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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Nepa In The Hot Seat: A Proposal For An Office Of Environmental Analysis, Aliza M. Cohen
Nepa In The Hot Seat: A Proposal For An Office Of Environmental Analysis, Aliza M. Cohen
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Judicial deference under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) can be problematic. It is a well-established rule of administrative law that courts will grant a high degree of deference to agency decisions. They do this out of respect for agency expertise and policy judgment. This deference is applied to NEPA lawsuits without acknowledging the special pressures that agencies face while assessing the environmental impacts of their own projects. Though there is a strong argument that these pressures undermine the reasons for deferential review, neither the statute nor the courts have provided plaintiffs with adequate means to remedy this problem. Agency …
Adminsitrative Law, Lynne Avakian
Adminsitrative Law, Lynne Avakian
Golden Gate University Law Review
No abstract provided.
End The Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed And Why It Can And Should Be Overruled, Jack M. Beermann
End The Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed And Why It Can And Should Be Overruled, Jack M. Beermann
Faculty Scholarship
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, decided in 1984, the Supreme Court announced a startling new approach to judicial review of statutory interpretation by administrative agencies, which requires courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Although it was perhaps hoped that Chevron would simplify judicial review and increase deference to agency interpretation, the opposite has occurred. Chevron has complicated judicial review and at best it is uncertain whether it has resulted in increased deference to agency interpretation. In fact, for numerous reasons, Chevron has been a failure on any reasonable measure and should be overruled. Further, overruling Chevron …
Is The United States Tax Court Exempt From Administrative Law Jurisprudence When Acting As A Reviewing Court , Diane L. Fahey
Is The United States Tax Court Exempt From Administrative Law Jurisprudence When Acting As A Reviewing Court , Diane L. Fahey
Cleveland State Law Review
Commentators have argued that the Tax Court should fill in the gaps in its statutory authority for collection due process appeals by turning to traditional administrative law jurisprudence, including the APA, which suggestion the Tax Court has resisted despite the fact that the federal district court did so. The majority of the Tax Court insists that it has never been subject to administrative law jurisprudence or the APA, nor could it be. Most of the courts of appeals that have considered the issue have held that the Tax Court is bound by the APA and traditional administrative law jurisprudence when …
“To Remand, Or Not To Remand”: Ventura’S Ordinary Remand Rule And The Evolving Jurisprudence Of Futility, Patrick J. Glen
“To Remand, Or Not To Remand”: Ventura’S Ordinary Remand Rule And The Evolving Jurisprudence Of Futility, Patrick J. Glen
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
It is a foundational principle of administrative law that a reviewing court should not dispose of a petition for review or appeal on grounds not relied upon by the agency, and should not reach issues in the first instance not addressed administratively. In such circumstances, there is a strong presumption that the reviewing court should remand the case to the agency for further proceedings rather than reach out to decide the disputed issues. The United States Supreme Court explicitly extended operation of the “ordinary remand rule” to the immigration context in its 2002 decision in INS v. Ventura. Notwithstanding subsequent …
Fitting The Formula For Judicial Review: The Law-Fact Distinction In Immigration Law, Rebecca Sharpless
Fitting The Formula For Judicial Review: The Law-Fact Distinction In Immigration Law, Rebecca Sharpless
Rebecca Sharpless
The ill-defined law-fact distinction often stands as the gatekeeper to judicial review of an agency deportation order, restricting non-citizens facing deportation to raising only questions of law when appearing before an appellate court. The restriction on review most affects cases whose dispositions typically turn on the resolution of factual issues, including claims under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and claims for discretionary relief from deportation like cancellation of removal. Convention Against Torture claims, for example, often involve extensive fact-finding on the part of the immigration judge regarding conditions in the applicant’s home country and the applicant’s personal circumstances. …