Law Commons^™

Voice Without Say: Why More Capitalist Firms Are Not (Genuinely) Participatory, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

Why are most capitalist enterprises of any size organized as authoritarian bureaucracies rather than incorporating genuinely employee participation that would give the workers real authority? Even firms with employee participation programs leave virtually all decision making power in the hands of management. The standard answer is that hierarchy is more economically efficient than any sort of genuine participation, so that participatory firms would be less productive or efficient and lose out to more traditional competitors. This answer is indefensible. After surveying the history, legal status, and varieties of employee participation, I examine and reject as question-begging the argument that the …

It Ain’T Necessarily So: The Misuse Of “Human Nature” In Law And Social Policy And The Bankruptcy Of The “Nature-Nuture” Debate, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

Debate about legal and policy reform has been haunted by a pernicious confusion about human nature, the idea that it is a set of rigid dispositions, today generally conceived as genetic, that is manifested the same way in all circumstances. Opponents of egalitarian alternatives argue that we cannot depart far from the status quo because human nature stands in the way. Advocates of such reforms too often deny the existence of human nature because, sharing this conception, they think it would prevent changes they deem desirable. Both views rest on deep errors about what it is to have a nature …

Where Did Mill Go Wrong?: Why The Capital Managed Firm Rather Than The Labor Managed Enterprise Is The Predominant Organizational Form In Market Economies, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

In this Article, I propose a novel law and economics explanation of a deeply puzzling aspect of business organization in market economies. Why are virtually all firms are organized as capital managed and owned (capitalist) enterprises rather than as labor managed and owned cooperatives? Over 150 years ago, J.S. Mill predicted that efficiency and other advantages would eventually make worker cooperatives predominant over capitalist firms. Mill was right about the advantages but wrong about the results. The standard explanation is that capitalist enterprise is more efficient. Empirical research, however, overwhelmingly contradicts this. But employees almost never even attempt to organize …

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short piece is a contribution to The Encylopedia of Global Justice (ed. D.K. Chatterjee) (forthcoming from Springer Verlag May 2011). It summarizes the state of reserach on the problem for collective choice discovered by Kenneth Arrow in his Impossibility Theorem. In 1951 Arrow proved that a set of four or five (depending on how one counts them) minimal constraints that seem constitutive of democratic decisionmaking, including nondictatorship and rational consistency, are mutually incompatible. This created the burgeoning field of Social Choice Theory. I explain the problem in nontechnical terms, explore its implications especially for global justice, and review the …

Less Than Meets The Eye: Anti-Discrimination And The Development Of Section 5 Enforcement And Eleventh Amendment Abrogation Law Since City Of Boerne V. Flores, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

The conventional wisdom is that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment since City of Boerne has raised the bar for Congress to pass anti discrimination legislation and made it far more difficult for plaintiffs to sue the states and state agencies. I show, by close analysis of the Court's case law on state sovereign immunity and Congress' Section 5 power to abrogate that immunity, that this is a misreading.

As the jurisprudence developed from Boerne, Kimel (age discrimination) and Garrett (disability discrimination in employment) to Hibbs (sex discrimination) and Lane (disability discrimination in public accommodations), the Court has …

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …