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Full-Text Articles in Law

“Bull” Coming From The States: Why The U.S. Supreme Court Should Use Williams V. Illinois To Close One Of Bullcoming’S Confrontation Clause Loopholes, Tara Klimek Price Aug 2011

“Bull” Coming From The States: Why The U.S. Supreme Court Should Use Williams V. Illinois To Close One Of Bullcoming’S Confrontation Clause Loopholes, Tara Klimek Price

Tara Price

Imagine that you are selected as a juror in a trial where the defendant is accused of driving while under the influence of alcohol. You listen to the police officer who testifies that he observed the defendant and believed him to be intoxicated. You hear about how after obtaining a warrant, the officer took the defendant to the emergency room for a blood-alcohol test. The police officer finishes his testimony, and the next witness will testify about the results of the defendant’s blood-alcohol test.

But before the witness can testify, defense counsel objects. Apparently, this is not the laboratory analyst …


Avoiding A Confrontation?: How Courts Have Erred In Finding That Nontestimonial Hearsay Is Beyond The Scope Of The Bruton Doctrine, Colin Miller Mar 2011

Avoiding A Confrontation?: How Courts Have Erred In Finding That Nontestimonial Hearsay Is Beyond The Scope Of The Bruton Doctrine, Colin Miller

Colin Miller

The Bruton doctrine holds that the Confrontation Clause is violated by the admission at a joint jury trial of a nontestifying co-defendant’s confession that facially incriminates other defendants but is inadmissible against them under the rules of evidence. Under this doctrine, Co-Defendant’s confession to Police Officer that “Defendant and I killed Victim” could not be admitted unless Co-Defendant testified at trial. But what if Co-Defendant made his confession to his mother, his brother, his lover, or his friend? While the vast majority of courts before 2004 would have held that such “noncustodial” confessions violated the Bruton doctrine, the tables have …


Confrontation And Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There And Should There Be A Doctrinal Exception, Eleanor Simon Jan 2011

Confrontation And Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There And Should There Be A Doctrinal Exception, Eleanor Simon

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

Close to five million intimate partner rapes and physical assaults are perpetrated against women in the United States annually. Domestic violence accounts for twenty percent of all non-fatal crime experienced by women in this county. Despite these statistics, many have argued that in the past six years the Supreme Court has "put a target on [the] back" of the domestic violence victim, has "significantly eroded offender accountability in domestic violence prosecutions," and has directly instigated a substantial decline in domestic violence prosecutions. The asserted cause is the Court's complete and groundbreaking re-conceptualization of the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal …


A Defense Attorney’S Guide To Confrontation After Michigan V. Bryant, Kathryn K. Polonsky Jan 2011

A Defense Attorney’S Guide To Confrontation After Michigan V. Bryant, Kathryn K. Polonsky

Kathryn K Polonsky

In 1603, the Crown charged Sir Walter Raleigh with high treason in part for plotting to murder King James I. In preparing for trial, Lord Cobham, Raleigh’s alleged co-conspirator, was interrogated and signed a sworn confession. During trial, the King used the Crown-procured ex parte testimony of Cobham against Raleigh. Raleigh demanded Cobham be brought before the court so Raleigh might interrogate him “face to face.” Raleigh was sure Cobham would prove his innocence. After all, Cobham had written a letter stating his charges against Raleigh contained no truth.

The Judges refused to allow Raleigh the use of Cobham’s exonerating …


Grabbing The Bullcoming By The Horns: How The Supreme Court Could Have Used Bullcoming V. New Mexico To Clarify Confrontation Clause Requirements For Csi-Type Reports, Paul F. Rothstein, Ronald J. Coleman Jan 2011

Grabbing The Bullcoming By The Horns: How The Supreme Court Could Have Used Bullcoming V. New Mexico To Clarify Confrontation Clause Requirements For Csi-Type Reports, Paul F. Rothstein, Ronald J. Coleman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In the pilot episode of the hit television show CSI, Grissom says to Warrick: "Concentrate on what cannot lie. The evidence." Although Grissom is a beloved figure in U.S. popular culture, the U.S. is currently unwilling to accept that evidence never lies. In stark contrast to Grissom's statement, the common law has a long history of allowing criminal defendants to cross-examine and question witnesses providing evidence against them. The right to confront an accusatory witness is reflected in the historical legal documents of Great Britain, in Shakespearean writing, and even in the Bible. In the United States, the right to …


Williams V. Illinois And The Confrontation Clause: Does Testimony By A Surrogate Witness Violate The Confrontation Clause?, Paul F. Rothstein, Ronald J. Coleman Jan 2011

Williams V. Illinois And The Confrontation Clause: Does Testimony By A Surrogate Witness Violate The Confrontation Clause?, Paul F. Rothstein, Ronald J. Coleman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article comprises a four-part debate between Paul Rothstein, Professor of Law at Georgetown Law Center, and Ronald J. Coleman, who works in the litigation practice group at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, on Williams v. Illinois, a Supreme Court case that involves the Confrontation Clause, which entitles a criminal defendant to confront an accusing witness in court. The issue at hand is whether said clause is infringed when a report not introduced into evidence at trial is used by an expert to testify about the results of testing that has been conducted by a non-testifying third party. …


Who Must Testify To The Results Of A Forensic Laboratory Test? Bullcoming V. New Mexico, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2011

Who Must Testify To The Results Of A Forensic Laboratory Test? Bullcoming V. New Mexico, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Does the Confrontation Clause permit the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform or observe the reported test?


Potential Responses To The Melendez-Diaz Line Of Cases, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2011

Potential Responses To The Melendez-Diaz Line Of Cases, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Criminal prosecution is increasingly dependent on proof of the results of forensic laboratory tests. They are used, for example, to prove that a given substance contains cocaine; the prove what a driver’s blood alcohol content was; and to demonstrate that the DNA profile of some substance found at the crime scene matches that of the accused.

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009), the United States Supreme Court resolved a question that had divided the lower courts in the wake of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Melendez-Diaz Court held by a 5-4 vote that forensic laboratory …


When Originalism Attacks: How Justice Scalia's Resort To Original Expected Application In Crawford V. Washington Came Back To Bite Him In Michigan V. Bryant (Forthcoming In 59 Drake L Rev ___ (Symposium Issue)(Summer 2011)), Brendan T. Beery Dec 2010

When Originalism Attacks: How Justice Scalia's Resort To Original Expected Application In Crawford V. Washington Came Back To Bite Him In Michigan V. Bryant (Forthcoming In 59 Drake L Rev ___ (Symposium Issue)(Summer 2011)), Brendan T. Beery

Brendan T Beery

Justice Scalia personifies the philosophical anxieties that lead judges to adopt species of textualist and originalist methods that anchor meaning to centuries past and to surface meaning. The resulting constitutional rules are so narrow that they are impossible to apply without producing absurd results. Thus, Justice Scalia’s brand of originalism and textualism, which are effectuated by embedding original expected application in the Court’s precedents and willfully ignoring semantic depth, invite future courts to manifest the kind of intellectual dishonesty and contortionism exemplified by the Court’s recent opinion in Michigan v. Bryant. This Article explores that case and, more broadly, the …