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Full-Text Articles in Law

Supreme Court Of The United States, October Term 2010 Preview, Update: December 7, 2010, Georgetown University Law Center, Supreme Court Institute Dec 2010

Supreme Court Of The United States, October Term 2010 Preview, Update: December 7, 2010, Georgetown University Law Center, Supreme Court Institute

Supreme Court Overviews

No abstract provided.


Supreme Court Of The United States, October Term 2010 Preview, Georgetown University Law Center, Supreme Court Institute Sep 2010

Supreme Court Of The United States, October Term 2010 Preview, Georgetown University Law Center, Supreme Court Institute

Supreme Court Overviews

No abstract provided.


Supreme Court Of The United States, October Term 2009 Preview, Update: February 22, 2010, Georgetown University Law Center, Supreme Court Institute Feb 2010

Supreme Court Of The United States, October Term 2009 Preview, Update: February 22, 2010, Georgetown University Law Center, Supreme Court Institute

Supreme Court Overviews

No abstract provided.


The Subjects Of The Constitution, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz Jan 2010

The Subjects Of The Constitution, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Two centuries after Marbury v. Madison, there remains a deep confusion about quite what a court is reviewing when it engages in judicial review. Conventional wisdom has it that judicial review is the review of certain legal objects: statutes, regulations. But strictly speaking, this is not quite right. The Constitution prohibits not objects but actions. Judicial review is the review of such actions. And actions require actors: verbs require subjects. So before judicial review focuses on verbs, let alone objects, it should begin at the beginning, with subjects. Every constitutional inquiry should begin with a basic question that has been …


Process, People, Power And Policy: Empirical Studies Of Civil Procedure And Courts, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Bryant Garth Jan 2010

Process, People, Power And Policy: Empirical Studies Of Civil Procedure And Courts, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Bryant Garth

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This review essay, by Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Dean Bryant Garth, reports on the history and deployment of empirical studies of civil procedure rules, court policies, and legal developments for reforms of court procedures and practices in both the United States and England and Wales. It traces the influence of particular individuals (e.g., Charles Clark in the United States, and Harry Woolf in England) in the use of empirical studies of litigation patterns and court rules to effectuate legal reforms. The essay reviews some particularly contentious issues over time, such as whether there is/was too much or too little litigation, …


Harvard And Yale Ascendant: The Legal Education Of The Justices From Holmes To Kagan, Patrick J. Glen Jan 2010

Harvard And Yale Ascendant: The Legal Education Of The Justices From Holmes To Kagan, Patrick J. Glen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

With the nomination of Elena Kagan to be a justice of the United States Supreme Court, it is quite possible that eight of the nine justices will have graduated from only two law schools—Harvard and Yale. This article frames this development in the historical context of the legal education of those justices confirmed between 1902 and 2010. What this historical review makes clear is that the Ivy League dominance of the Supreme Court is a relatively recent occurrence whose beginnings can be traced to Antonin Scalia’s 1986 confirmation. Prior to that time, although Harvard and Yale were consistently represented among …


Narrative, Normativity, And Causation, Lawrence B. Solum Jan 2010

Narrative, Normativity, And Causation, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay examines the relationship between constitutional narratives, causation, and normativity in the context of Barry Friedman’s book, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution. In his book, Friedman provides a grand narrative of American constitutional history that emphasizes the role of public opinion in the development of American constitutional law. That narrative involves both implicit and explicit claims about the causal forces that shape constitutional doctrine and about normative constitutional theory. The aim of this essay is to identify those claims, excavate their theoretical assumptions, …


The Misuse Of Textualism: A Further Reply To Prof. Kahn, Stephen B. Cohen Jan 2010

The Misuse Of Textualism: A Further Reply To Prof. Kahn, Stephen B. Cohen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Because readers have already endured four articles, two by me and two by Prof. Douglas A. Kahn, debating the meaning of section 67(e)(1), I am reluctant to respond to Prof. Kahn’s rejoinder, which appeared in the January 18 issue of Tax Notes. Nevertheless, our disagreement implicates the judicial craft of two U.S. Supreme Court members, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Sonia Sotomayor. I therefore feel it important to answer Prof. Kahn’s latest contentions, recognizing my duty to be as brief as possible.


Honest-Services Fraud: A (Vague) Threat To Millions Of Blissfully Unaware (And Non-Culpable) American Workers, Julie R. O'Sullivan Jan 2010

Honest-Services Fraud: A (Vague) Threat To Millions Of Blissfully Unaware (And Non-Culpable) American Workers, Julie R. O'Sullivan

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The author believes that statute 18 U.S.C. § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague, at least as applied to cases in which employees of private entities are prosecuted for depriving their employers of a right to their honest services (so-called “private cases”). Objections to vagueness rest on due process. “Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” The Supreme Court’s vagueness precedents do not provide much …