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Articles 1 - 14 of 14
Full-Text Articles in Law
Independent Invention As A Defense To Patent Infringement, Samson Vermont
Independent Invention As A Defense To Patent Infringement, Samson Vermont
Michigan Law Review
Under current law, independent invention is no defense to patent infringement. This Article argues that independent invention should be a defense, provided the independent inventor creates the invention before receiving actual or constructive notice that someone else already created it. The defense reduces wasteful duplication of effort and enhances dissemination of inventions without lowering the incentive to invent below the necessary minimum. To be sure, the defense lowers the incentive for inventions that face significant odds of being invented by more than one inventor By enabling a second inventor to compete with a first inventor the defense essentially breaks up …
"Eggshell" Victims, Private Precautions, And The Societal Benefits Of Shifting Crime, Robert A. Mikos
"Eggshell" Victims, Private Precautions, And The Societal Benefits Of Shifting Crime, Robert A. Mikos
Michigan Law Review
Individuals spend billions of dollars every year on precautions to protect themselves from crime. Yet the legal academy has criticized many private precautions because they merely shift crime onto other, less guarded citizens, rather than reduce crime. The conventional wisdom likens such precaution-taking to rent-seeking: citizens spend resources to shift crime losses onto other victims, without reducing the size of those losses to society. The result is an unambiguous reduction in social welfare. This Article argues that the conventional wisdom is flawed because it overlooks how the law systematically understates the harms suffered by some victims of crime, first, by …
The Neglected Political Economy Of Eminent Domain, Nicole Stelle Garnett
The Neglected Political Economy Of Eminent Domain, Nicole Stelle Garnett
Michigan Law Review
This Article challenges a foundational assumption about eminent domain- namely, that owners are systematically undercompensated because they receive only fair market value for their property. In fact, scholars may have overstated the undercompensation problem because they have focused on the compensation required by the Constitution, rather than on the actual mechanics of the eminent domain process. The Article examines three ways that "Takers" (i.e., nonjudicial actors in the eminent domain process) minimize undercompensation. First, Takers may avoid taking high subjective value properties. (By way of illustration, Professor Garnett discusses evidence that Chicago's freeways were rerouted in the 1950s to avoid …
Information Asymmetries And The Rights To Exclude, Lior Jacob Strahilevitz
Information Asymmetries And The Rights To Exclude, Lior Jacob Strahilevitz
Michigan Law Review
The American law generally regards the "bundle of rights" as property's dominant metaphor. On this conception of property, ownership empowers an individual to control a particular resource in any number of ways. For example, he may use it, transfer it, exclude others from it, divide it, and perhaps even destroy it. The various rights in the bundle, however, are not equal in terms of importance. To the contrary, American courts and commentators have deemed the "right to exclude" foremost among the property rights, with the Supreme Court characterizing it as the "hallmark of a protected property interest" and leading property …
Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect Of Corporate Deal Structures, Victor Fleischer
Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect Of Corporate Deal Structures, Victor Fleischer
Michigan Law Review
Consider the unusual legal structures of the following four deals: When Google went public in 2004, it used an Internet auction to sell its stock to shareholders. When Ben & Jerry's went public in 1984, it sold its stock only to Vermont residents. Steve Jobs's contract with Apple entitles him to an annual cash salary of exactly one dollar. Stanley Works, a Connecticut toolmaker, considered reincorporating in Bermuda to reduce its tax liability. Under public pressure, it changed its mind and remains legally incorporated in Connecticut. What do these deals have in common? In each case, the legal infrastructure of …
The Political Market For Criminal Justice, Rachel E. Barkow
The Political Market For Criminal Justice, Rachel E. Barkow
Michigan Law Review
In 2004, the number of individuals incarcerated in the United States exceeded the two million mark. The current incarceration rate in the United States is 726 per 100,000 residents, the highest incarceration rate in the Western world and a dramatic increase from just three decades ago. Not only are more people serving time, but sentences have markedly lengthened. What should we make of these trends? The answer has been easy for most legal scholars: to them, the incarceration rate in the United States is too high, and reforms are necessary to lower sentences. But many political leaders and voters reach …
Crime, Criminals, And Competitive Crime Control, Wayne A. Logan
Crime, Criminals, And Competitive Crime Control, Wayne A. Logan
Michigan Law Review
Given the negative consequences of crime, it should come as no surprise that states will endeavor to make their dominions less hospitable to potential criminal actors. This predisposition, when played out on a national stage, would appear ripe for a dynamic in which states will seek to "out-tough" one another, leading to a spiral of detrimental competitiveness. Doran Teichman, in an article recently appearing in these pages, advances just such a view. Teichman posits that the decentralized structure of America's federalist system provides states with "an incentive to increasingly harshen" their crime control efforts, with the net result being excessive …
Decentralizing Crime Control: The Political Economy Perspective, Doron Teichman
Decentralizing Crime Control: The Political Economy Perspective, Doron Teichman
Michigan Law Review
In an article recently published on the pages of this Law Review, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition ("The Market"), I put forward a theory of crime control in a decentralized government. Specifically, I made three distinct claims. First, criminal justice policies affect the geographic decision of criminals as to where to commit their crimes. Other things being equal, criminal activity will tend to shift to areas in which the expected sanction is lower. Second, local jurisdictions attempting to lower their crime rates will react to policies adopted by neighboring jurisdictions and try …
One-Sided Contracts In Competitive Consumer Markets, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Richard A. Posner
One-Sided Contracts In Competitive Consumer Markets, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Richard A. Posner
Michigan Law Review
The usual assumption in economic analysis of law is that in a competitive market without informational asymmetries, the terms of contracts between sellers and buyers will be optimal-that is, that any deviation from these terms would impose expected costs on one party that exceed benefits to the other. But could there be cases in which "one-sided" contracts containing terms that impose a greater expected cost on one side than benefit on the other-would be found in competitive markets even in the absence of fraud, prohibitive information costs, or other market imperfections? That is the possibility we explore in this Article.
