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Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Law
Gaming The System: Bio-Economics, Game Theory, & Fisheries Management, Richard A. Grisel
Gaming The System: Bio-Economics, Game Theory, & Fisheries Management, Richard A. Grisel
Richard A Grisel
This paper argues that game theory provides powerful, effective new tools to analyze externalities that occur in the context of strategic, multi-party, interactive decision-making. I will attempt to treat this as a non-technical paper and avoid the complex mathematics better left to economists and mathematicians. Instead, a more achievable goal is to illustrate how high-seas open-access fishing is virtually identical to a game situation, treat the fundamentals of game theory, and demonstrate that game theoretic analyses are well-suited and fruitful for designing effective policy responses to fisheries management, particularly with respect to the straddling stocks problem. Indeed, one seminal fisheries …
Information Escrows, Ian Ayres, Cait Unkovic
Information Escrows, Ian Ayres, Cait Unkovic
Michigan Law Review
A variety of information escrows - including allegation escrows, suspicion escrows, and shared-interest escrows - hold the promise of reducing the first-mover disadvantage that can deter people with socially valuable private information from disclosing that information to others. Information escrows allow people to transmit sensitive information to a trusted intermediary, an escrow agent, who only forwards the information under prespecified conditions. For example, an allegation escrow for sexual harassment might allow a victim to place a private complaint into escrow with instructions that the complaint be lodged with the proper authorities only if the escrow agent receives at least one …
Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George
Using Game Theory And Contractarianism To Reform Corporate Governance: Why Shareholders Should Seek Disincentive Schemes In Executive Compensation Plans, Elias Pete George
Golden Gate University Law Review
Employing a model of game theory, this Article shows how current judge-made law in areas of the duty of loyalty does not adequately prevent corporate managers from violating their fiduciary duty. This Article presents a solution, advising shareholders to reform corporate governance through executive compensation contracts that would properly incentivize corporate managers to comport with their duty of loyalty. Part I examines the rise of contractarianism, the prominent legal academic view of a corporation that helps to guide judicial interpretation of corporate law pertaining to managers’ fiduciary duties. Part II examines agency costs, a subset of transaction costs, and the …
Explaining Adversarial Boilerplate Language In The Battle Of The Forms: Are Consequential Damages In The U.C.C. Gap Fillers A Penalty Default Rule?, Ryan Griffee
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
In this article, game theory is applied to the battle of the forms and related scenarios to explain Daniel Keating’s observations, reported in the article “Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action,” 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678 (2000). The first of the two major findings in this article is that there is a game-theoretic reason drafters of boilerplate language should use adversarial, U.C.C. § 2-207(1) proviso-conforming language, namely, to ensure that clients receive terms that are no worse than the default U.C.C. gap fillers. The second major finding is that there is a penalty default rule in contract law. …
Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided Chicken To Informational Norms, Richard Warner, Robert Sloan
Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided Chicken To Informational Norms, Richard Warner, Robert Sloan
All Faculty Scholarship
When you download the free audio recording software from Audacity, you agree that Audacity may collect your information and use it to send you advertising. Billions of such pay-with-data exchanges feed information daily to a massive advertising ecosystem that tailors web site advertising as closely as possible to individual interests. The vast majority want considerably more control over our information. We nonetheless routinely enter pay-with-data exchanges when we visit CNN.com, use Gmail, or visit any of a vast number of other websites. Why? And, what, if anything, should we do about it? We answer both questions by describing pay-with-data exchanges …
Commerce Games And The Individual Mandate, Leslie Meltzer Henry, Maxwell L. Stearns
Commerce Games And The Individual Mandate, Leslie Meltzer Henry, Maxwell L. Stearns
Faculty Scholarship
While the Supreme Court declined an early invitation to resolve challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”), a recent split between the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (sustaining the PPACA’s “individual mandate”) and the Eleventh Circuit (striking it down) virtually ensures that the Court will decide the fate of this centerpiece of the Obama Administration’s regulatory agenda. Whatever the Court’s decision, it will likely affect Commerce Clause doctrine- and related doctrines - for years or even decades to come.
