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Articles 1 - 30 of 35
Full-Text Articles in Law
Chevron And Stare Decisis, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
Chevron And Stare Decisis, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
Scholarly Works
In our contribution to this Chevron on Trial Symposium, we argue that the Supreme Court should not overrule Chevron in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and its companion case Relentless v. Department of Commerce. We based our argument largely on statutory stare decisis. In particular, Chevron deference is a bedrock precedent in administrative law, relied on by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts thousands of times since Chevron was decided in 1984. Congress, federal agencies, and the regulated public have also structured their affairs around the precedent. Conversely, the constitutional arguments against Chevron are unpersuasive, and the debate …
Silent Sentences: The Procedural Tragedy Of The Bureau Of Prisons' Sentence Computation Policy, Max Abramson
Silent Sentences: The Procedural Tragedy Of The Bureau Of Prisons' Sentence Computation Policy, Max Abramson
Georgia Law Review
The Bureau of Prisons has systematically lengthened sentences—at times doubling them—for prisoners subject to federal and state sentences for the same conduct. This phenomenon does not stem from any expressed intent on the part of federal or state judges, defense attorneys, the prosecution, or a plea deal. Instead, it arises through silence at a prisoner’s federal sentencing on a key issue: whether the federal sentence is consecutive to or concurrent with a yet-to-beimposed state sentence.
For those facing both a federal sentence and a yet-to-beimposed state sentence for the same conduct, perhaps no other aspect of sentencing has a greater …
How Chevron Deference Fits Into Article Iii, Kent H. Barnett
How Chevron Deference Fits Into Article Iii, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
U.S. Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch, along with Professor Philip Hamburger, assert that Chevron deference-under which courts defer to reasonable agency statutory interpretations-violates Article III. Chevron does so because, they argue, it either permits agencies, not courts, "to say what the law is" or requires judges to forgo independent judgment by favoring the government's position. If they are correct, Congress could not require courts to accept reasonable agency statutory interpretations under any circumstances. This Article does what these critics, perhaps surprisingly, do not do-situates challenges to Chevron within the broad landscape of the Court's current Article III …
The Gun Subsidy, Christian Turner, Justin Van Orsdol
The Gun Subsidy, Christian Turner, Justin Van Orsdol
Scholarly Works
Despite thousands of gun deaths annually, the United States has failed to reach consensus on any means of addressing the public health crisis that is gun violence. The issue has become politically polarized, constitutionalized, and an object of pessimism and despair. We propose a regulatory system in which gun manufacturers would be strictly liable to a federal fund for deaths caused by their guns, paired with a subsidy that will serve to ensure the availability of guns sufficient to meet the rights the Supreme Court has found in the Second Amendment. While strict liability of this kind can indeed serve …
The Guardian Trustee In Bankruptcy Courts And Beyond, Lindsey Simon
The Guardian Trustee In Bankruptcy Courts And Beyond, Lindsey Simon
Scholarly Works
Litigation systems create dangers of unfairness. Citizens worry, and should worry, about exploitive settlements in aggregate litigation, potential biases in administrative proceedings, and troubling power imbalances in criminal trials. Public confidence in adjudicative processes has eroded to an all-time low. This Article explores the untapped potential of adding independent watchdog entities to address systemic threats to the integrity of government decisionmaking. These entities, which I call “guardian trustees,” do not fit within the traditional framework of our adversary system. Though guardian trustees already operate in bankruptcy proceedings, they have thus far received little attention in scholarly literature. This Article begins …
Chevron Abroad, Kent H. Barnett, Lindsey Vinson
Chevron Abroad, Kent H. Barnett, Lindsey Vinson
Scholarly Works
This Article presents our comparative findings of how courts in five other countries review agency statutory interpretation. These comparisons permit us to understand and participate better in current debates about the increasingly controversial Chevron doctrine in American law, whereby courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes that an agency administers. Those debates concern, among other things, Chevron 's purported inevitability, functioning and normative propriety. Our inquiry into judicial review in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia provides useful and unexpected findings. Chevron, contrary to some scholars' views, is not inevitable because only one of these countries has …
Due Process For Article Iii—Rethinking Murray's Lessee, Kent H. Barnett
Due Process For Article Iii—Rethinking Murray's Lessee, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
The Founders sought to protect federal judges’ impartiality primarily because those judges would review the political branches’ actions. To that end, Article III judges retain their offices during “good behaviour,” and Congress cannot reduce their compensation while they are in office. But Article III has taken a curious turn. Article III generally does not prohibit Article I courts or agencies from deciding “public rights” cases, i.e., when the government is a party and seeking to vindicate its own actions and interpretations under federal law against a private party. In contrast, Article III courts generally must resolve cases that concern “private …
Some Kind Of Hearing Officer, Kent H. Barnett
Some Kind Of Hearing Officer, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
