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Articles 1 - 30 of 132
Full-Text Articles in Law
Getting Merger Guidelines Right, Keith N. Hylton
Getting Merger Guidelines Right, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This paper is on the new Merger Guidelines. It makes several arguments. First, that the Guidelines should be understood as existing in a political equilibrium. Second, that the new structural presumption of the Merger Guidelines (HHI = 1,800) is too strict, and that an economically reasonable revision in the structural presumption would have increased rather than decreased the threshold. Whereas the new Guidelines lowers the threshold to HHI 1,800 from HHI 2,500, an economically reasonable revision would have increased the threshold to HHI 3,200. I justify this argument using a bare-bones model of Cournot competition. Third, it seems unlikely, …
When Can An Agreement On Environmental Policies Comply With U.S. Antitrust Laws?, Nathan Mendelsohn
When Can An Agreement On Environmental Policies Comply With U.S. Antitrust Laws?, Nathan Mendelsohn
Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review
No abstract provided.
Federal Enforcers Signal Heightened Scrutiny Of Algorithm Use To Inform Pricing Decisions, Lohr A. Beck, Carley H. Thompson
Federal Enforcers Signal Heightened Scrutiny Of Algorithm Use To Inform Pricing Decisions, Lohr A. Beck, Carley H. Thompson
Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review
No abstract provided.
The Public’S Companies, Andrew K. Jennings
The Public’S Companies, Andrew K. Jennings
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
This Essay uses a series of survey studies to consider how public understandings of public and private companies map into urgent debates over the role of the corporation in American society. Does a social-media company, for example, owe it to its users to follow the free-speech principles embodied in the First Amendment? May corporate managers pursue environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) policies that could reduce short-term or long-term profits? How should companies respond to political pushback against their approaches to free expression or ESG?
The studies’ results are consistent with understandings that both public and private companies have greater public …
The Battle With Big Tech: Analyzing Antitrust Enforcement And Proposed Reforms, Youngjae Lee, Morgan Hagenbuch
The Battle With Big Tech: Analyzing Antitrust Enforcement And Proposed Reforms, Youngjae Lee, Morgan Hagenbuch
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
Stakeholderism Silo Busting, Aneil Kovvali
Stakeholderism Silo Busting, Aneil Kovvali
Articles by Maurer Faculty
The fields of antitrust, bankruptcy, corporate, and securities law are undergoing tumultuous debates. On one side in each field is the dominant view that each field should focus exclusively on a specific constituency—antitrust on consumers, bankruptcy on creditors, corporate law on shareholders, and securities regulation on financial investors. On the other side is a growing insurgency that seeks to broaden the focus to a larger set of stakeholders, including workers, the environment, and political communities. But these conversations have largely proceeded in parallel, with each debate unfolding within the framework and literature of a single field. Studying these debates together …
Inflation, Market Failures, And Algorithms, Rory Van Loo
Inflation, Market Failures, And Algorithms, Rory Van Loo
Faculty Scholarship
Inflation is a problem of tremendous scale. But inflation itself is unlikely to cause the greatest economic harm during inflationary periods. Instead, a more likely source of devastation will be policymakers’ response to inflation. Their main anti-inflation tools, most notably increasing interest rates, increase unemployment and the risk of recessions. This Article argues that there is a better approach. Rather than defaulting to interest rate hikes that harm markets, policy makers should prioritize laws that lower prices while improving markets. For decades, businesses have raised prices by manipulating consumers, exercising monopoly power, and lobbying for laws that block competition. Automated …
Mergers, Antitrust, And The Interplay Of Entrepreneurial Activity And The Investments That Fund It, Gary Dushnitsky, D. Daniel Sokol
Mergers, Antitrust, And The Interplay Of Entrepreneurial Activity And The Investments That Fund It, Gary Dushnitsky, D. Daniel Sokol
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law
This Article addresses the potentially negative implications of proposed antitrust legislation on the entrepreneurial ecosystem in general, with a particular focus on the venture capitalists (VCs) that fund it. First, it offers a review of how antitrust merger law currently works and how proposed legislative changes to antitrust may threaten the innovative Venture Capital (VC)-backed ecosystem that has made the United States the center of global innovation across many different industries. Accompanying this review are some empirical observations. Second, recognizing that the understanding of innovative entrepreneurial activity calls for a deep appreciation of those who back it, the Article also …
Output Effect Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Sinchit Lai
Output Effect Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Sinchit Lai
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
A growing body of literature evaluates the impact of antitrust laws on economic growth. Most of these empirical studies identify a positive impact; however, the existing literature only studies the effect of the existence of antitrust laws, but not their enforcement. To fill this gap in the literature, this Article uses private antitrust case filing numbers to examine the growth effect. Employing U.S. data and, after addressing endogeneity, using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis, I identify a negative and robust association between private enforcement and output on a national level in the short run over the period from …
Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Are large digital platforms that deal directly with consumers “winner take all,” or natural monopoly, firms? That question is surprisingly complex and does not produce the same answer for every platform. The closer one looks at digital platforms the less they seem to be winner-take-all. As a result, competition can be made to work in most of them. Further, antitrust enforcement, with its accommodation of firm variety, is generally superior to any form of statutory regulation that generalizes over large numbers.
