Law Commons^™

Opting Out Of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise Of The Modern Class Action, Myriam Gilles

Michigan Law Review

It is reasonable to expect that courts will demonstrate great solicitude for the recent innovation that I term "collective action waivers" - i.e., contractual provisions contained within arbitration agreements whereby consumers and others waive their rights to participate in any form of collective litigation or class arbitration. The history of mass tort class actions and the hegemonic expansion of pro-arbitration jurisprudence compel this conclusion. And, as the now-dominant economic model of contract law has moved the focus of courts from the value of consent to the value of efficiency, arbitration agreements found in all manner of shrink-wrap, scroll-text and bill-stuffer …

Preventing The Subversion Of Devlin V. Scardelletti, Brian Wolfman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Devlin v. Scardelletti that objecting class members could appeal a federal district court’s approval of a class settlement without first intervening in the litigation. Public interest lawyer Brian Wolfman says the ruling was a victory for both objectors and the integrity of class action procedure: Objectors, he argues, help keep fairness hearings fair.

But a number of courts are now ruling that Devlin only applies to non-opt-out class actions, rather than the much more numerous ones that give class members opt-out rights. In this article, Wolfman details the exact wording of the …

The Risks Of And Reactions To Underdeterrence In Torts, Thomas C. Galligan

ExpressO

The Risks of and Reactions to Underdeterrence in Torts posits that as our nation considers tort reform at both the state and federal levels, it should not be blinded to the fact that, while tort law may, in some cases, overdeter, it also may underdeter, especially in mass tort cases. The piece contends that the traditional (one-on-one) model of tort law may both cause and exacerbate the underdeterrence problems and, consequently, alternative models (class action, augmented awards, and public tort suits) must be considered and analyzed. The piece proceeds to compare and contrast the strengths and weaknesses of each of …

Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch

Articles

When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 ("PSLRA"), the Act's "lead plaintiff' provision was the centerpiece of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the terms of counsel's compensation. Congress's stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was to encourage institutional investors-pension funds, mutual …

Preclusion In Class Action Litigation, Tobias Barrington Wolff

All Faculty Scholarship

"Despite the intense focus that courts and commentators have trained upon class litigation for the last twenty-five years, a central feature of the class-action lawsuit has received no sustained attention: the preclusive effect that a judgment in a class action should have upon the other, non-class claims of absentees. The omission is a serious one. If claim and issue preclusion were to operate in their normal mode when a claim is certified for class treatment, absentees would sometimes face a serious threat of having their high-value individual claims compromised. Such a threat, in turn, can create ex ante conflicts of …

What Counts As Fraud? An Empirical Study Of Motions To Dismiss Under The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Adam C. Pritchard, Hillary A. Sale

Articles

This article presents the findings of a study of the resolution of motions to dismiss securities fraud lawsuits since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995. Our sample consists of decisions on motions to dismiss in securities class actions by district and appellate courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits for cases filed after the passage of the Reform Act to the end of 2002. These circuits are the leading circuits for the filing of securities class actions and are generally recognized as representing two ends of the securities class action spectrum. Post-PSLRA, the Second …