In his prominent 1975 law-review article, “Some Kind of Hearing,” Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly explored how courts (and agencies) should respond when the Due Process Clause required, in the Supreme Court’s exceedingly vague words, “some kind of hearing.” That phrase led to the familiar (if unhelpful) Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, in which courts weigh three factors to determine how much process or formality is due. But the Supreme Court has never applied Mathews to another, often ignored facet of due process—the requirement for impartial adjudicators. As it turns out, Congress and agencies have broad discretion to fashion not …
Towards Optimal Enforcement, Kent H. Barnett
Towards Optimal Enforcement, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
In Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, Professor Michael Sant'Ambrogio argues that a hybrid private/public enforcement model in agency proceedings may provide the best hope of achieving optimal federal law enforcement. In other words, a blunderbuss approach of choosing public enforcement or private enforcement (whether in judicial or agency proceedings) is unlikely to prove ideal. He identifies various tools--such as agencies' role in the review or initiation of proceedings, or the use of class-wide proceedings--that Congress or agencies can use to calibrate agency enforcement to its optimal design. I consider three additional tools that may optimize enforcement goals with hybrid public …
Judge Kavanaugh, Chevron Deference, And The Supreme Court, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker
Judge Kavanaugh, Chevron Deference, And The Supreme Court, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker
Popular Media
How might a new U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh review federal agency statutory interpretations that come before him on the Court?
To find at least a preliminary answer, we can look to his judicial behavior while serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit—and there is plenty of relevant Kavanaugh judicial behavior to observe. Since starting his service on the D.C. Circuit in 2006, Judge Kavanaugh has participated in the disposition of around 2,700 cases and has authored more than 300 opinions. Over a third of those authored opinions involved administrative law.
Non-Alj Adjudicators In Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, And Removal, Kent H. Barnett, Russell Wheeler
Non-Alj Adjudicators In Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, And Removal, Kent H. Barnett, Russell Wheeler
Georgia Law Review
This article republishes—in substantively similar form—our 2018 report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) concerning federal agencies’ adjudicators who are not administrative law judges (ALJs). (We refer to these adjudicators as “non-ALJ Adjudicators” or “non-ALJs.”) As our data indicate, non-ALJs significantly outnumber ALJs. Yet non-ALJs are often overlooked and difficult to discuss as a class because of their disparate titles and characteristics. To obtain more information on non-ALJs, we surveyed agencies on non-ALJs’ hearings and, among other things, the characteristics concerning non-ALJs’ salaries, selection, oversight, and removal. We first present our reported data on these matters, which …
Administrative Law's Political Dynamics, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker
Administrative Law's Political Dynamics, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker
Scholarly Works
Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. commanded courts to uphold federal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes as long as those interpretations are reasonable. This Chevron deference doctrine was based in part on the Court’s desire to temper administrative law’s political dynamics by vesting federal agencies, not courts, with primary authority to make policy judgments about ambiguous laws Congress charged the agencies to administer. Despite this express objective, scholars such as Frank Cross, Emerson Tiller, and Cass Sunstein have empirically documented how politics influence circuit court review of agency statutory …
Between Economic Planning And Market Competition: Institutional Law And Economics In The Us, Laura Phillips Sawyer
Between Economic Planning And Market Competition: Institutional Law And Economics In The Us, Laura Phillips Sawyer
Scholarly Works
In 1926 John Maurice Clark published a seminal text in institutionalist economics, Social Control of Business, surveying the ways in which business was subject to control by a variety of formal and informal constraints. 1 The text rejected mainstream ideas in neoclassical political economy by explaining how individual self-interest and competition could be manipulated not only through legal rules but also by custom, habit, codes of ethics, and morals. Representative of the institutionalist movement, Clark discarded presumptions of an individualistic economy based on market competition. Instead, he posited that long-term public goals of prosperity and equity could be achieved through …
If Established By Law, Then An Administrative Judge Is An Officer, Jennifer L. Cotton
If Established By Law, Then An Administrative Judge Is An Officer, Jennifer L. Cotton
Georgia Law Review
Administrative Judges (AJs) are a large and often overlooked group of federal agency adjudicators. While courts have examined Article II Appointments Clause challenges to Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), courts have yet to encounter a legal challenge to the constitutionality of AJs’ appointment procedures. The constitutionality of any federal government actor’s appointment is dependent upon whether that actor is an “officer” or an “employee” under the Article II Appointments clause. It is apparent that the current “significant authority” test that the Supreme Court has espoused to distinguish between officers and employees is unworkable. This Note endeavors to set forth a bright-line …
Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam Legislation, Randy Beck
Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam Legislation, Randy Beck
Scholarly Works
For hundreds of years prior to ratification of the U.S. Constitution, Anglo-American legislatures used qui tam legislation to enforce legal constraints on government officials. A qui tam statute allows a private informer to collect a statutory fine for illegal conduct, even if the informer lacks the particularized injury normally required for Article III standing. This essay explores whether qui tam regulation should be revived as a means of ensuring executive branch legal accountability."