Litigants, judges, and academic commentators have focused on whether the Court’s “economic activity” tests, …
The Mythology Of Game Theory, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner, Nick Weller
The Mythology Of Game Theory, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner, Nick Weller
Faculty Scholarship
Non-cooperative game theory is at its heart a theory of cognition, specifically a theory of how decisions are made. Game theory's leverage is that we can design different payoffs, settings, player arrays, action possibilities, and information structures, and that these differences lead to different strategies, outcomes, and equilibria. It is well-known that, in experimental settings, people do not adopt the predicted strategies, outcomes, and equilibria. The standard response to this mismatch of prediction and observation is to add various psychological axioms to the game-theoretic framework. Regardless of the differing specific proposals and results, game theory uniformly makes certain cognitive assumptions …
The Theory Of Minds Within The Theory Of Games, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner, Nicholas Weller
The Theory Of Minds Within The Theory Of Games, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner, Nicholas Weller
Faculty Scholarship
Classical rationality as accepted by game theory assumes that a human chooser in a given moment has consistent preferences and beliefs and that actions result consistently from those preferences and beliefs, and moreover that these preferences, beliefs, and actions remain the same across equal choice moments. Since, as is widely found in prior experiments, subjects do not follow the predictions of classical rationality, behavioral game theorists have assumed consistent deviations from classical rationality by assigning to subjects certain dispositions— risk preference, cognitive abilities, social norms, etc. All of these theories are fundamentally cognitive theories, making claims about how individual human …
The Challenge Of Flexible Intelligence For Models Of Human Behavior, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner, Nicholas Weller
The Challenge Of Flexible Intelligence For Models Of Human Behavior, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner, Nicholas Weller
Faculty Scholarship
Game theoretic predictions about equilibrium behavior depend upon assumptions of inflexibility of belief, of accord between belief and choice, and of choice across situations that share a game-theoretic structure. However, researchers rarely possess any knowledge of the actual beliefs of subjects, and rarely compare how a subject behaves in settings that share game-theoretic structure but that differ in other respects. Our within-subject experiments utilize a belief elicitation mechanism, roughly similar to a prediction market, in a laboratory setting to identify subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’ choices and beliefs. These experiments additionally allow us to compare choices in different settings that …
When Agencies Go Nuclear: A Game Theoretic Approach To The Biggest Sticks In An Agency's Arsenal, Brigham Daniels
When Agencies Go Nuclear: A Game Theoretic Approach To The Biggest Sticks In An Agency's Arsenal, Brigham Daniels
Faculty Scholarship
A regulatory agency’s arsenal often contains multiple weapons. Occasionally, however, an agency has the power to completely obliterate its regulatory targets or to make major waves in society by using a “regulatory nuke.” A regulatory nuke is a tool with two primary characteristics. First, it packs power sufficient to profoundly impact individual regulatory targets or significantly affect important aspects of society or the economy. Second, from the perspective of the regulatory agency, it is politically unavailable in all but the most extreme situations. They are found in many corners of the federal bureaucracy. This Article illustrates that even when individual …
Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided Chicken To Informational Norms, Richard Warner, Robert Sloan
Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided Chicken To Informational Norms, Richard Warner, Robert Sloan
Richard Warner
When you download the free audio recording software from Audacity, you agree that Audacity may collect your information and use it to send you advertising. Billions of such pay-with-data exchanges feed information daily to a massive advertising ecosystem that tailors web site advertising as closely as possible to individual interests. The vast majority want considerably more control over our information. We nonetheless routinely enter pay-with-data exchanges when we visit CNN.com, use Gmail, or visit any of a vast number of other websites. Why? And, what, if anything, should we do about it? We answer both questions by describing pay-with-data exchanges …