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Full-Text Articles in Law
Opting Out Of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis Of Contractual Choice Of Law, Erin A. O'Hara
Opting Out Of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis Of Contractual Choice Of Law, Erin A. O'Hara
Vanderbilt Law Review
This Article uses public choice theory to analyze the function of choice-of-law clauses in contracts. Choice-of-law clauses are now quite common and are increasingly enforced, especially with the proliferation of international and Internet transactions. Because these clauses can be used by parties to avoid regulation, academics are now vigorously debating the extent to which this contractual opt out should be permitted. The Article presents a positive political theory of the interplay of legislative action and the enforcement of choice of law. It demonstrates that the important normative debate over choice of law is somewhat misguided because both sides fail to …
Bargaining Theory And Regulatory Reform: The Political Logic Of Inefficient Regulation, David B. Spence, Lekha Gopalakrishnan
Bargaining Theory And Regulatory Reform: The Political Logic Of Inefficient Regulation, David B. Spence, