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Full-Text Articles in Law
Antitrust Damages And Deadweight Loss (Symposium), Christopher Leslie
Antitrust Damages And Deadweight Loss (Symposium), Christopher Leslie
Christopher R. Leslie
No abstract provided.
Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, And Cartel Stability, Christopher R. Leslie
Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, And Cartel Stability, Christopher R. Leslie
Christopher R. Leslie
This paper reviews, and proposes revisions to, the government's Corporate Leniency Policy, which confers leniency upon the first member of a price-fixing cartel to expose the illegal activity to the DOJ's Antitrust Division. Three important limitations apply. First, the ringleader of the cartel is ineligible for immunity. Second, leniency is not automatic if the government has its own internal investigation significantly underway. Third, a firm must confess "promptly" in order to qualify for amnesty. This paper proposes doing away with these limitations. It may seem counter-intuitive to enact policies that make it easier for the worst antitrust criminals to escape …
The Anticompetitive Effects Of Unenforced Invalid Patents, Christopher R. Leslie
The Anticompetitive Effects Of Unenforced Invalid Patents, Christopher R. Leslie
Christopher R. Leslie
Antitrust law and patent law assume that an invalid patent cannot distort competition unless the patentee enforces the patent by initiating infringement litigation or explicitly threatening to do so. The Article argues that invalid patents can destroy competition - even without such enforcement efforts - by creating legitimate fears of litigation, increasing the costs of market entry, delaying market entry, scaring away competitors' customers and business partners, and deterring research. Despite the anticompetitive risks posed by invalid patents, neither patent law nor antitrust law does an effective job of ridding the marketplace of invalid patents. In particular, because antitrust law …