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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach To The Shareholder Bylaw Debate, Christopher M. Bruner
Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach To The Shareholder Bylaw Debate, Christopher M. Bruner
Scholarly Works
Over recent decades, shareholders in public corporations have increasingly sought to augment their own power - and, correlatively, to limit the power of boards - through creative use of corporate bylaws. The bylaws lend themselves to such efforts because enacting, amending, and repealing bylaws are essentially the only corporate governance actions that shareholders can undertake unilaterally. In this Article I examine thecontested nature of bylaws, the fundamental issues of corporate power and purpose that they implicate, and the differing ways in which state and federal lawmakers and regulators may impact the debate regarding thescope of the shareholders' bylaw authority.
The …
Corporate Governance Reform In A Time Of Crisis, Christopher M. Bruner
Corporate Governance Reform In A Time Of Crisis, Christopher M. Bruner
Scholarly Works
In this article I argue that crisis-driven corporate governance reform efforts in the United States and the United Kingdom that aim to empower shareholders are misguided, and offer an explanation of why policymakers in each country have reacted to the financial crisis as they have. I first discuss the risk incentives of shareholders and managers in financial firms, and examine how excessive leverage and risk-taking in pursuit of short-term returns for shareholders led to the crisis. I then describe the far greater power and centrality that U.K. shareholders have historically possessed relative to their U.S. counterparts, and explore historical and …
Placebo Ethics, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller
Placebo Ethics, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller
Scholarly Works
While there are innumerable theories on the best remedy for the current financial crisis, there is agreement on one point, at least: increased transparency is good. We look at a provision from the last round of financial regulation, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which imposed disclosure requirements tailored to prevent some of the kinds of abuses that led to the downfall of Enron. In response to Enron's self-dealing transactions, Section 406 of SOX required a public company to disclose its code of ethics and to disclose immediately any waivers from that code the company grants to its top …
The Ilc And The Reconstruction Of U.S. Banking, Mehrsa Baradaran
The Ilc And The Reconstruction Of U.S. Banking, Mehrsa Baradaran
Scholarly Works
Since the Great Depression, bank regulators in the United States have endeavored to separate banking institutions from commercial firms, believing such separation was necessary for stability and growth. The recent collapse of our financial system indicates that this premise may be false, as Industrial Loan Companies ("ILCs") – the only institutions where commercial firms are permitted to own banks – remain sound. ILCs have persisted throughout U.S. banking history through exceptions and omissions in banking legislation, but the strength and resilience they have exhibited in the current financial collapse are worth investigating and even emulating. This article examines recent controversy …
Organizations Matter: They Are Institutions, After All, John Linarelli
Organizations Matter: They Are Institutions, After All, John Linarelli
Scholarly Works
Judge Posner (2010) offers a substantial agenda for organization economics. He advises us on how organization economics can shed substantial light on some of the most pressing social problems of the day. I comment on two of the areas he selects for discussion and offer some comments on the relationship of organization economics to new institutional economics. Judge Posner surely is right to argue that organization economics can help us understand the failures of corporate governance in regulating executive pay. Moreover, with additional and more institutionally nuanced theorizing, organizational economics should further our understanding of the work of judiciaries in …
The Changing Face Of Money, Christopher M. Bruner
The Changing Face Of Money, Christopher M. Bruner
Scholarly Works
In this essay I argue that widespread failure to comprehend the intrinsic nature of modern money loomed large in the recent crisis, and that broader comprehension of its meaning is a precondition for effective post-crisis reforms. First, I provide a brief history of money, emphasizing its gradual divergence from inherent value. I then consider the value of today’s dollar in economic, legal and psychological terms, arguing that each perspective conveys a single over-arching lesson—that better comprehending our money requires better comprehending ourselves. The introspection that this exercise demands reveals with unique clarity some of the critical lessons of the crisis …