Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Publication
- File Type
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Why Justice Scalia Should Be A Constitutional Comparativist ... Sometimes, David Gray
Why Justice Scalia Should Be A Constitutional Comparativist ... Sometimes, David Gray
David C. Gray
The burgeoning literature on transjudicialism and constitutional comparativism generally reaffirms the familiar lines of contest between textualists and those more inclined to read the Constitution as a living document. As a consequence, it tends to be politicized, if not polemic. This article begins to shift the debate toward a more rigorous focus on first principles. In particular, it argues that full faith to the basic commitments of originalism, as advanced in Justice Scalia's writings, opinions, and speeches, requires domestic courts to consult contemporary foreign sources when interpreting universalist language found in the Constitution. While the article does not propose a …
Original Intention And Public Meaning In Constitutional Interpretation, Richard Kay
Original Intention And Public Meaning In Constitutional Interpretation, Richard Kay
Richard Kay
In recent years academic explanations of the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation have shifted the relevant inquiry from the subjective intent of the constitution-makers to the "original public meaning" of the Constitution's words. This article is a critical analysis of that development. In the actual course of adjudication by honest and competent judges either method should usually yield the same result. The reliance on public meaning, however, distracts the interpreter from the connection between the normative force of the Constitution and the founding events, a link that is essential to the legitimacy of constitutional judicial review. In the hands of …
The Unexceptionalism Of Evolving Standards, Corinna Barrett Lain
The Unexceptionalism Of Evolving Standards, Corinna Barrett Lain
Corinna Lain
Conventional wisdom is that outside the Eighth Amendment context, the Supreme Court does not engage in the sort of explicitly majoritarian state nose-counting for which the “evolving standards of decency” doctrine is famous. Yet this impression is simply inaccurate. Across a stunning variety of civil liberties contexts, the Court routinely—and explicitly—bases constitutional protection on whether a majority of states agree with it. This Article examines the Supreme Court’s reliance on the majority position of the states to identify constitutional norms, then turns to the qualifications, explanations, and implications of state polling as a larger doctrinal phenomenon. While the past few …