Law Commons^™

The Digital Divide And Courtroom Technology: Can David Keep Up With Goliath?, Michael E. Heintz

Federal Communications Law Journal

The federal judiciary recently embraced the technological revolution. Select courts are now equipped with state-of-the-art technology to aid in trial presentations. Before the judiciary made the improvements, litigants had to keep pace with the technological advancements themselves, often at a great cost. One might think that the recent technological improvements made to federal courtrooms would have widened the gap between large and small firms where the available resources are vastly different, but that is not the case. In fact, the installation of new technology into courtrooms serves to equalize what would otherwise be a "digital divide."

Part II of this …

The Koon Trap: Why Imperfect Entrapment Fails To Justify Departure From The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Joseph M. Meadows

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Practice Of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, And The Meaning Of Precedent In An Interpretive Community, Lauren K. Robel

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Doing Our Politics In Court: Gerrymandering, "Fair Representation" And An Exegesis Into The Judicial Role, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

The Dynamic Judicial Opinion, William D. Popkin

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Eskridge's article on Dynamic Statutory Interpretation advances an aggressively pragmatic theory of interpretation but has had more influence among academics than judges because of a failure to attend to the problems of writing a candid, pragmatic and dynamic judicial opinion. This article argues that, although not free from doubt, a candid judicial opinion is preferable, and discusses how to write such an opinion - suggesting that judges rely on the "intent of the statute," not legislative intent; and adopt a personal/exploratory style in presenting their views.

Baker's Promise, Equal Protection, And The Modern Redistricting Revolution: A Plea For Rationality, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The conventional wisdom contends that Baker v. Carr did not set down a standard for lower courts to follow. This Article responds to this position. It reaches three conclusions. First, it argues the implicit promise of Baker v. Carr pointed toward a loose, flexible rationality standard for deciding redistricting controversies. Under this approach, states were given much room to enact redistricting plans in accordance to their states' particular needs. Second, the lower courts applied precisely this standard in litigation in the wake of Baker, and did so quite capably. This conclusion responds to those who exhort the imposition of a …