Law Commons^™

Antitrust Review Of The At&T/T-Mobile Transaction, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes

Scholarly Works

In this Essay, we review AT&T Inc.’s proposed $39 billion acquisition of T-Mobile USA, Inc., under federal merger law, under the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and with a focus on possible remedies. We find, under a rule of law approach, that the proposed acquisition is presumptively anticompetitive, and the merging parties in their public disclosures have failed to overcome this presumption. Next we find that under the Merger Guidelines, there is reason to believe that the transaction may result in higher prices to consumers under several different plausible theories. Finally, we turn …

Crony Capitalism And Antitrust, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

In August 2011, the United States brought a landmark antitrust lawsuit to prevent the merger of two of the nation’s four largest mobile wireless telecommunications services providers, AT&T Inc. and T‑Mobile USA, Inc. But why are so many elected officials asking the Obama administration to intercede in the Department of Justice’s lawsuit to force a settlement? Why are they approving a merger that would likely lead to higher prices, fewer jobs, less innovation, and higher taxes for their constituents? Does it have anything to do with the money they are receiving from AT&T and T-Mobile?

This Essay examines the recent …

Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, Maurice E. Stucke

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust policy today is an anomaly. On the one hand, antitrust is thriving internationally. On the other hand, antitrust’s influence has diminished domestically. Over the past thirty years, there have been fewer antitrust investigations and private actions. Today the Supreme Court complains about antitrust suits, and places greater faith in the antitrust function being subsumed in a regulatory framework. So what happened to the antitrust movement in the United States?

Two import factors contributed to antitrust policy’s domestic decline. The first is salience, especially the salience of the U.S. antitrust goals. In the past thirty years, enforcers and courts abandoned …

Mixed Agendas And Government Regulation Of Business: Can We Clean Up The Mess?, Thomas M. Arnold, Jerry L. Stevens

University of Richmond Law Review

The purpose of this article is first to navigate through variousperspectives on government regulation in an effort to develop areasonable and consistent view for regulatory proposals. Parts II and III of this article provide a brief outline of our current regulatory environment and its evolution. Part IV presents arguments for an efficient regulation of business by using market based regulation with a separation of efficiency and equity issues, where feasible. Examples of this regulatory approach appear throughout the article along with suggested reforms.

Antitrust Review Of The At&T/T-Mobile Transaction, Maurice E. Stucke, Allen Grunes

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, we review AT&T Inc.’s proposed $39 billion acquisition of T-Mobile USA, Inc., under federal merger law, under the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and with a focus on possible remedies. We find, under a rule of law approach, that the proposed acquisition is presumptively anticompetitive, and the merging parties in their public disclosures have failed to overcome this presumption. Next we find that under the Merger Guidelines, there is reason to believe that the transaction may result in higher prices to consumers under several different plausible theories. Finally, we turn …

Toward A Unified Theory Of Exclusionary Vertical Restraints, Daniel A. Crane, Graciela Miralles

Articles

The law of exclusionary vertical restraints-contractual or other business relationships between vertically related firms-is deeply confused and inconsistent in both the United States and the European Union. A variety of vertical practices, including predatory pricing, tying, exclusive dealing, price discrimination, and bundling, are treated very differently based on formalistic distinctions that bear no relationship to the practices' exclusionary potential. We propose a comprehensive, unified test for all exclusionary vertical restraints that centers on two factors: foreclosure and substantiality. We then assign economic content to these factors. A restraint forecloses if it denies equally efficient rivals a reasonable opportunity to make …

The New United States Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Devolution, Evolution, Or Counterrevolution?, Thomas J. Horton

Thomas J. Horton

No abstract provided.