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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Transatlantic Perspective On Judicial Deference In Administrative Law, Maciej Bernatt
Transatlantic Perspective On Judicial Deference In Administrative Law, Maciej Bernatt
Maciej Bernatt
The U.S. concept of judicial deference in administrative law limits the scope of judicial review of administrative agencies’ actions in the light of agencies’ superior expertise and separation of powers arguments. It may serve as an interesting point of reference for the European discussion about adequate institutional balance between administration and courts. The paper analyzes whether there are grounds for the validity of the concept of judicial deference in Continental Europe and in what areas (law, facts or both). As a starting point it is observed that it remains generally accepted in Europe that it is a role of courts …
Superstatute Theory And Administrative Common Law, Kathryn E. Kovacs
Superstatute Theory And Administrative Common Law, Kathryn E. Kovacs
Indiana Law Journal
This Article employs William Eskridge and John Ferejohn’s theory of superstatutes as a tool to argue that administrative common law that contradicts or ignores the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is illegitimate. Eskridge and Ferejohn conceive of statutes that emerge from a lengthy, public debate and take on great normative weight over time as “superstatutes.” Superstatute theory highlights the deficiency in deliberation about the meaning of the APA. The APA bears all the hallmarks of a superstatute. Unlike the typical federal superstatute, however, the APA is not administered by a single agency. Thus, to respect and encourage the civic-republican style of …
Adjudication Under The Bankruptcy Amendments Of 1984: An Examination Of Congressional Response To The Northern Pipeline Decision, John M. Evans
Adjudication Under The Bankruptcy Amendments Of 1984: An Examination Of Congressional Response To The Northern Pipeline Decision, John M. Evans
John Evans
No abstract provided.
The Case For Categorical Nonenforcement, Leigh Osofsky
Quitting In Protest: A Theory Of Presidential Policy Making And Agency Response, Charles M. Cameron, John M. De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Quitting In Protest: A Theory Of Presidential Policy Making And Agency Response, Charles M. Cameron, John M. De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines the effects of centralized presidential policy-making, implemented through unilateral executive action, on the willingness of bureaucrats to exert effort and stay in the government. Extending models in organizational economics, we show that policy initiative by the president is a substitute for initiative by civil servants. Yet, total effort is enhanced when both work. Presidential centralization of policy often impels policy-oriented bureaucrats ("zealots") to quit rather than implement presidential policies they dislike. Those most likely to quit are a range of moderate bureaucrats. More extreme bureaucrats may be willing to wait out an opposition president in the hope …