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Ricoeur’S Critical Hermeneutics And The Psychotherapeutic Model Of Critical Theory, Francis J. Mootz Iii Jan 2006

Ricoeur’S Critical Hermeneutics And The Psychotherapeutic Model Of Critical Theory, Francis J. Mootz Iii

Scholarly Works

This paper seeks to extend Ricoeur’s acclaimed mediation of the Gadamer-Habermas debate. Freud’s psychoanalytic practice was an important touchstone for the debate, and Ricoeur’s reading of Freud provides a key to his critical intervention in the debate. The emerging postmodern account of psychotherapeutic practice provides a model of the critical hermeneutics that Ricoeur championed. Bringing Ricoeur’s insights to bear on this model, we can advance the questioning spurred by the Gadamer-Habermas debate without pretending to bring closure to the unending conversation of thinking.


Critical Constitutionalism Now, Louis Michael Seidman Jan 2006

Critical Constitutionalism Now, Louis Michael Seidman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The starting point for this essay is the claim that if the texts that critical scholars studied are unstable over time, then this must also be true of the studies themselves. There is no reason to suppose that the critical perspective, uniquely among all possible perspectives, reflects timeless and contextless truth. The question I want to ask, then, is what meaning the critical perspective has for us now in our new and dramatically transformed environment. I proceed in four parts. First, I address the meaning that critical scholars attributed to constitutional law in the late twentieth century. Second, I describe …


Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations On Punishment, Bernard E. Harcourt Jan 2006

Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations On Punishment, Bernard E. Harcourt

Faculty Scholarship

Since the modern era, the discourse of punishment has cycled through three sets of questions. The first, born of the Enlightenment itself, asked: On what ground does the sovereign have the right to punish? Nietzsche most forcefully, but others as well, argued that the question itself begged its own answer. The right to punish, they suggested, is what defines sovereignty, and as such, can never serve to limit sovereign power. With the birth of the social sciences, this skepticism gave rise to a second set of questions: What then is the true function of punishment? What is it that we …