Law Commons^™

Bring On The Chicken And Hot Oil: Reviving The Nondelegation Doctrine For Congressional Delegations To The President, Loren Jacobson

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

The so-called “nondelegation doctrine” posits that Congress may not transfer its legislative power to another branch of government, and yet Congress delegates its authority routinely not only to the President, but to a whole host of other entities it has created and that are located in the executive branch, including executive branch agencies, independent agencies, commissions, and sometimes even private parties. Recognizing that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives,” the Supreme Court of the United States …

Legal Provisions On Shared Use Of Mining Infrastructure: Rail, Port, And Power, Logan Hinderliter, Martin Dietrich Brauch, Perrine Toledano

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

In 2011, CCSI began to research how mining infrastructure can be leveraged for sustainable development and in 2013 created an economic, legal, and operational framework to generate shared-use benefits from rail, ports, power, water, and internet and telecommunications. CCSI has published many works on shared use in the mining sector. Those works, along with other mining-related publications and mining concessions available online, ground the analytical framework of this paper, provide insight on the economic drivers of the mining sector, and detail how legal provisions – including laws, regulations, and contractual terms – can forefront shared use.

This paper is part …

What’S The Deference? Interpreting The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines After Kisor, Liam Murphy

Vanderbilt Law Review

For more than three decades, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines have constrained the punishment doled out by federal judges, limiting discretion that was once nearly unlimited and bringing standardization to the penological decisionmaking process. For twice as long, the Supreme Court has constrained judges in a different way—by requiring that administrative agencies receive deference when they interpret the meaning of their own regulations. At the convergence of these two domains sits “commentary,” or interpretive notes the U.S. Sentencing Commission appends to the otherwise congressionally approved Guidelines. In Stinson v. United States, the Court made clear that commentary should be reviewed and …

Delegating Climate Authorities, Mark P. Nevitt

Faculty Articles

The science is clear: the United States and the world must take dramatic action to address climate change or face irreversible, catastrophic planetary harm. Within the U.S.—the world’s largest historic emitter of greenhouse gas emissions—this will require passing new legislation or turning to existing statutes and authorities to address the climate crisis. Doing so implicates existing and prospective delegations of legislative authority to a large swath of administrative agencies. Yet congressional climate decision-making delegations to any executive branch agency must not dismiss the newly resurgent nondelegation doctrine. Described by some scholars as the “most dangerous idea in American law,” the …

Optimizing Whistleblowing, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Whistleblowers have exposed misconduct in settings ranging from public health to national security. Whistleblowing thus consistently plays a vital role in safeguarding society. But how much whistleblowing is optimal? And how many meritless claims should we tolerate to reach that optimum? Surprisingly, legislators and scholars have overlooked these essential questions, a neglect that has resulted in undertheorized, stab-in-the-dark whistleblower regimes, risking both overdeterrence and underdeterrence.

This Article confronts the question of optimal whistleblowing in the context of financial fraud. Design choices, which play out along two axes, have profound effects on the successful implementation of whistleblowing policy. One axis varies …

Modeling Through, Ryan Calo

Articles

Theorists of justice have long imagined a decision-maker capable of acting wisely in every circumstance. Policymakers seldom live up to this ideal. They face well-understood limits, including an inability to anticipate the societal impacts of state intervention along a range of dimensions and values. Policymakers cannot see around corners or address societal problems at their roots. When it comes to regulation and policy-setting, policymakers are often forced, in the memorable words of political economist Charles Lindblom, to “muddle through” as best they can.

Powerful new affordances, from supercomputing to artificial intelligence, have arisen in the decades since Lindblom’s 1959 article …