Modularity In Contracts: Boilerplate And Information Flow, Henry E. Smith
Modularity In Contracts: Boilerplate And Information Flow, Henry E. Smith
Michigan Law Review
Contractual boilerplate is a little like property. Such a statement might seem like a category mistake. After all, contractual boilerplate language is part of contracts, which, unlike property, are freely customizable by the parties. Contracts create rights between those parties, not against the world at large. Nor do people who devise new boilerplate terms usually have intellectual property in the provisions themselves. I will argue that, in an interesting and overlooked way, boilerplate is the first way station on the road from contract to property. In particular, boilerplate, like all legal communication, is the result of striking a trade-off between …
The Role Of Nonprofits In The Production Of Boilerplate, Kevin E. Davis
The Role Of Nonprofits In The Production Of Boilerplate, Kevin E. Davis
Michigan Law Review
Drafting contracts-by which I really mean the documents that embody contracts-requires investments of time, experience, and ingenuity. Those investments may yield significant returns because the quality of contractual terms can be an important determinant of the gains that parties realize from trade. This in tum suggests that, from an economic perspective, it is important to understand how contracts are produced. It seems particularly important to examine the production of contracts or individual contractual terms that are widely used-that is to say, "boilerplate." In a market oriented society, boilerplate is the predominant feature of the network of legal obligations that provides …
Choice, Consent, And Cycling: The Hidden Limitations Of Consent, Leo Katz
Choice, Consent, And Cycling: The Hidden Limitations Of Consent, Leo Katz
Michigan Law Review
Most legal scholars assume that if V consents to allow D to do something to him, such consent makes D's actions legally and morally acceptable. To be sure, they are willing to make an exception when consent is given under a specified list of conditions: Force, fraud, incompetence, third-party effects, unequal bargaining power, commodification, paternalism - all of these may be grounds for rejecting the validity of V's consent. We might call scholars who take this view of consent quasi-libertarians. In this Article, I argue against the quasi-libertarian view of consent. My central claim is that the validity of consent …
Boilerplate Today: The Rise Of Modularity And The Waning Of Consent, Margaret Jane Radin
Boilerplate Today: The Rise Of Modularity And The Waning Of Consent, Margaret Jane Radin
Michigan Law Review
Thanks to the vision of Omri Ben-Shahar and the excellence of the scholars contributing to this symposium, students of the law of commercial exchange transactions will now understand how important and interesting, and indeed exciting, boilerplate really is. The various presentations are so rich that my assigned task of commentary cannot approach an adequate summation. Instead of attempting such a task, therefore, I will take up a slightly different one. My commentary will relate some of the ideas presented in the symposium to two themes that I think are significant for the groundwork of contract today: the growing modularity of …
The Law And Sociology Of Boilerplate, Todd D. Rakoff
The Law And Sociology Of Boilerplate, Todd D. Rakoff
Michigan Law Review
In my view, the scholarship presented at this symposium demonstrates that, in order to analyze form contracts and boilerplate successfully, one must carry out a set of operations that embodies an approach I will call law and sociology. But I presume I was invited to be a commentator at this conference on boilerplate not because the article I wrote on one branch of the subject awhile back exemplified this methodological approach, but because it took a rather strong substantive position. And so I think I ought first to say a brief word about that. The article in question concerned contracts …