Law Commons^™

Agency Cost Problems In Executive Compensation: An Evaluation Of Dividend Equivalent Rights On Restricted Stocks, Ufuoma Barbara Akpotaire

Ufuoma Barbara Akpotaire

Some authors argue that the integration of stock options as well as restricted stocks into executive compensation may reduce the conflicts between shareholders and management but may at the same time give rise to other agency problems connected to debt. While this line of argument may hold some merit, the structure of executive compensation packages, has over the years, focused less on stock options and more on restricted stocks. A classic example of this trend is Microsoft, who in 2003, switched from using stock options to restricted stock.

Compensating executives through restricted stocks has recently come under scrutiny due to …

Examining Timely Disclosure Of Material Information To Shareholders And The Privacy Concerns Of Executive Officers, Ufuoma Barbara Akpotaire

Ufuoma Barbara Akpotaire

On January 20, 1993, Michael Walsh, the former Chairman and CEO of Tenneco revealed to the public that he had brain cancer. This type of disclosure of health issues are arguable serious enough to affect Wall Street. Other company officials have previously made similar disclosures such as Hugh Martin, CEO of Pacific Biosciences who in October 2010 disclosed to his employees that he had cancer of the Blood (multiple myeloma), and Harry J. Pearce, the Vice President of General Motors, who disclosed in 2001 that he had leukemia.

The above public disclosures are however more the exceptions than the rule. …

The Post-Tarp Movement To Regulate Banker Pay, Eric D. Chason

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

A New Legal Theory To Test Executive Pay: Contractual Unconscionability, Lawrence A. Cunningham

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Lucrative pay to corporate managers remains controversial yet continues to evade judicial scrutiny for legitimacy. Although many arrangements likely would pass the most rigorous scrutiny, it seems equally clear that some would not. Some agreements are not the product of arm’s-length bargaining, can rivet managers on short-term stock prices at the destruction of long-term business value, and can misalign manager-shareholder interests. Yet even such objectionable arrangements are immune from serious legal oversight. In theory, they are open to judicial review under corporate law, but shareholders challenging pay contracts face formidable procedural hurdles in derivative litigation and substantive obstacles from corporation …