Law Commons^™

"Flaw-Backs:" Executive Compensation Clawbacks And Their Costly Flaw, Connor Douglas Maag

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Saving money should not be expensive. Compensation “clawbacks” are a legal mechanism for companies to reclaim employee compensation, but the legislative framework is complex and disorganized. There are four primary federal claw-back provisions: Sarbanes-Oxley § 304, Dodd-Frank § 954, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(TARP), and Dodd-Frank § 956—as well as voluntary contractual clawback policies. This comment untangles the web of clawback legislation by overlaying each clawback mechanism to extract a single, clear, and concise description of executive compensation clawbacks, called the “Comprehensive Clawback Coverage.” The Comprehensive Clawback Coverage reveals a major flaw in the legal and regulatory framework: clawbacks increase agency …

The Case For Investor Ordering, Scott Hirst

Faculty Scholarship

Whether corporate arrangements should be mandated by public law or “privately ordered” by corporations themselves has been a foundational question in corporate law scholarship. State corporation laws are generally privately ordered. But a significant and growing number of arrangements are governed by “corporate regulations” created by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). SEC corporate regulations are invariably mandatory. Whether they should be is the focus of this Article.

This Article contributes to the ongoing debate by showing that whether mandatory or privately-ordered rules are optimal depends on the nature of investors, and their incentives in choosing corporate arrangements. The …

Proxy Access Voting: Evaluating Proxy Access And The Recent Phenomenon Of Corporations Adopting Shareholder Protective Policies, Danielle Vukovich

San Diego International Law Journal

Shareholders hold a financial stake in a corporation, and therefore are often viewed as owners of the corporation and believed to be in control for all corporate actions. However, their powers are circumscribed. Board of directors committees nominate directors to serve the corporation and these directors have the power to select the corporation’s officers. The committees provide shareholders a slate of proposed directors that are voted on and approved at the annual shareholder meeting. Shareholders may also propose their own slate of directors, but this typically requires a proxy contest, which can be expensive due to the costs both associated …

Financial Regulation In The Bitcoin Era, William Magnuson

Faculty Scholarship

The recent decade has witnessed an extraordinary degree of innovation in the financial sector. Developments in financial technology, computing power, and networking theory have allowed decentralized online platforms such as Bitcoin to fundamentally change the way that financial services are provided. While these innovations have been applauded by many as bringing a welcome degree of competition to a sector long dominated by powerful incumbents, they also create a set of challenges for current financial regulation. How do fiduciary standards apply to algorithms? How does online finance affect the behavior of investors? And more generally, how can regulators monitor and constrain …

The Cambridge Handbook Of Social Enterprise Law, Lloyd Histoshi Mayer, Paul B. Miller

Books

Book Chapters

Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Creating a Tax Space for Social Enterprise, in The Cambridge Handbook of Social Enterprise Law 157 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018)

While still relatively few in number compared to traditional nonprofit and for-profit organizations, the rise of social enterprises represents a possible disruption of not only existing models of doing business but also areas of law that in many respects have seen little fundamental change for decades. One such area is domestic tax law, where social enterprises currently find themselves subject to the rules of for-profit activities and entities. Here, both scholars …

Tax Havens As Producers Of Corporate Law, William J. Moon

Faculty Scholarship

This Review Essay situates Christopher Bruner’s new book, Re-imagining Offshore Finance, within the literature examining the regulation of cross-border finance and highlights its import for thinking about the complicated (and contested) relationship between territorially-configured domestic laws and the increasingly liberal movement of capital. Part I sets out the book’s central thesis. In addition to highlighting Bruner’s novel framework identifying the factors that propel certain small jurisdictions into becoming magnets for cross-border finance, I outline the limits of the framework in accounting for the stability in the overall demand for the commercialization of sovereignty, only one of which is facilitating …

The Law Of Social Entrepreneurship – Creating Shared Value Through The Lens Of Sandra Day O’Connor’S Icivics, Anat Alon-Beck

Faculty Publications

This article calls for harmonizing state law legislation on social enterprises, due to the potential discrepancy between the various states on the nature and legal structure of social enterprises. Since 2008, legislators in thirty-five (35) states across the United States of America and the District of Columbia, have enacted some form of innovative social enterprise legislation. This new revolution in corporate law is called social entrepreneurship, mirroring social movements in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Public opinion has led to a shift in prevalent corporate governance theory, from current share-holder centric corporate governance to collaborative corporate governance. A …

From Corporate Law To Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

In the 1960s and 1970s, corporate law and finance scholars gave up on their traditional approaches. Corporate law had become “towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.” In finance, the theory of the firm was recognized as an “empty box.” This essay tracks how corporate law was reborn as corporate governance through three examples of how we have usefully complicated the inquiry into corporate behavior. Part I frames the first complication, defining governance broadly as the company’s operating system, a braided framework of legal and non-legal elements. Part II adds a second complication by …