Law Commons^™

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: The Case For Putting It To Work, Not To Rest, Bradford Higdon

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Parity As Comparative Capacity: A New Empirics Of The Parity Debate, Meredith R. Aska Mcbride

University of Cincinnati Law Review

In 1977, Burt Neuborne published an article in the Harvard Law Review proclaiming that parity was a “myth”—that state courts could not be trusted to enforce federal constitutional rights. For the next 15 years, the question of parity (the equivalence of state and federal courts in adjudicating federal causes of action) was at the forefront of federal courts scholarship. But in the early 1990s, the parity debate ground to a halt after important commentators proclaimed it an empirical question that, paradoxically, could not be answered by any existing empirical methods. This article argues that proposition was unfounded at the time …

How Chevron Deference Fits Into Article Iii, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

U.S. Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch, along with Professor Philip Hamburger, assert that Chevron deference-under which courts defer to reasonable agency statutory interpretations-violates Article III. Chevron does so because, they argue, it either permits agencies, not courts, "to say what the law is" or requires judges to forgo independent judgment by favoring the government's position. If they are correct, Congress could not require courts to accept reasonable agency statutory interpretations under any circumstances. This Article does what these critics, perhaps surprisingly, do not do-situates challenges to Chevron within the broad landscape of the Court's current Article III …

A Prelude To A Critical Race Perspective On Civil Procedure, Portia Pedro

Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, I examine the lack of scholarly attention given to the role of civil procedure in racial subordination. I posit that a dearth of critical thought interrogating the connections between procedure and the subjugation of marginalized peoples might be due to the limited experiences of procedural scholars; a misconception that procedural rules are a technical, objective, neutral area; and avoidance of discussion of race or other aspects of identity unless there is a case, material, or scholarly topic that meets an unreasonably high standard. I emphasize the importance of a critical race analysis of civil procedure.

Federalism Limits On Non-Article Iii Adjudication, F. Andrew Hessick

Pepperdine Law Review

Although Article III of the Constitution vests the federal judicial power in the Article III courts, the Supreme Court has created a patchwork of exceptions permitting non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate various disputes. In doing so, the Court has focused on the separation of powers, concluding that these non-Article III adjudications do not unduly infringe on the judicial power of the Article III courts. But separation of powers is not the only consideration relevant to the lawfulness of non-Article III adjudication. Article I adjudications also implicate federalism. Permitting Article I tribunals threatens the role of state courts by expanding federal …

The Nature Of Standing, Matthew Hall, Christian Turner

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Most academic studies of standing have focused on restrictions on federal court jurisdiction drawn from Article III of U.S. Constitution and related doctrinal schemes developed by state courts. These rules are constructed atop a few words of the Constitution: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity," arising under various circumstances. The Supreme Court has interpreted these words to require federal courts to assess whether a plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact that is both fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant and redressable by a favorable ruling before proceeding to the merits of …

Beyond Qualified Immunity, Fred O. Smith Jr.

Michigan Law Review Online

I never watched the video. The descriptions themselves have always felt like enough. Traumatizing enough. Invasive enough. George Floyd, father of two, laying on the ground, as an unfazed officer kneeled on his neck for at least eight minutes and forty-six seconds. He pleaded for his life and cried out to his deceased mother until he met his inevitable death. His name should be said for the record before saying almost anything else. The recording of the chilling final minutes of his life is, in all probability, one of the impetuses for this multi-journal Reckoning and Reform Symposium.

The Aoc In The Age Of Covid - Pandemic Preparedness Planning In The Federal Courts, Zoe Niesel

Faculty Articles

The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic created a crisis for American society—and the federal courts were not exempt. Court facilities came to a grinding halt, cases were postponed, and judiciary employees adopted work-from-home practices. Having court operations impacted by a pandemic was not a new phenomenon, but the size, scope, and technological lift of the COVID-19 pandemic was certainly unique.

