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Ambiguity In The Sense Of Agency, Shaun Gallagher

Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers (Archive)

In a variety of recent studies the concept of the sense of agency has been shown to be phenomenologically complex, involving different levels of experience, from the basic aspects of sensory-motor processing (e.g., Farrer et al. 2003; Tsakiris and Haggard 2005; Tsakiris, Bosbach, and Gallagher 2007) to the higher levels of intention formation and retrospective judgment (e.g., Pacherie 2006, 2007; Stephens and Graham 2000; Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen 2008; Gallagher 2007, 2010). After summarizing this complexity, I will argue, first, that the way that these various contributory elements manifest themselves in the actual phenomenology of agency remains ambiguous, and that …