Assuming that an antitrust violation is found, what should be the remedy? Breaking up large firms subject to extensive …
The Case For Preemptive Oligopoly Regulation, Jeffrey D. Manns
The Case For Preemptive Oligopoly Regulation, Jeffrey D. Manns
Indiana Law Journal
One of the few things former President Donald Trump and leading Democrats appear to agree on is the need to subject Big Technology (“Big Tech”) firms to antitrust scrutiny. But unsurprisingly they disagree about how to address the problem. Senator Elizabeth Warren and many other leading Democrats have called for breaking up large technology firms, such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook, in a revival of the trust-busting progressive era of the early twentieth century. In contrast, the Trump administration triggered more traditional antitrust monopoly review of potential anticompetitive activities of a number of leading technology firms, which is more likely …
Common Ownership: Do Managers Really Compete Less?, Merritt B. Fox, Manesh S. Patel
Common Ownership: Do Managers Really Compete Less?, Merritt B. Fox, Manesh S. Patel
Faculty Scholarship
This Article addresses an important question in modern antitrust: when large investment funds have holdings across an industry, is competition depressed?
The question of the impact of common ownership on competition has gained much attention as the role of institutional shareholding has grown, with the funds of the three largest management companies holding in aggregate approximately 21% of the shares of a typical S&P 500 firm. It is a source of acute disagreement among scholars and policymakers, with some who believe common ownership does depress competition seeking antitrust law reforms that would significantly constrain how investment funds operate. Neglected in …
Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis
Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
We examine the role of private information on the impact of vertical mergers. A vertical merger can improve the information that is available to an upstream monopolist because, after the merger, the monopolist can observe the cost of its downstream merger partner. In the pre-merger world, because the costs of the downstream firms are private information, the monopolist has incomplete information and cannot implement the monopoly outcome: The expected pre-merger equilibrium price of the downstream product is lower than the monopoly price. After a vertical merger, the equilibrium input price that is charged to the downstream rival can either increase …
In Defense Of Breakups: Administering A “Radical” Remedy, Rory Van Loo
In Defense Of Breakups: Administering A “Radical” Remedy, Rory Van Loo
Faculty Scholarship
Calls for breaking up monopolies—especially Amazon, Facebook, and Google—have largely focused on proving that past acquisitions of companies like Whole Foods, Instagram, and YouTube were anticompetitive. But scholars have paid insufficient attention to another major obstacle that also explains why the government in recent decades has not broken up a single large company. After establishing that an anticompetitive merger or other act has occurred, there is great skepticism of breakups as a remedy. Judges, scholars, and regulators see a breakup as extreme, frequently comparing the remedy to trying to “unscramble eggs.” They doubt the government’s competence in executing such a …
Competitive Harm From Vertical Mergers, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Competitive Harm From Vertical Mergers, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The antitrust enforcement Agencies' 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines introduce a nontechnical application of bargaining theory into the assessment of competitive effects from vertical acquisitions. The economics of such bargaining is complex and can produce skepticism among judges, who might regard its mathematics as overly technical, its game theory as excessively theoretical or speculative, or its assumptions as unrealistic.
However, we have been there before. The introduction of concentration indexes, particularly the HHI, in the Merger Guidelines was initially met with skepticism but gradually they were accepted as judges became more comfortable with them. The same thing very largely happened again …
Antitrust Changeup: How A Single Antitrust Reform Could Be A Home Run For Minor League Baseball Players, Jeremy Ulm
Antitrust Changeup: How A Single Antitrust Reform Could Be A Home Run For Minor League Baseball Players, Jeremy Ulm
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act to protect competition in the marketplace. Federal antitrust law has developed to prevent businesses from exerting unfair power on their employees and customers. Specifically, the Sherman Act prevents competitors from reaching unreasonable agreements amongst themselves and from monopolizing markets. However, not all industries have these protections.
