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Full-Text Articles in Law

Jefferson's "Laws Of Nature": Newtonian Influence And The Dual Valence Of Jurisprudence And Science, Allen P. Mendenhall Jun 2010

Jefferson's "Laws Of Nature": Newtonian Influence And The Dual Valence Of Jurisprudence And Science, Allen P. Mendenhall

Allen Mendenhall

Jefferson appears to have conceived of natural law rather differently from his predecessors - namely, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Richard Hooker, Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke, and, among others, William Blackstone. This particular pedigree looked to divine decree or moral order to anchor natural law philosophy. But Jefferson’s various writings, most notably the Declaration and Notes on the State of Virginia, champion the thinking of a natural historian, a man who celebrated reason and scientific method, who extolled fact over fancy, material over the immaterial, observation over superstition, and experiment over divine revelation. They reveal, in other words, an …


The Effect Of Legal Theories On Judicial Decisions, Anthony D'Amato Jan 2010

The Effect Of Legal Theories On Judicial Decisions, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

I draw a distinction in the beginning of this essay between judicial decision-making and a judge's decision-making. To persuade a judge, we should try to discover what her theories are. Across a range of theories, I offered well-known case examples typically cited as examples of each theory. Then I showed that the exact same theory used to justify or explain those case results could be used to justify or explain the opposite result in each of those cases.


The Injustice Of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Anthony D'Amato Jan 2010

The Injustice Of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

How can we possibly plan our lives on the basis of the law of tomorrow when we can't predict what that law will be? Are courts that are attracted to dynamic statutory interpretation teaching us that we can no longer know and rely on the rule of law in our daily lives because months or years later they can use policy considerations to make new law and apply that law retroactively to us? Doesn't dynamic statutory interpretation amount to unconstitutional ex post facto legislation? Hasn't justice become impossible to get from courts if judges insist on upsetting both sides' expectations …


Кризисный Период Развития Отечественного Юридического Образования (1917-1920 Г.Г.), Leonid G. Berlyavskiy Jan 2010

Кризисный Период Развития Отечественного Юридического Образования (1917-1920 Г.Г.), Leonid G. Berlyavskiy

Leonid G. Berlyavskiy

In 1917-1920 Sovnarkom and Narkompros of the RSFSR have accepted the whole complex of the statutory acts directed on abolition of the Law faculties and simultaneously establishment of the new state high schools and scientific institutions network, under control to the power. The Socialist Academy of Social Studies has been founded as a counterbalance to the project of the Institute of Social Sciences developed within the limits of the Academy of Sciences for social studies, including, jurisprudence, began to be considered as the sphere of the Party apparatus priority interests


Constructing The Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution Of Federalist 10, Ian C. Bartrum Jan 2010

Constructing The Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution Of Federalist 10, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This paper is part of larger symposium convened for the 2010 AALS annual meeting. In it I adapt some of my earlier constitutional theoretical work to engage the topic of that symposium: the so-called “interpretation/construction distinction”. I make two related criticisms of the distinction: (1) it relies on a flawed conception of linguistic meaning, and (2) while these flaws may be harmless in the “easy” cases of interpretation, they are much more problematic in the difficult cases of most concern. Thus, I doubt the ultimate utility of the distinction as part of a “true and correct” model of constitutional theory. …


Clear As Mud: How The Uncertain Precedential Status Of Unpublished Opinions Muddles Qualified Immunity Determinations, David R. Cleveland Jan 2010

Clear As Mud: How The Uncertain Precedential Status Of Unpublished Opinions Muddles Qualified Immunity Determinations, David R. Cleveland

David R. Cleveland

While unpublished opinions are now freely citeable under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, their precedential value remains uncertain. This ambiguity muddles the already unclear law surrounding qualified immunity and denies courts valuable precedents for making fair and consistent judgments on these critical civil rights issues. When faced with a claim that they have violated a person’s civil rights, government officials typically claim qualified immunity. The test is whether they have violated “clearly established law.” Unfortunately, the federal circuits differ on whether unpublished opinions may be used in determining clearly established law. This article, Clear as Mud: How the Uncertain …


Inter-American System, Claudia Martin Jan 2010

Inter-American System, Claudia Martin

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.


Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation Of Statutes?, Anthony D'Amato Jan 2010

Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation Of Statutes?, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

An aspect of the battle over deconstruction is whether resort to legislative intent might help to determine the content of a statutory text that otherwise, in splendid isolation, could be deconstructed by simply positing different interpretive contexts. I examine the same issue by recounting my own quest for determinate meaning in statutes—a sort of personal legislative history. I do not claim for jurisprudence the role of ensuring faithful reception of the legislature's message, for that is impossible. At best, jurisprudential theory only reduces the degrees of interpretive freedom, and then only probably, not necessarily. The more significant thesis of this …


Pragmatic Indeterminacy, Anthony D'Amato Jan 2010

Pragmatic Indeterminacy, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

If, as a result of taking Indeterminacy seriously, we revolutionize the way we teach law and the way we select judges, then we will also revolutionize the way cases are litigated (because the new judges will expect to hear a different kind of argumentation) and the way people order their lives in anticipation of the way their disputes will be decided by these new judges.


