Law Commons^™

The Nsa Domestic Surveillance Program: An Analysis Of Congressional Oversight During An Era Of One-Party Rule, Tara M. Sugiyama, Marisa Perry

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

On December 16, 2005, the New York Times sounded a fire alarm when it revealed that, in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, President George W Bush had issued a secret executive order permitting the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct warrantless surveillance on individuals to unearth nascent terrorist activity. Congress responded to the disclosure of the NSA domestic surveillance program largely by shirking its oversight duties. This Note argues that when a single party controls both the executive and the legislative branches, the fire-alarm model fails to provide sufficient congressional oversight. Short of future elections altering the balance …

Down To The Wire: Assessing The Constitutionality Of The National Security Agency's Warrantless Wiretapping Program: Exit The Rule Of Law, Fletcher N. Baldwin Jr., Robert B. Shaw

UF Law Faculty Publications

The article discusses the constitutionality of warrantless wiretapping surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA) on U.S. citizens. The wiretapping program existed weeks after the September 11, 2001 attacks, on the justification that Congress authorized the president to wiretap U.S. citizens without a warrant, and that the president had inherent authority as commander-in-chief. But it is argued that Congress did not expressly authorize the president to conduct warrantless wiretapping and that he does not have such inherent authority.

We intend this Article to be a commentary on the constitutionality of the NSA wiretapping program solely as it relates to the …