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Articles 1 - 10 of 10

Full-Text Articles in Law

The 1996 Telecommunications Act: Ten Years Later, Pat Aufderheide Jun 2006

The 1996 Telecommunications Act: Ten Years Later, Pat Aufderheide

Federal Communications Law Journal

No abstract provided.


The Law Of Unintended Consequences, Susan Ness Jun 2006

The Law Of Unintended Consequences, Susan Ness

Federal Communications Law Journal

No abstract provided.


The Failure Of Competition Under The 1996 Telecommunications Act, Gene Kimmelman, Mark Cooper, Magda Herra Jun 2006

The Failure Of Competition Under The 1996 Telecommunications Act, Gene Kimmelman, Mark Cooper, Magda Herra

Federal Communications Law Journal

No abstract provided.


The 1996 Telecommunications Act, Jim Robbins Jun 2006

The 1996 Telecommunications Act, Jim Robbins

Federal Communications Law Journal

No abstract provided.


Ten Years Under The 1996 Telecommunications Act, Reed Hundt Jun 2006

Ten Years Under The 1996 Telecommunications Act, Reed Hundt

Federal Communications Law Journal

Keynote speech delivered at the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Ten Years Later Symposium, February 6, 2006, George Washington University.


Standards Ownership And Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Mar 2006

Standards Ownership And Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust law is a blunt instrument for dealing with many claims of anticompetitive standard setting. Antitrust fact finders lack the sophistication to pass judgment on the substantive merits of a standard. In any event, antitrust is not a roving mandate to question bad standards. It requires an injury to competition, and whether the minimum conditions for competitive harm are present can often be determined without examining the substance of the standard itself.

When government involvement in standard setting is substantial antitrust challenges should generally be rejected. The petitioning process in a democratic system protects even bad legislative judgments from collateral …


The Size Of Cartel Overcharges: Implications For U.S. And Ec Fining Policies, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande Jan 2006

The Size Of Cartel Overcharges: Implications For U.S. And Ec Fining Policies, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The purpose of this article is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Union (EU) and the United States are at the optimal levels. We collected and analyzed the available information concerning the size of the overcharges caused by hard-core pricing fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation agreements. Data sets of United States cartels were assembled and examined. These cartels overcharged an average of 18% to 37%, depending upon the data set and methodology employed in the analysis and whether mean or median figures are used. Separate data sets for European cartels also were analyzed, which …


Rankings, Reductionism, And Responsibility, Frank Pasquale Jan 2006

Rankings, Reductionism, And Responsibility, Frank Pasquale

Faculty Scholarship

After discussing how search engines operate, and sketching a normative basis for regulation of the rankings they generate, this piece proposes some minor, non-intrusive legal remedies for those who claim that they are harmed by search engine results. Such harms include unwanted (but high-ranking) results relating to them, or exclusion from high-ranking results they claim they are due to appear on. In the first case (deemed inclusion harm), I propose a right not to suppress the results, but merely to add an asterisk to the hyperlink directing web users to them, which would lead to the complainant's own comment on …


Tweaking Antitrust's Business Model , Thom Lambert Jan 2006

Tweaking Antitrust's Business Model , Thom Lambert

Faculty Publications

This essay evaluates Hovenkamp's suggestions, concluding that most are sound, that a few might be slightly revised to enhance their effectiveness or administrability, and that a couple are downright unwise. In particular, the essay criticizes Hovenkamp's call for abandonment of the indirect purchaser rule and his proposed test for identifying exclusionary conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.


Exclusionary Conduct, Effect On Consumers, And The Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, Steven C. Salop Jan 2006

Exclusionary Conduct, Effect On Consumers, And The Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The central thesis of this article is that the use of the profit-sacrifice test as the sole liability standard for exclusionary conduct, or as a required prong of a multi-pronged liability standard is fundamentally flawed. The profit-sacrifice test may be useful, for example, as one type of evidence of anticompetitive purpose. In unilateral refusal to deal cases, it can be useful in determining the non-exclusionary benchmark. However, the test is not generally a reliable indicator of the impact of allegedly exclusionary conduct on consumer welfare - the primary focus of the antitrust laws. The profit-sacrifice test also is prone to …