Legal Realism Explains Nothing, Anthony D'Amato Jan 2010

Legal Realism Explains Nothing, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

I argue that American legal realism as derived from Oliver Wendell Holmes's prediction theory of law was misinterpreted, and that a deeper examination of law-as-prediction might help to reduce the pathology of judicial lawmaking that has been the unfortunate consequence of legal realism.


The Speluncean Explorers--Further Proceedings, Anthony D'Amato Jan 2010

The Speluncean Explorers--Further Proceedings, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

Lon L. Fuller's The Case of the Speluncean Explorers is a classic in jurisprudence. The case presents five judicial opinions which clash with each other and produce for the reader an exhilarating excursion into fundamental theories of law and the state and the role of courts vis-i-vis legislatures and executives. Though the issues articulated by Fuller are timeless, the past thirty years in jurisprudential scholarship have produced at least one major new vantage point—the "rights thesis".


The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, Anthony D'Amato Jan 2010

The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

This essay will attempt to show that the disparity between the rule of law and the dictates of morality is itself a product of the paradigmatic way in which the "Bad Samaritan" cases are analyzed. If we examine the cases in an entirely different way, many of the standard problems will dissolve and new alternatives will become apparent. The essay will also show that the "Bad Samaritan" paradigm is part of a larger paradigm linking the law of torts with the criminal law, which also needs to be reexamined. Finally a recommendation for dealing with the "Bad Samaritan" problem legislatively …


Elmer's Rule: A Jurisprudential Dialogue, Anthony D'Amato Jan 2010

Elmer's Rule: A Jurisprudential Dialogue, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

Cardozo wrote of Riggs v. Palmer that this case that two analytical paths pointed in different directions and the judges selected the path that seemed better to lead to "justice". Dworkin has claimed that the case demonstrates the triumph of certain "principles" over what are called "rules of law". Taylor has argued that there was no "law" at all about murderers inheriting from testators before the actual decision in Riggs, and that consequently the decision itself was the only "law" that affected Elmer. All of these suggest that the decision in Riggs was largely unpredictable and therefore must have come …


Judicial Legislation, Anthony D'Amato Jan 2010

Judicial Legislation, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

My argument will be that it is unjust in the broadest view of our legal system for judges to legislate, even if they confine their legislation to the narrowest limits in the closest of cases. To the extent that my argument is successful in diminishing the judicial legislation position, it would tend to serve to corroborate Dworkin's rights thesis.


Is Equality A Totally Empty Idea?, Anthony D'Amato Jan 2010

Is Equality A Totally Empty Idea?, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

Comments on Westen article The Empty Idea of Equality. The only way we know what direction to move in making reductions and increases in burdens is to have a concept of equality in mind. The only way we can know that one burden is 'great' and another burden is 'considerably lesser,' to use the words in Westen's standard, is to compare the burdens. But comparison presupposes a measure of equality, for we cannot know that one burden is greater than another unless we first have a concept of when the two burdens are equal. Westen's standard, therefore, is logically posterior …


Is The Law Hopeful?, Annelise Riles Jan 2010

Is The Law Hopeful?, Annelise Riles

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

This essay asks what legal studies can contribute to the now vigorous debates in economics, sociology, psychology, philosophy, literary studies and anthropology about the nature and sources of hope in personal and social life. What does the law contribute to hope? Is there anything hopeful about law? Rather than focus on the ends of law (social justice, economic efficiency, etc.) this essay focuses instead on the means (or techniques of the law). Through a critical engagement with the work of Hans Vaihinger, Morris Cohen and Pierre Schlag on legal fictions and legal technicalities, the essay argues that what is “hopeful” …


The Oft-Ignored Mr. Turton: The Role Of District Collector In A Passage To India, Allen P. Mendenhall Dec 2009

The Oft-Ignored Mr. Turton: The Role Of District Collector In A Passage To India, Allen P. Mendenhall

Allen Mendenhall

E.M. Forster’s A Passage to India presents Brahman Hindu jurisprudence as an alternative to British rule of law, a utilitarian jurisprudence that hinges on mercantilism, central planning, and imperialism. Building on John Hasnas’s critiques of rule of law and Murray Rothbard’s critiques of Benthamite utilitarianism, this essay argues that Forster’s depictions of Brahman Hindu in the novel endorse polycentric legal systems. Mr. Turton is the local district collector whose job is to pander to both British and Indian interests; positioned as such, Turton is a site for critique and comparison. Forster uses Turton to show that Brahman Hindu jurisprudence is …