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Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

2014

Antitrust

William H. Page

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Law

Software Development As An Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The Enforcement Of The Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers Nov 2014

Software Development As An Antitrust Remedy: Lessons From The Enforcement Of The Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers

William H. Page

An important provision in each of the final judgments in the government's Microsoft antitrust case requires Microsoft to "make available" to software developers the communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate "natively" (that is, without adding software) with Microsoft server operating systems in corporate networks or over the Internet. The short-term goal of the provision is to allow developers, as licensees of the protocols, to write applications for non-Microsoft server operating systems that interoperate with Windows client computers in the same ways that applications written for Microsoft's server operating systems interoperate with Windows clients. The long-term goal …


State Action And The Meaning Of Agreement Under Sherman Act: An Approach To Hybrid Restraints, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page Nov 2014

State Action And The Meaning Of Agreement Under Sherman Act: An Approach To Hybrid Restraints, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page

William H. Page

Antitrust observers are familiar with the two-part Midcal test for the immunity of state regulation from federal antitrust laws: the state must clearly articulate its policy to displace competition and must "actively supervise" any private conduct pursuant to the policy. But state action need not meet these requirements if it is "unilateral" and therefore does not conflict with Section 1. Only if a state-authorized restraint is "hybrid," combining state and private action in a way that resembles aprohibited agreement, need the restraint satisfy Midcal. In this article, John Lopatka and Bill Page examine the history andcurrent importance of the distinction …


Who Suffered Antitrust Injury In The Microsoft Case?, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page Nov 2014

Who Suffered Antitrust Injury In The Microsoft Case?, John E. Lopatka, William H. Page

William H. Page

Most of the popular and scholarly discussions of Microsoft have focused on whether the defendant violated the law and, if so, whether the remedial order was appropriate. Never far from the surface in all of these discussions, however, has been the prospect of private antitrust suits that would inevitably follow a government victory. Indeed, numerous consumer class actions were filed against Microsoft in the wake of the District Court's issuance of its findings of fact. Should the District Court's decisions on liability stand, Microsoft can expect to face other suits by a variety of actors, including competitors, original equipment manufacturers …


Monopolization, Innovation, And Consumer Welfare, John Lopatka, William Page Nov 2014

Monopolization, Innovation, And Consumer Welfare, John Lopatka, William Page

William H. Page

While most commentators and the enforcement agencies voice support for the consumer welfare standard, substantial disagreement exists over when economic theory justifies a presumption of consumer injury. Virtually all would subscribe to the theoretical prediction that an effective cartel will likely inflict consumer injury by reducing output and thus increasing prices. But the academic and judicial consensus disappears when the theory at issue predicts that a practice -- a merger or a predatory pricing campaign, for example -- will harm consumers in the future through some complex sequence of events.

In our view, the desire to protect innovation is legitimate, …