analysis of the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation.1 A brief summary of our areas of agreement and disagreement may help set the stage for this response. It appears that Professor McGinnis substantially agrees with the two central propositions of our article. First, he appears to agree with our definition of efficient traditions as those evolving over long periods of time from decentralized processes.2 Second, he explicitly agrees that Justices Scalia and Souter have adopted sub-optimal models of tradition because they rely on sources that lack the …
Finding The Constitution: An Economic Analysis Of Tradition's Role In Constitutional Interpretation, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki
Finding The Constitution: An Economic Analysis Of Tradition's Role In Constitutional Interpretation, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki
Articles
In this Article, Professor Pritchard and Professor Zywicki examine the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation, a topic that has received significant attention in recent years. After outlining the current debate over the use of tradition, the authors discuss the efficiency purposes of constitutionalism--precommitment and the reduction of agency costs--and demonstrate how the use of tradition in constitutional interpretation can serve these purposes. Rejecting both Justice Scalia's majoritarian model, which focuses on legislative sources of tradition, and Justice Souter's common-law model, which focuses on Supreme Court precedent as a source of tradition, the authors propose an alternative model--the "finding model"-- …