Law Commons^™

Claim Preclusion And The Problem Of Fictional Consent, Lindsey Simon

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The doctrine of claim preclusion promotes fairness and finality by preventing parties from raising claims that already were (or could have been) raised in a prior proceeding. This strict consequence can be imposed only when the litigant received minimal due process protections in the initial proceeding, including notice and direct or indirect participation.

Modern litigation has caused a new problem. In some cases, a party may be precluded from ever raising a claim on the grounds of “fictional consent” to a prior court’s decisionmaking authority. Litigation devices have expanded the potential reach of judgments through aggregation and broad jurisdictional grants, …

Publicly Funded Objectors, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

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On paper, class actions run like clockwork. But practice suggests the need for tune-ups: sometimes judges still approve settlements rife with red flags, and professional objectors may be more concerned with shaking down class counsel than with improving class members’ outcomes. The lack of data on the number of opt-outs, objectors, and claims rates fuels debates on both sides, for little is known about how well or poorly class members actually fare. This reveals a ubiquitous problem — information barriers confront judges, objectors, and even reformers. Rule 23’s answer is to empower objectors. At best, objectors are a partial fix. …

The Rico Trend In Class Action Warfare, Briana Lynn Rosenbaum

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Aggregate litigation, including class actions and mass actions, have been under attack for decades. Recent Supreme Court cases have further weakened class actions, and the current Congress is considering numerous aggregate litigation and tort reform efforts. Recently, defendants in aggregate litigation have employed an additional tactic by filing civil RICO cases against plaintiffs’ counsel. In a number of these cases, defendants’ primarily allegation is that plaintiffs’ counsel are fraudulently inflating the value of lawsuits by filing baseless lawsuits as part of aggregate litigation. In some of these cases, the predicate acts consist solely of litigation filings: the filing of complaints …

Calibrating Participation: Reflections On Procedure Versus Procedural Justice, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

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When the same defendant harms many people in similar ways, a plaintiff’s ability to meaningfully participate in litigating her rights is curtailed dramatically. Now it is the rare plaintiff who sues a nationwide (or worldwide) corporation in her home jurisdiction and is able to litigate and resolve her claims there. Although several factors play a role in this phenomenon, including tort reform efforts like the Class Action Fairness Act, one of the most significant factors is Supreme Court jurisprudence over the last ten years in the areas of arbitration, personal jurisdiction, pleading, and class actions. Of course, recent cases aren’t …

Financing Issue Classes: Benefits And Barriers To Third-Party Funding, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

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This essay, written for NYU's symposium on Litigation Funding: The Basics and Beyond, explores the costs and benefits of using third-party financing to fund issue class actions.

Adequately Representing Groups, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

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Adequate representation and preclusion depend on whether the courts treat a litigant as part of a group experiencing an aggregate harm or as a distinct person suffering individual injuries. And though a vast literature about adequate representation exists in the class-action context, it thins dramatically when contemplating other forms of group litigation, such as parens patriae actions and multidistrict litigation. As class actions have gradually fallen into disfavor and attorneys and commentators seek alternative means for resolving group harms, the relative clarity of Rule 23 wanes. How should courts evaluate adequate representation in parens patriae actions and in multidistrict litigation? …

Disaggregating, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

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Commonality is a defining characteristic of mass-tort litigation. But mass-tort claimants typically do not share enough in common to warrant class certification. That is, commonality does not predominate. Yet, without class certification, judges cannot conclude these cases as a unit absent a private settlement.

This paradox prompts two questions. First, what level of commonality justifies aggregating mass torts, shorn of Rule 23’s procedural protections? And, second, should the federal judicial system continue to centralize claims with nominal commonality when judges typically cannot resolve them collectively absent a private settlement? This Article’s title suggests one answer: if minimal commonality continues to …

Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

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Adequate representation in securities class actions is, at best, an afterthought and, at worst, usurped and subsumed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s lead-plaintiff appointment process. Once appointed, the lead plaintiff bears a crushing burden: Congress expects her to monitor the attorney, thwart strike suits, and deter fraud, while judges expect her appointment as the “most adequate plaintiff” to resolve intra-class conflicts and adequate-representation problems. But even if she could be all things to all people, the lead plaintiff has little authority to do much aside from appointing lead counsel. Plus, class members in securities-fraud cases have diverse preferences …

Litigating Groups, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

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Large-scale litigation, such as the Vioxx, Zyprexa, and asbestos cases, breeds conflict. Conflicts arise between attorneys and their clients (agency problems), plaintiffs and other plaintiffs (group problems), and plaintiffs' attorneys and other plaintiffs' attorneys (competition problems). Although these cases cannot be certified as class actions, they still proceed en masse to achieve economies of scale and present a credible threat to defendants. Assuming that coordinating and consolidating large-scale litigation is systemically desirable, this Article explores a new approach to removing the group and agency problems that increase aggregate litigation's costs and undermine its normative goals such as fairness, compensation, and …

A New Way Forward: A Response To Judge Weinstein, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

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This short essay responds to Judge Jack Weinstein's essay, Preliminary Reflections on Administration of Complex Litigations, 2009 Cardozo De Novo 1. In so doing, it also provides a condensed version of my earlier article, Litigating Groups, which analyzes group dynamics within nonclass aggregation. By drawing on the literature of moral and political philosophy as well as social psychology, I contend that, in the face of hard cases, of instability and disunity, plaintiffs who have made promises and assurances to one another can invoke social norms of promise-keeping, social agglomeration, compatibility, and the desire for means-end coherence to achieve consensus, mitigate …

Symposium, Justice And Democracy Forum: The Law And Politics Of Tort Reform, Ann C. Mcginley

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On April 25, 2003, the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (“UNLV”) Center for Democratic Culture (“CDC”) and the William S. Boyd School of Law sponsored a one-day symposium addressing issues of tort reform. In particular, the Forum addressed concerns regarding construction defect litigation and medical malpractice, two areas of current and substantial concern in Nevada. As reflected in the discussion at the Forum, both topics received considerable attention from the Nevada State Legislature during its 2003 Session. Ultimately, the legislature enacted amendments to state statutes governing claims for defective construction. Despite significant lobbying by physicians and insurers, the legislature did …

Should An Arbitration Provision Trump The Class Action? No: Permitting Companies To Skirt Class Actions Through Mandatory Arbitration Would Be Dangerous And Unwise, Jean R. Sternlight

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Companies are deliberately using mandatory arbitration to prevent consumers and employces from joining together in class actions. As Carroll Neesemann has explained, eliminating the class action is a "strong incentive" of those companies that impose the requirement of arbitration on consumers and employees. Mr. Neesemann defends this phenomenon, and his article offers companies and their attorneys some tips on how to effectively use arbitration to insulate themselves from the threat of class actions. By contrast, this essay argues that it is dangerous and unwise to permit companies to use mandatory arbitration to exempt themselves from class action suits.

Contracting Access To The Courts: Myth Or Reality? Bane Or Boon?, Jeffrey W. Stempel

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Many scholars of the dispute resolution system perceive a sea change in attitudes toward adjudication that took place in the mid-1970s. Among the events of the time included the Pound Conference, which put the Chief Justice of the United States and the national judicial establishment on record in favor of at least some refinement, if not restriction, on access to courts. In addition, Chief Justice Burger, the driving force behind the Pound Conference, also used his bully pulpit as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to promote ADR, particularly court-annexed arbitration. The availability of judicial adjuncts such as court-annexed arbitration …