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Full-Text Articles in Law

A Contractual Approach To Shareholder Oppression Law, Benjamin Means Dec 2010

A Contractual Approach To Shareholder Oppression Law, Benjamin Means

Faculty Publications

According to standard law and economics, minority shareholders in closely held corporations must bargain against opportunism by controlling shareholders before investing. Put simply, you made your bed, now you must lie in it. Yet most courts offer a remedy for shareholder oppression, often premised on the notion that controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties to the minority or must honor the minority's reasonable expectations. Thus, law and economics, the dominant mode of corporate law scholarship, appears irreconcilably opposed to minority shareholder protection, a defining feature of the existing law of close corporations.

This Article contends that a more nuanced theory of …


Handling Fiduciary Issues In Limited Liability Company Formations Under The New Hampshire Limited Liability Company Act—A Practical Introduction, John M. Cunningham Feb 2010

Handling Fiduciary Issues In Limited Liability Company Formations Under The New Hampshire Limited Liability Company Act—A Practical Introduction, John M. Cunningham

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “Absent an agreement among the parties to the contrary, business entity fiduciary duties arise automatically under state common law and applicable statutory law whenever one person entrusts the management of his or her business to another person and the other person agrees to accept this entrustment. The two principal fiduciary duties are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires that business managers carry out their management responsibilities non-negligently. The duty of loyalty requires that business managers avoid conflicts of interest with the entity that they have agreed to manage.

However, the common …


The Fatal Design Defects Of L3cs, Daniel S. Kleinberger Jan 2010

The Fatal Design Defects Of L3cs, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

This article argues that the L3C is an unnecessary and unwise contrivance, and it's very existence is inherently misleading. The notion that an L3C should have privileged status under the Internal Revenue Code (known as the Code) for access to tax-exempt foundation resources is inescapably at odds with the key policies that underpin the relevant Code sections, and L3Cs are not on track-let alone on a fast track-to receive special status under the Code. An ordinary limited liability company (LLC) can perform precisely the same functions proclaimed of L3Cs. In addition, because of technical flaws, the L3C legislation adopted to …


When The Law Is Understood—L3c No, Daniel S. Kleinberger, J. William Callison Jan 2010

When The Law Is Understood—L3c No, Daniel S. Kleinberger, J. William Callison

Faculty Scholarship

The November, 2009 issue of Community Dividend, included an article entitled “The L3C: A new business model for socially responsible investing.” The article spoke enthusiastically about “[t]he low-profit limited liability company, or L3C, …a newly developed form of business that blends attributes of nonprofit and for-profit organizations in order to promote investment in socially responsible objectives.”

We understand the enthusiasm; proponents of the L3C have predicted dramatic benefits. However, after careful study of the relevant law, we have concluded that the enthusiasm is misplaced. The L3C concept is fundamentally flawed, potentially dangerous, and at best counterproductive.

We also understand that …


The Single Member Limited Liability Company As Disregarded Entity: Now You See It, Now You Don’T, Daniel S. Kleinberger Jan 2010

The Single Member Limited Liability Company As Disregarded Entity: Now You See It, Now You Don’T, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

The power and complexity of the single member limited liability company (“SMLLC”) comes from a conceptual contradiction: the conflation of owner and organization for tax purposes and the separation of owner and entity for non-tax, state law purposes. The contraction has significant practical consequences, which this article explores and illustrates, considering: • The SMLLC in federal court (single member not permitted to represent the LLC) • The IRS’s tortuous path to determining whether an SMLLC’s sole member is liable for the SMLLC’s unpaid employment taxes (yes; yes vindicated by the courts; then no, as a matter of policy) • Transfer …


Llcs Are The New King Of The Hill: An Empirical Study Of The Number Of New Llcs, Corporations And Lps Formed In The United States Between 2004-2007 And How Llcs Were Taxed For Tax Years 2002-2006, Rodney D. Chrisman Jan 2010

Llcs Are The New King Of The Hill: An Empirical Study Of The Number Of New Llcs, Corporations And Lps Formed In The United States Between 2004-2007 And How Llcs Were Taxed For Tax Years 2002-2006, Rodney D. Chrisman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.


The Analytic Protocol For The Duty Of Loyalty Under The Prototype Llc Act, Thomas E. Geu, Thomas E. Rutledge Dec 2009

The Analytic Protocol For The Duty Of Loyalty Under The Prototype Llc Act, Thomas E. Geu, Thomas E. Rutledge

Thomas E. Geu

No abstract provided.


To Be Or Not To Be Exclusive: Statutory Construction Of The Charging Order In The Single Member Llc, Thomas E. Geu, John W. Debruyn, Thomas E. Rutledge Dec 2009

To Be Or Not To Be Exclusive: Statutory Construction Of The Charging Order In The Single Member Llc, Thomas E. Geu, John W. Debruyn, Thomas E. Rutledge

Thomas E. Geu

No abstract provided.