Historically, federal antitrust law has not governed the “Business of Baseball.” The Supreme Court had the opportunity to apply antitrust law to baseball in Federal Baseball Club, Incorporated v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs; however, the Court held that the Business of Baseball was not …
Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–April 2020, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley
Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–April 2020, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
We have revised our earlier listing of vertical merger enforcement actions by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission since 1994. This revised listing includes 66 vertical matters beginning in 1994 through April 2020. It includes challenges and certain proposed transactions that were abandoned in the face of Agency concerns. This listing can be treated as an Appendix to Steven C. Salop and Daniel P. Culley, Revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 JOURNAL OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 (2016).
The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms As Public Enforcers, Rory Van Loo
The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms As Public Enforcers, Rory Van Loo
Faculty Scholarship
The world’s largest businesses must routinely police other businesses. By public mandate, Facebook monitors app developers’ privacy safeguards, Citibank audits call centers for deceptive sales practices, and Exxon reviews offshore oil platforms’ environmental standards. Scholars have devoted significant attention to how policy makers deploy other private sector enforcers, such as certification bodies, accountants, lawyers, and other periphery “gatekeepers.” However, the literature has yet to explore the emerging regulatory conscription of large firms at the center of the economy. This Article examines the rise of the enforcer-firm through case studies of the industries that are home to the most valuable companies, …
Asymmetric Stakes In Antitrust Litigation, Erik Hovenkamp, Steven C. Salop
Asymmetric Stakes In Antitrust Litigation, Erik Hovenkamp, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Private antitrust litigation often involves a dominant firm being accused of exclusionary conduct by a smaller rival or entrant. Importantly, the firms in such cases generally have asymmetric stakes: the defendant typically has a much larger financial interest on the line. We explore the broad policy implications of this fact using a novel model of litigation with endogenous effort. Asymmetric stakes lead dominant defendants to invest systematically more resources into litigation, causing the plaintiff's success probability to fall below the efficient level--a distortion that carries over to ex ante settlements. We explain that enhanced damages may reduce the problem, but …
Nascent Competitors, C. Scott Hemphill, Tim Wu
Nascent Competitors, C. Scott Hemphill, Tim Wu
Faculty Scholarship
A nascent competitor is a firm whose prospective innovation represents a serious threat to an incumbent. Protecting such competition is a critical mission for antitrust law, given the outsized role of unproven outsiders as innovators and the uniquely potent threat they often pose to powerful entrenched firms. In this Article, we identify nascent competition as a distinct analytical category and outline a program of antitrust enforcement to protect it. We make the case for enforcement even where the ultimate competitive significance of the target is uncertain, and explain why a contrary view is mistaken as a matter of policy and …
Debunking The Purchaser Welfare Account Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us A Total Welfare Standard And Why We Should Keep It, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
The last several years have seen a vigorous debate among antitrust scholars and practitionersa bout the appropriates tandardf or evaluating the conduct of monopolists under section 2 of the Sherman Act. While most of the debate over possible standards has focused on the empirical question of each standard's economic utility, this Article undertakes a somewhat different task: It examines the normative benchmark that courts have actually chosen when adjudicating section 2 cases. This Article explores three possible benchmarks-producer welfare, purchaser welfare, and total welfare-and concludes that courts have opted for a total welfare normative approach to section 2 since the …
Procompetitive Justifications In Antitrust Law, John M. Newman
Procompetitive Justifications In Antitrust Law, John M. Newman
Indiana Law Journal
The Rule of Reason, which has come to dominate modern antitrust law, allows defendants the opportunity to justify their conduct by demonstrating procompetitive effects. Seizing the opportunity, defendants have begun offering increasingly numerous and creative explanations for their behavior.
But which of these myriad justifications are valid? To leading jurists and scholars, this has remained an “open question,” even an “absolute mystery.” Examination of the relevant case law reveals multiple competing approaches and seemingly irreconcilable opinions. The ongoing lack of clarity in this area is inexcusable: procompetitive-justification analysis is vital to a properly functioning antitrust enterprise.
This Article provides answers …
The Separation Of Platforms And Commerce, Lina M. Khan
The Separation Of Platforms And Commerce, Lina M. Khan
Faculty Scholarship
A handful of digital platforms mediate a growing share of online commerce and communications. By structuring access to markets, these firms function as gatekeepers for billions of dollars in economic activity. One feature dominant digital platforms share is that they have integrated across business lines such that they both operate a platform and market their own goods and services on it. This structure places dominant platforms in direct competition with some of the businesses that depend on them, creating a conflict of interest that platforms can exploit to further entrench their dominance, thwart competition, and stifle innovation.
This Article argues …
Trade Openness And Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton
Trade Openness And Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton
Faculty Scholarship
Openness to international trade and adoption of antitrust laws can both curb anti-competitive behavior. But scholars have long debated the relationship between the two. Some argue that greater trade openness makes antitrust unnecessary, while others contend that antitrust laws are still needed to realize the benefits of trade liberalization. Data limitations have made this debate largely theoretical to date. We study the relationship between trade and antitrust empirically using new data on antitrust laws and enforcement activities. We find that trade openness and stringency of antitrust laws are positively correlated from 1950 to 2010 overall, but the positive correlation disappears …
Revising The Vertical Merger Guidelines (Ftc Hearings), Steven C. Salop
Revising The Vertical Merger Guidelines (Ftc Hearings), Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This slide deck was the author’s presentation at the FTC Hearings on Vertical Mergers (November 1, 2018). The deck sets out a summary of the author’s economic analysis and proposed revisions to the U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines.
Serial Collusion By Multi-Product Firms, Michael J. Meurer, William Kovacic, Robert Marshall
Serial Collusion By Multi-Product Firms, Michael J. Meurer, William Kovacic, Robert Marshall
Faculty Scholarship
We provide empirical evidence that many multi-product firms have each participated in several cartels over the past 50 years. Standard analysis of cartel conduct, as well as enforcement policy, is rooted in the presumption that each cartel in which a given firm participates is a singular activity, independent of other cartel conduct by the firm. We argue that this analysis is deficient in many respects in the face of serial collusion by multi-product firms. We offer policy recommendations to reign in serial collusion, including a mandatory coordinated effects review for any merger involving a serial colluder, regardless of the apparent …
The Mystery Of Section 253(B), Matthew Gagnier
The Mystery Of Section 253(B), Matthew Gagnier
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review
In 2014, Elon Musk, the renowned and socially-minded CEO of Tesla Motors, Inc., posted a blog on Tesla’s website that stated the company would be freeing up many of its patents involved in the creation of the company’s electric cars to any interested party. Yet again, Musk astounded the public by choosing the betterment of society over corporate profits—stirring up a more positive image than any other corporate personality. But there are numerous questions that Musk’s positive PR have drowned out: Where can you access the patents?; How did freeing up the patents get past the other executive officers and …
Horizontal Shareholding And Antitrust Policy, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Horizontal Shareholding And Antitrust Policy, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
“Horizontal shareholding” occurs when one or more equity funds own shares of competitors operating in a concentrated product market. For example, the four largest mutual fund companies might be large shareholders of all the major United States air carriers. A growing body of empirical literature concludes that under these conditions market output in the product market is lower and prices higher than they would otherwise be.
Here we consider how the antitrust laws might be applied to this practice, identifying the issues that courts are likely to encounter and attempting to anticipate litigation problems. We assume that neither the mutual …
The Never-Ending Quest For Clarity Amidst Uncertainty: Hospital M&A And Antitrust Scrutiny, Ross E. Bautista
The Never-Ending Quest For Clarity Amidst Uncertainty: Hospital M&A And Antitrust Scrutiny, Ross E. Bautista
San Diego Law Review
Although critics say hospitals justify mergers in the same way as they did during the M&A boom of the 1990s, these critics frequently link the current wave of mergers with the purpose of becoming more integrated and efficient to achieve the level of cost savings and improved quality that the United States and patients currently require. However, the results from hospital consolidation remain uncertain because of the limited and mixed evidence about its impact on quality of care and price. Part I of this Article discusses the recent surge in hospital M&A activity. Part II brings some clarity by discussing …
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition, which generally refers to a price increase resulting from a reduction in output. However, a merger that threatens competition may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve its product. Attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assumptions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. We tolerate most mergers because of a background, highly generalized belief that most or at least many produce cost …