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Full-Text Articles in Law
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
Since the very moment of its adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been subject to a litany of critiques, many of them seemingly well-placed. The almost universal condemnation of the Act for its asserted 'federalization' of corporate law, by contrast, deserves short shrift. Though widely invoked - and blithely accepted - dissection of this argument against the legislation shows it to rely either on flawed assumptions or on normative preferences not ordinarily acknowledged (or perhaps even accepted) by those who criticize Sarbanes-Oxley for its federalization of state corporate law.
Once we appreciate as much, we can begin by replacing …
Why The Board Is Broken, Tamar Frankel, Joseph Anton
Why The Board Is Broken, Tamar Frankel, Joseph Anton
Faculty Scholarship
Boards of Directors are anachronistic to major companies in the 21st century. Boards had their origin in an era when oversight was easily executed. Corporate directors were controlling shareholders or their nominees. As companies became truly public, directors were nominated by the chief operating officers and served as their advisers. Large companies needed the resources of outsiders to lend their collective genius in an era when outside knowledge, data, and experience were expensive to collect. But as businesses grew larger, the Board's responsibility as representative of the shareholders' interests became more important as well. To advise and supervise enormous …
Changing Paradigms: The Liability Of Corporate Groups In Germany, René Reich-Graefe
Changing Paradigms: The Liability Of Corporate Groups In Germany, René Reich-Graefe
Faculty Scholarship
The German law on affiliated companies and groups of companies ("Konzernrecht"), as embodied in the German Stock Corporation Act of 1965, as amended ("Aktiengesetz"), has often been credited for its innovative approach to the dichotomy of liability strategies relevant to corporate groups-viz., the traditional concept of entity liability based on the fundamental doctrine of the legal separateness of the corporate entity and, accordingly, resulting in a limitation of investor liability as the rule, and discrete and rare occurrences of what is almost poetically designated the "piercing of the corporate veil" ("DurchgriffshaJtung") as narrow and reluctantly crafted exceptions, and the more …
Conflicts Of Interest In Publicly-Traded And Closely-Held Corporations: A Comparative And Economic Analysis, Zohar Goshen
Conflicts Of Interest In Publicly-Traded And Closely-Held Corporations: A Comparative And Economic Analysis, Zohar Goshen
Faculty Scholarship
Conflicts of interest in corporate law can be addressed by two main alternatives: a requirement of a majority of the minority vote or the imposition of duties of loyalty and fairness. A comparison of Delaware, the UK, Canada, and Israel reveals that while the conflicts of interest problem within publicly-traded corporations receives different treatment in the different jurisdictions — either a fairness rule or a majority of the minority rule — closely-held corporations receive the same treatment of an imposition of duties of loyalty and fairness. This article explains this finding, demonstrating that determining which of these rules is adopted …