Law Commons^™

Conflict Of Interest And Disqualification In The Federal Courts: Suggestions For Reform, Arthur D. Hellman

Testimony

Although federal judges do not run for election, over the last three decades the process of nomination and confirmation has become politicized to a disturbing degree. There is a real danger that the judges will come to be perceived not as dispassionate servants of the law but as political actors who pursue political or ideological agendas. One consequence of these developments is likely to be increased scrutiny of judges’ responses to motions to recuse. Here as in other aspects of the operations of the judiciary, “just trust us” is no longer sufficient.

Two provisions of Title 28 of the United …

Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!? Giving Adequate Attention To Failings Of Judicial Impartiality, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Jeffrey W Stempel

In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), the Supreme Court by a 5-4 vote vacated and remanded a decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in which Justice Brent Benjamin cast the deciding vote in favor of Massey, a company run by Don Blankenship, who had provided $3 million in support to Benjamin during his 2004 election campaign.

Despite the unsavory taste of the entire episode, the Court was excessively careful not to criticize Justice Benjamin. Overlooked because of this undue judicial civility and controversy about the constitutional aspects of the decision …

Completing Caperton And Clarifying Common Sense Through Using The Right Standard For Constitutional Judicial Recusal, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Jeffrey W Stempel

In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court vacated a state supreme court decision in which a justice who had received $3 million in campaign support from a company CEO cast the deciding vote to relieve the company of a $50 million liability. The Caperton majority adopted a “probability of bias” standard for constitutional due process review of judicial disqualification decisions that differs from the ordinary “reasonable question as to impartiality” standard for recusal. Four dissenters objected to the majority’s limited supervision of state court disqualification practice, minimized the danger of biased judging presented by the …

Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic Persistance Of The Duty To Sit, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Jeffrey W Stempel

In 1974, the duty to sit -- a doctrine positing that judges should recuse themselves only if the case for disqualification was compelling -- was abolished in federal courts. Then-Justice William Rehnquist's refusal to disqualify himself in Laird v. Tatum (1972) was a partial catalyst in this legal reform, which was consistent with the ABA position on the duty to sit, at least in what I term it's "pernicious" form. Notwithstanding the official abolition of the doctrine, it continues to be invoked, as does the problematic Rehnquist opinion defending his indefensible refusal to recuse in Laird v. Taturm. This article …

Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, And A Judicial Solution: An Inspector General For The Courts, Ronald Rotunda

Ronald D. Rotunda

Many federal judges routinely fear criticism, but that fear is unwarranted. The public is rightly concerned that the procedure to investigate and discipline problem-judges is flawed, particularly in a few high-profile cases discussed in this article. Several recent indictments of federal judges add to the problem. As Judge Ralph Winter has acknowledged, the status quo is "not a confidence builder". Judges should welcome an Inspector General for the Federal Courts, who could restore public confidence in the federal judicial discipline system. The Inspector General can investigate potential ethical violations and proceed in those few instances where more is needed. This …

Original Sin And Judicial Independence: Providing Accountability For Justices, Paul D. Carrington, Roger C. Cramton

Faculty Scholarship

The independence of the judiciary is an enduring and defining objective of the legal profession. Law depends on judges to observe and enforce it. To secure such virtuous judges, they must be protected from retaliation by those who disapprove their decisions and prevented from receiving rewards from those who benefit by them. Those having the greatest stake in shielding judges from intimidation or reward are the profession that shares their dependence on public acceptance and respect. And that task of protecting judicial independence stands today at the very top of the agenda of the American legal profession.

Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic Persistence Of The Duty To Sit Doctrine, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

The duty to sit concept or “doctrine”—or at least what I term the “pernicious” version of the concept—emphasizes a judge's obligation to hear and decide cases unless there is a compelling ground for disqualification and creates a situation in which judges are erroneously pushed to resolve close disqualification issues against recusal when the presumption should run in exactly the opposite direction. In close cases, judges should err on the side of recusal in order to enhance public confidence in the judiciary and to ensure that subtle, subconscious, or hard-to-prove bias, prejudice, or partiality does not influence decision-making. The pernicious version …