Chevron Step Two's Domain, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
Chevron Step Two's Domain, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
Scholarly Works
An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or narrowing Chevron deference—a two-step inquiry under which courts defer to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies administer. Much of the debate centers on either Chevron’s domain (i.e., when Chevron should apply at all) or how courts ascertain statutory ambiguity at Chevron’s first step. Largely lost in this debate on constraining agency discretion is the role of Chevron’s second step: whether the agency’s resolution of a statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Drawing on the most comprehensive study of Chevron in the circuit courts, this Essay explores how …
Non-Alj Adjudicators In Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, And Removal, Kent H. Barnett, Russell Wheeler
Non-Alj Adjudicators In Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, And Removal, Kent H. Barnett, Russell Wheeler
Scholarly Works
This article republishes—in substantively similar form—our 2018 report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) concerning federal agencies’ adjudicators who are not administrative law judges (ALJs). (We refer to these adjudicators as “non-ALJ Adjudicators” or “non-ALJs.”) As our data indicate, non-ALJs significantly outnumber ALJs. Yet non-ALJs are often overlooked and difficult to discuss as a class because of their disparate titles and characteristics. To obtain more information on non-ALJs, we surveyed agencies on non-ALJs’ hearings and, among other things, the characteristics concerning non-ALJs’ salaries, selection, oversight, and removal. We first present our reported data on these matters, which …
Chevron In The Circuit Courts: The Codebook Appendix, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
Chevron In The Circuit Courts: The Codebook Appendix, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
Scholarly Works
For our empirical study on the use of Chevron deference in the federal courts of appeals, we utilized the following Codebook. This Codebook draws substantially from the codebook appended to William Eskridge and Lauren Baer's pathbreaking study of administrative law's deference doctrines at the Supreme Court. Our research assistants and we followed the instructions below when coding judicial decisions. To address questions as they arose and to ensure consistent coding, we maintained close contact with each other and our research assistants throughout the project and clarified the Codebook to address additional issues. Further details concerning our methodology (and its limitations) …
Looking More Closely At The Platypus Of Formal Rulemaking, Kent H. Barnett
Looking More Closely At The Platypus Of Formal Rulemaking, Kent H. Barnett
Popular Media
Professor Kent Barnett argues that the oft-criticized formal rulemaking process has virtues in proper settings.
Dictation And Delegation In Securities Regulation, Usha Rodrigues
Dictation And Delegation In Securities Regulation, Usha Rodrigues
Scholarly Works
When Congress undertakes major financial reform, either it dictates the precise contours of the law itself or it delegates the bulk of the rulemaking to an administrative agency. This choice has critical consequences. Making the law self-executing in federal legislation is swift, not subject to administrative tinkering, and less vulnerable than rulemaking to judicial second-guessing. Agency action is, in contrast, deliberate, subject to ongoing bureaucratic fiddling and more vulnerable than statutes to judicial challenge.
This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the extent of congressional delegation in securities law from 1970 to the present day, examining nine pieces of …
Short-Circuiting The New Major Questions Doctrine, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
Short-Circuiting The New Major Questions Doctrine, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
Scholarly Works
In Minor Courts, Major Questions, Michael Coenen and Seth Davis advance perhaps the most provocative proposal to date to address the new major questions doctrine articulated in King v. Burwell. They argue that the Supreme Court alone should identify “major questions” that deprive agencies of interpretive primacy, prohibiting the doctrine’s use in the lower courts. Although we agree that the Court provided little guidance about the doctrine’s scope in King v. Burwell, we are unpersuaded that the solution to this lack of guidance is to limit its doctrinal development to one court that hears fewer than eighty cases per year. …
How The Supreme Court Derailed Formal Rulemaking, Kent H. Barnett
How The Supreme Court Derailed Formal Rulemaking, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
Based on archival research, this Essay explores the untold story of how the Supreme Court in the 1970s largely ended “formal” trial-like rulemaking by federal agencies in two railway cases. In the first, nearly forgotten decision, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., the Court held sua sponte that an agency was not required to use formal rulemaking, despite its significant historical provenance. That unpersuasive decision all but decided the second, better-known decision, United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, the following term. In response to both decisions, agencies abandoned formal rulemaking—one of only four broad categories of agency action—and policymakers …
Chevron In The Circuit Courts, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
Chevron In The Circuit Courts, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
Scholarly Works
This Article presents findings from the most comprehensive empirical study to date on how the federal courts of appeals have applied Chevron deference—the doctrine under which courts defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it administers. Based on 1,558 agency interpretations the circuit courts reviewed from 2003 through 2013 (where they cited Chevron), we found that the circuit courts overall upheld 71% of interpretations and applied Chevron deference 77% of the time. But there was nearly a twenty-five-percentage-point difference in agency-win rates when the circuit courts applied Chevron deference than when they did not. Among …
Shifting The Burden Of Proving Patentability Vel Non In View Of Dickinson V. Zurko, Dawn-Marie Bey
Shifting The Burden Of Proving Patentability Vel Non In View Of Dickinson V. Zurko, Dawn-Marie Bey
Journal of Intellectual Property Law
This paper addresses the Patent Office's misinterpretation of the Supreme Court's ruling in Dickinson v. Zurko regarding the applicability of the factual review standards of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to Patent Office findings. More particularly, in accordance with this misinterpretation, recent guidelines promulgated by the Patent Office violate the APA and controlling precedent.
