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2006

Taxation

Constitutional Law

Articles 1 - 10 of 10

Full-Text Articles in Law

A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp Oct 2006

A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

The trend of the eminent domain reform and "Kelo plus" initiatives is toward a comprehensive Constitutional property right incorporating the elements of level of review, nature of government action, and extent of compensation. This article contains a draft amendment which reflects these concerns.


Finding New Constitutional Rights Through The Supreme Court’S Evolving “Government Purpose” Test Under Minimum Scrutiny, John H. Ryskamp May 2006

Finding New Constitutional Rights Through The Supreme Court’S Evolving “Government Purpose” Test Under Minimum Scrutiny, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

By now we all are familiar with the litany of cases which refused to find elevated scrutiny for so-called “affirmative” or “social” rights such as education, welfare or housing: Lindsey v. Normet, San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, Dandridge v. Williams, DeShaney v. Winnebago County. There didn’t seem to be anything in minimum scrutiny which could protect such facts as education or housing, from government action. However, unobtrusively and over the years, the Supreme Court has clarified and articulated one aspect of minimum scrutiny which holds promise for vindicating facts. You will recall that under minimum scrutiny government’s action is …


Finding The Constitutional Right To Education In San Antonio School District V. Rodriguez, John H. Ryskamp Apr 2006

Finding The Constitutional Right To Education In San Antonio School District V. Rodriguez, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court abolished the scrutiny regime because it impermissibly interfered with an important fact, liberty. And yet, even in earlier cases which ostensibly upheld the scrutiny regime, it is difficult to see that the Court ever did so to the detriment of facts it considered important. In short, the Court often (always?) found itself raising the level of scrutiny for a fact in the same case it upheld the regime, leaving us to wonder if the scrutiny regime ever actually had any effect at all, or even whether the Court felt it was relevant. As …


Discarded Deference: Judicial Independence In Informal Agency Guidance, Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz Apr 2006

Discarded Deference: Judicial Independence In Informal Agency Guidance, Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz

ExpressO

In the past few years, the Supreme Court has resurrected an intermediate deference standard from the 1940s to be applied by courts in considering informal guidance issued by administrative agencies. The decision upon which the deference standard is based is a product of a political solution and not a comprehensive evaluation of how the New Deal agencies fit within traditional role of the courts as sole interpreters of the law.

This 1940s decision has evolved such that deference to the views of administrative agencies has become a matter of judicial discretion, finding deference when the views of an agency parallel …


Discarded Deference: Judicial Independence In Informal Agency Guidance, Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz Mar 2006

Discarded Deference: Judicial Independence In Informal Agency Guidance, Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz

ExpressO

In the past few years, the Supreme Court has resurrected an intermediate deference standard from the 1940s to be applied by courts in considering informal guidance issued by administrative agencies. The decision upon which the deference standard is based is a product of a political solution and not a comprehensive evaluation of how the New Deal agencies fit within traditional role of the courts as sole interpreters of the law.

This 1940s decision has evolved such that deference to the views of administrative agencies has become a matter of judicial discretion, finding deference when the views of an agency parallel …


The Taxing Power, The Sixteenth Amendment, And The Meaning Of ‘Incomes,’, Erik M. Jensen Feb 2006

The Taxing Power, The Sixteenth Amendment, And The Meaning Of ‘Incomes,’, Erik M. Jensen

Faculty Publications

This article examines the debates leading to the enactment of the 1894 income tax, which the Supreme Court struck down in 1895, and the Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, and concludes that an income tax and a tax on consumption were understood to be fundamentally different types of taxes. The author argues that the term “taxes on incomes” in the Sixteenth Amendment should be interpreted with that distinction in mind. The Amendment was intended to make a “tax on incomes,” and only a tax on incomes, possible without the apportionment that would otherwise be required for a direct tax. For …


Unapportioned Direct-Consumption Taxes And The Sixteenth Amendment, Erik M. Jensen Feb 2006

Unapportioned Direct-Consumption Taxes And The Sixteenth Amendment, Erik M. Jensen

Faculty Publications

The point of this essay is simple: a direct-consumption tax like the Forbes-Armey-Hall-Rabushka flat tax or the Nunn-Domenici USA tax is not a "tax on incomes" within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. As a result, such a tax would be constitutional only if it were apportioned among the states on the basis of population. And since these taxes would not be apportioned-how could they be and work as they are intended to work?-they would be unconstitutional.


Taxation And The Constitution: How To Read The Direct-Tax Clauses, Erik M. Jensen Jan 2006

Taxation And The Constitution: How To Read The Direct-Tax Clauses, Erik M. Jensen

Faculty Publications

This essay responds to Professor Bruce Ackerman, who had challenged the author's understanding of the Direct-Tax Clauses of the Constitution and the Sixteenth Amendment to that Constitution.


Critical Theory And The Loneliness Of The Tax Prof, Erik M. Jensen Jan 2006

Critical Theory And The Loneliness Of The Tax Prof, Erik M. Jensen

Faculty Publications

This essay, prepared for a symposium on critical theory and tax law, has two goals: to suggest why feminist theory and critical race theory are spreading in taxation and to discuss some dangers of that criticism. The author evaluates three examples of the new criticism: an article on critical race theory by Professors Moran and Whitford; an article on feminist statutory interpretation by Professor Handelman; and a book, Taxing Women, by Professor McCaffery.


The Apportionment Of ‘Direct Taxes’: Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, Erik M. Jensen Jan 2006

The Apportionment Of ‘Direct Taxes’: Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, Erik M. Jensen

Faculty Publications

In debates about reorienting the American revenue system, nearly everyone assumes the Constitution is irrelevant. With few exceptions, the tax provisions in the original Constitution - particularly the direct-tax apportionment rule and the uniformity rule - have been interpreted to be paper tigers. And in only one major case has the Sixteenth Amendment, which excepts "taxes on incomes" from apportionment, been held to limit congressional power.

S Rejecting conventional wisdom, this Article argues that some consumption taxes would violate constitutional norms. The Article focuses on the requirement that “direct taxes” be apportioned among the states on the basis of population. …