Law Commons^™

Majoritarian Default Rules In Civil Contract Law: Legal Doctrine And Law & Economics [En Español], Daniel A. Monroy

Daniel A Monroy C

Resumen

El presente trabajo posee dos objetivos complementarios: Por un lado (i) basados en una lectura de la doctrina jurídica civilista en general, se evidencia la existencia de un criterio normativo al que debiera responder las reglas predeterminadas (reglas supletivas) en el derecho de contratos. Por otro lado, (ii) se contrasta e enriquece dicho criterio normativo con los aportes que sobre el mismo punto ha efectuado el Análisis Económico del Derecho (AED). Así, la hipótesis del trabajo se expresa en la idea de que, conforme la doctrina jurídica civilista, las reglas predeterminadas debieran ser el reflejo de lo regular, lo …

Context Matters--What Lawyers Say About Choice Of Law Decisions In Merger Agreements, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

ABSTRACT: The study of choice of law provisions in merger agreements yields various theories as to how much thought parties put into them, and what factors influence such decisions. Eisenberg and Miller found a shift to New York law and other scholars later hypothesized that parties specify New York law rather than Delaware law because New York law is more formalistic. However, a study of 343 merger agreements, consisting of 15 lawyer interviews and a survey sent to 812 lawyers, suggests differently. First, there is no shift from Delaware to New York. Second, a desire for formalistic law is not …

Regulatory Institutions Of The Global South: Why Are They Different And What Can Be Done About It?, Yugank Goyal

Yugank Goyal

Developing countries suffer from underperforming regulatory agencies compared to those in the developed world. The paper attempts to theorize general reasons behind such divergence. It argues that the differences lie in developing countries’ (a) higher priorities for redistribution, (b) structurally different institutional endowments, especially at informal level, and (c) limited informational channels. The paper proposes that a multi-stakeholder (with increased emphasis on judiciary and civil society) approach has potential to address the shortcomings. It tests these claims through studying cases of telecom and electricity regulation in India.

There Are Penalty Defaults Rules In The Colombian Contract Law [En Español], Daniel A. Monroy

Daniel A Monroy C

In the late 80s, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner proposed a supplementary and controversial theory about how to fill gaps in incomplete contracts. Specifically, the authors coined the concept of "penalty default rule", this is a default rule that fills a gap with a term that the majority of parties wouldn't have wanted. Based on this theoretical background, the aim of this paper is to show that indeed, there are penalty defaults rules in the Colombian contract law. To this end, our the paper (i) proposes a methodology to identify hypothetical fact situations in which penalty defaults should be established, …

Let Educators Educate, Let Builders Build: Making A Case For School Facility Privatization, John Pizzo

John Pizzo

No abstract provided.

Boilerplate Shock, Gregory Shill

Gregory Shill

No nation was spared in the recent global downturn, but several countries in the Eurozone arguably took the hardest punch, and they are still down. Doubts about the solvency of Greece, Spain, and a number of their neighbors are increasing the likelihood of a breakup of the common European currency. Observers believe a single departure and sovereign debt default might set off a “bank run” on the euro, with devastating regional and global consequences.

What mechanisms are available to address—or ideally, to prevent—such a disaster?

One unlikely candidate is boilerplate language in the contracts that govern Eurozone sovereign bonds. As …