To date, the proper procedures for prosecuting a patent application have been carefully honed through a myriad of statutes, rules, and controlling legal opinions. The resulting procedures are set forth in exemplary prose in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) issued and revised periodically by …
Against Administrative Judges, Kent H. Barnett
Against Administrative Judges, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
The single largest cadre of federal adjudicators goes largely ignored by scholars, policymakers, courts, and even litigating parties. These Administrative Judges or “AJs,” often confused with well-known federal Administrative Law Judges or “ALJs,” operate by the thousands in numerous federal agencies. Yet unlike ALJs, the significantly more numerous AJs preside over less formal hearings and have no significant statutory protections to preserve their impartiality. The national press has recently called attention to the alleged unfairness of certain ALJ proceedings, and regulated parties have successfully enjoined agencies’ use of ALJs. While fixes are necessary for ALJ adjudication, any solution that ignores …
The Teaching Of International Law, Ian Brownlie
The Teaching Of International Law, Ian Brownlie
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Standing For (And Up To) Separation Of Powers, Kent H. Barnett
Standing For (And Up To) Separation Of Powers, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
The U.S. Constitution requires federal agencies to comply with separation-of-powers (or structural) safeguards, such as by obtaining valid appointments, exercising certain limited powers, and being sufficiently subject to the President’s control. Who can best protect these safeguards? A growing number of scholars call for allowing only the political branches — Congress and the President — to defend them. These scholars would limit or end judicial review because private judicial challenges are aberrant to justiciability doctrine and lead courts to meddle in minor matters that rarely effect regulatory outcomes.
This Article defends the right of private parties to assert justiciable structural …
Why Bias Challenges To Administrative Adjudication Should Succeed, Kent H. Barnett
Why Bias Challenges To Administrative Adjudication Should Succeed, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
How much confidence would you have in a judge whom your opponent hired, can pay bonuses to, and can seek to discipline or remove? I recently argued that numerous administrative adjudicators very likely suffer from an unconstitutional appearance of partiality because the agencies that are often parties in administrative hearings can hire, pay bonuses to, discipline, and remove these adjudicators.
In this Article for the Missouri Law Review’s Symposium on A Future Without the Administrative State?, I contend that challenges to adjudicators’ appearance of partiality are well positioned to be part of the new wave of structural challenges to the …
Codifying Chevmore, Kent H. Barnett
Codifying Chevmore, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
This Article considers the significance and promise of Congress’s unprecedented codification of the well-known Chevron and Skidmore judicial-deference doctrines (to which I refer collectively as “Chevmore”). Congress did so in the Dodd-Frank Act by instructing courts to apply the Skidmore deference factors when reviewing certain agency-preemption decisions and by referring to Chevron throughout.
This codification is meaningful because it informs the delegation theory that undergirds Chevmore (i.e., that Congress intends to delegate interpretive primacy over statutory interpretation to agencies under Chevron or courts under Skidmore). Scholars and at least three Supreme Court Justices have decried the judicial inquiry into congressional …
Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise With Chevmore Codification, Kent H. Barnett
Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise With Chevmore Codification, Kent H. Barnett
Scholarly Works
After nearly thirty years, the judicially crafted Chevron and Skidmore judicial-review doctrines have found new life as exotic, yet familiar, legislative tools. When Chevron deference applies, courts employ two steps: they consider whether the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous, and, if so, they defer to an administering agency’s reasonable interpretation. Skidmore deference, in contrast, is a less deferential regime in which courts assume interpretative primacy over statutory ambiguities but defer to agency action based on four factors — the agency’s thoroughness, reasoning, consistency, and overall persuasiveness. In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress directed courts …