Law Commons^™

Antitrust Changeup: How A Single Antitrust Reform Could Be A Home Run For Minor League Baseball Players, Jeremy Ulm

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act to protect competition in the marketplace. Federal antitrust law has developed to prevent businesses from exerting unfair power on their employees and customers. Specifically, the Sherman Act prevents competitors from reaching unreasonable agreements amongst themselves and from monopolizing markets. However, not all industries have these protections.

Historically, federal antitrust law has not governed the “Business of Baseball.” The Supreme Court had the opportunity to apply antitrust law to baseball in Federal Baseball Club, Incorporated v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs; however, the Court held that the Business of Baseball was not …

Behavioral Lessons For Antitrust Enforcement, Avishalom Tor

Faculty Lectures and Presentations

These are lecture slides to accompany a virtual lecture.

Avishalom Tor, professor and director of the Research Program on Law and Market Behavior at Notre Dame Law School, delivered this lecture to lawyers and economists of the Department of Justice’s antitrust division in Washington D.C. and throughout the country in the summer of 2020.

The lecture provides a systematic review of the lessons empirical behavioral findings offer to antitrust law, enforcement, and policy. Professor Tor introduces key findings of behavioral antitrust and explores their implications for doctrine and enforcement across the field, in areas ranging from horizontal restraints, through …

Why It's A Bad Idea To Let A Few Tech Companies Monopolize Our Data, Maurice Stucke

Book Chapters

No abstract provided.

Artificial Stupidity, Clark D. Asay

William & Mary Law Review

Artificial intelligence is everywhere. And yet, the experts tell us, it is not yet actually anywhere. This is because we are yet to achieve artificial general intelligence, or artificially intelligent systems that are capable of thinking for themselves and adapting to their circumstances. Instead, all the AI hype—and it is constant—concerns narrower, weaker forms of artificial intelligence, which are confined to performing specific, narrow tasks. The promise of true artificial general intelligence thus remains elusive. Artificial stupidity reigns supreme.

What is the best set of policies to achieve more general, stronger forms of artificial intelligence? Surprisingly, scholars have paid little …

No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, Marina Lao

William & Mary Law Review

The power of today’s tech giants has prompted calls for changes in antitrust law and policy which, for decades, has been exceedingly permissive in merger enforcement and in constraining dominant firm conduct. Economically, the fear is that the largest digital platforms are so dominant and its data advantage so substantial that competition is foreclosed, resulting in long-term harm to consumers and to the economy. But the concerns extend beyond economics. Critics worry, too, that the large platforms’ tremendous economic power poses risks of social and political harm and threatens our democracy. These concerns have prompted discussions of ways to reinvigorate …

The Defend Trade Secrets Act And Foreign Theft: The Application Of The Act To Extraterritorial Misappropriation, John Dustin Hawkins

Journal of Intellectual Property Law

This Note explores the evolution of federal trade secret law in the United States, particularly the enactment of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016. Part II discusses the legislative history of the Act, as well as key provisions and definitions of the Act, which are critical when considering the DTSA's extraterritorial application. Additionally, this Note considers the tests used by courts to determine extraterritorial application in other areas of U.S. law. Part III explains why a uniformly-applied balancing test would best serve the courts in determining the extraterritorial application of the DTSA to reach foreign conduct.

Movements, Moments, And The Eroding Antitrust Consensus, Michael Wolfe

Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal

Timothy Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (Columbia Global Reports, 2018). $14.99.

Timothy Wu’s book, The Curse of Bigness, offers a brief history on and critical perspective of antitrust law’s development over the last century, calling for a return to a Brandeisian approach to the law. In this review-essay, I use Wu’s text as a starting point to explore antitrust law’s current political moment. Tracing the dynamics at play in this debate and Wu’s role in it, I note areas underexplored in Wu’s text regarding the interplay of antitrust law with other forms of …

The Curse Of Bigness: New Deal Supplement, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

This is a supplement to the book, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age. It covers the years between 1920 - 1945, with a focus on the New Deal, and represents material left out of the original book.

It is meant to be read together with the larger volume, but can also be read separately.

Uber's Efficiencies: A Modest Proposal For Limiting Use Of Antitrust's Per Se Rule, Kathleen Guilfoyle

University of Colorado Law Review

In antitrust law, the per se rule against horizontal price-fixing seems set in stone. Over time, however, antitrust enforcers and courts have declined to use this rule and instead have used the rule of reason. This change stems directly from the recognition that the per se rule's blunt application may end up harming consumers in some contexts. Using Uber as an example of a consumer-friendly, efficiencyenhancing business model, this Comment argues that using the per se rule to analyze horizontal arrangements like Uber's sacrifices consumer welfare. Instead, courts should use the rule of reason and engage in cost-benefit analysis where …