Law Commons^™

Crawford V. Washington, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

On June 9, by granting certiorari in Crawford v. Washington, 02-9410, the Supreme Court signaled its intention to enter once again into the realm of the Confrontation Clause, in which it has found itself deeply perplexed. This time there was a difference, however, because the grant indicated that the Court might be willing to rethink its jurisprudence in this area. Crawford, like Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), and Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), presents a classic case of what might be called station-house testimony. Michael Crawford was accused of stabbing another man. His wife, Sylvia, was …

Expert Information And Expert Evidence: A Preliminary Taxonomy, Samuel R. Gross, Jennifer L. Mnookin

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Federal Rule of Evidence 702 speaks in very general terms. It governs every situation in which "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact," and provides that, in that situation, "a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise . . . .' In 2000, following a trio of Supreme Court cases interpreting Rule 702, the Rule was amended to include a third requirement, in addition to the helpfulness of the testimony and the qualifications of the witness: reliability. Under Rule 702 …

In Defense Of The Search And Seizure Exclusionary Rule (Law And Truth - The Twenty-First Annual National Student Federalist Society Symposium On Law And Public Policy - 2002), Yale Kamisar

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think Dean Pye's advice about casebook writing was sound,6 and what he had to say also applies to discussions and debates about such issues as the search and seizure exclusionary rule. We cannot (at least we should not) begin with Mapp v. Ohio. We need a prelude.

Minimizing The Jury Over-Valuation Concern (Visions Of Rationality In Evidence Law Symposium), Richard D. Friedman

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A great deal of the rhetoric of evidence discourse concerns the supposed cognitive inadequacies of the jury. In various contexts we are told that although an item of evidence is probative, it must be excluded because the jury will give it too much weight. I believe this approach has played far too great a role in evidentiary law, and that it is an interesting project to see whether we can construct a satisfactory body of law without relying at all on the cognitive inadequacy argument. I think that, at least to a large extent, we can. In some settings, where …

Sometimes What Everybody Thinks They Know Is True, Richard D. Friedman, Roger C. Park

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This essay responds to D. Davis and W. C. Follette (2002), who question the value of motive evidence in murder cases. They argue that the evidence that a husband had extramartial affairs, that he heavily insured his wife's life, or that he battered his wife is ordinarily of infinitesimal probative value. We disagree. To be sure, it would be foolish to predict solely on the basis of such evidence that a husband will murder his wife. However, when this kind of evidence is cobmined with other evidence in a realistic murder case, the evidence can be quite probative. We analyze …

Weighing Poison Fruit, Yale Kamisar

Articles

In the simplest cases involving the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, the items the defense is trying to suppress, such as drugs found during the search of a suspect's pocket, are direct, or primary, in their relationship to the police action. Thus, if the police have acted unlawfully, the evidence must be excluded from trial.

Many times, however, evidence is derivative, or secondary, in character. For example, an illegal search may turn up a key to an airport locker where the proceeds of a bank robbery are being kept. Or a coerced confession may reveal the place where a suspect …

Squeezing Daubert Out Of The Picture, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In this essay, I will offer some thoughts on how we might reframe the issues governing the admissibility of expert evidence. My principal focus is not on any particular type of expert evidence but on broader questions: the extent to which we ought to rely on rulings of admissibility, the standards that should govern admissibility rulings, and the role of the trial and appellate courts in making those rulings. To some extent, I will concentrate on the context of criminal cases, but for the most part my conclusions apply in both civil and criminal litigation. Here are my conclusions: First, …

Confrontation As A Hot Topic: The Virtues Of Going Back To Square One, Richard D. Friedman

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I have been working so obsessively on the accused's right to confront the witnesses against him 1 that I am gratified that the organizers of this conference have designated confrontation as one of the "hot topics" of Evidence law. I am not so egotistical as to think that my work has made confrontation into a hot topic; I am just glad to know that I am working where a good deal of action is, and that other scholars recognize that confrontation is an important area in which dramatic changes may be occurring.

A Resident Of Evidenceland Defends His Turf, Richard D. Friedman

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A few years ago, I wrote an essay welcoming Judge Richard Posner down from a star to Evidenceland, the sometimes obscure province occupied by evidence scholars.1 Although I criticized one of the points of his article on the economics of evidence law, I expressed the hope that he would remain in Evidenceland for an extended stay.2 I should have known that if he did so he would tell us long-term inhabitants what we have been doing wrong.