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2003

University of Michigan Law School

Journal

Constitutional Law

Marshall (John)

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Foreword: A Silk Purse?, John T. Noonan Jr. Aug 2003

Foreword: A Silk Purse?, John T. Noonan Jr.

Michigan Law Review

On March 2, 1801, President John Adams appointed forty-two persons to be justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. John Marshall, doubling as Secretary of State as well as Chief Justice, failed to deliver the commissions. Adams's term expired. James Madison, Marshall's successor as Secretary of State, withheld seventeen of the commissions. In 1802, William Marbury and three other appointees to this minor office brought mandamus against Madison in the Supreme Court. Madison was ordered to show cause why the writ should not issue. Congress abolished the June sitting of the Court. Only in 1803 was the case …


The Irrepressible Myth Of Marbury, Michael Stokes Paulsen Aug 2003

The Irrepressible Myth Of Marbury, Michael Stokes Paulsen

Michigan Law Review

Nearly all of American constitutional law today rests on a myth. The myth, presented as standard history both in junior high civics texts and in advanced law school courses on constitutional law, runs something like this: A long, long time ago - 1803, if the storyteller is trying to be precise - in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court of the United States created the doctrine of "judicial review." Judicial review is the power of the Supreme Court to decide the meaning of the Constitution and to strike down laws that the Court finds unconstitutional. As …


Attitudes About Attitudes, Michael J. Gerhardt May 2003

Attitudes About Attitudes, Michael J. Gerhardt

Michigan Law Review

Attitudes about the Supreme Court differ sharply, particularly among academics. Law professors believe the Constitution and other laws constrain the Court, while most political scientists do not. These different perspectives on justices' fidelity to the law ensure that legal scholars and political scientists have little to say about the Court that is of interest to each other. As a result, it should not be surprising that most legal scholars are unfamiliar with Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal, the two political scientists most closely associated with the view that the law does not constrain the justices from voting their policy preferences. …