Against this background, this Article examines the history and future of pandemic preparedness planning in the federal court system and seeks to capture some of the lessons learned from initial federal court transitions to pandemic operations in 2020. The Article begins by …

The Strange Career Of The Three-Judge District Court: Federalism And Civil Rights, 1954-76, Michael E. Solimine

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

The three-judge district court has had a long and strange career in the history of the federal court system. Congress created the court in 1910 as a response to the canonical decision of Ex parte Young two years earlier, which permitted federal court suits against state officials to facilitate constitutional challenges to state laws. The three-judge court statute was a reaction by Progressive Era politicians to such perceived judicial overreach, and required any such challenges to be brought before a specially convened trial court of three judges, with a direct appeal to the Supreme Court available. First established as a …

The Political Reality Of Diversity Jurisdiction, Richard D. Freer

Faculty Articles

Diversity jurisdiction survived concerted frontal assaults made from the mid- to late-twentieth century. It weathered criticism of academics and of some high-profile federal judges. Today, diversity jurisdiction represents a burgeoning percentage of the federal civil docket, and it is supported by an efficiency rationale that did not exist at the founding. Today, academics and judges seem relatively ambivalent toward, and some even accepting of, diversity jurisdiction. Today, we see efforts not to abolish diversity jurisdiction, but to rationalize the various threads of its doctrine.

These efforts should be informed by the lessons that should have been learned by those who …

Lech's Mess With The Tenth Circuit: Why Governmental Entities Are Not Exempt From Paying Just Compensation When They Destroy Property Pursuant To Their Police Powers, Emilio R. Longoria

Faculty Articles

On June 29, 2020, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Lech v. Jackson, a Tenth Circuit inverse condemnation case, which held that governmental entities are categorically exempt from paying just compensation when they destroy private property pursuant to their police powers. This denial of certiorari cements a highly controversial circuit court holding into our takings jurisprudence the effects of which will be serious and far reaching. This article dissects the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Lech and explains how and why this holding should be revisited. If it is not, we risk losing the protection that the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation …

What Happens In State Court Stays In State Court Comity And The Relitigation Exception To The Anti-Injunction Act, Juan Antonio Solis, Rory Ryan

FIU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Missing Decisions, Merritt E. Mcalister

UF Law Faculty Publications

Significant numbers of federal appellate merits terminations—those decisions resolving appeals and other proceedings on the merits—are missing from Westlaw and Lexis, the leading commercial legal databases. Bloomberg Law has similar, and similarly incomplete, coverage. Across most of the circuits huge percentages—at least 25% or more—of the courts’ self-reported merits terminations, which predominately include unpublished adjudications, never make their way to navigable databases.

Although scholars have long considered how publication practices shapes access to court decisions—especially at the district court level—this is the first work to analyze commercial database access to unpublished federal appellate decisions. Since at least 2007, when a …

Advisory Opinions And The Problem Of Legal Authority, Christian R. Burset

Journal Articles

The prohibition against advisory opinions is fundamental to our understanding of federal judicial power, but we’ve misunderstood its origins. Discussions of the doctrine begin not with a constitutional text or even a court case, but a letter in which the Jay Court rejected President Washington’s request for legal advice. Courts and scholars have offered a variety of explanations for the Jay Court’s behavior. But they all depict the earliest Justices as responding to uniquely American concerns about advisory opinions.

This Article offers a different explanation. Drawing on previously untapped archival sources, it shows that judges throughout the anglophone world—not only …

Slapps Across America, Jack Toscano

Touro Law Review

The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in New York Times v. Sullivan was meant to protect our fundamental right to free speech from defamation lawsuits. However, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, known as SLAPPS, continue to chill free speech through weak but expensive to defend defamation lawsuits. In response to SLAPPs many states have passed anti-SLAPP statutes that are meant to identify SLAPPs, quickly dismiss SLAPPS, and punish plaintiffs who bring SLAPPs. A difficult issue for federal courts throughout the country is whether these state anti-SLAPP statutes should apply in federal courts. This Note examines the Supreme Court opinions in Shady …

Federal Courts: Art. Iii(1), Art. I(8), Art. Iv(3)(2), Art. Ii(2)/I(8)(3), And Art. Ii(1) Adjudication, Laura K. Donohue, Jeremy M. Mccabe

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The distinction among the several types of federal courts in the United States has gone almost unremarked in the academic literature. Instead, attention focuses on Article III “constitutional” courts with occasional discussion of how they differ from what are referred to as “non-constitutional” or “legislative” courts. At best, these labels are misleading: all federal courts have a constitutional locus, and most, but not all, federal courts are brought into being via legislation. The binary approach further ignores the full range of federal courts, which are rooted in different constitutional provisions: Art. III(1), Art. I(8); Art. IV(3); Art. II(2)/I(8)(3); and Art. …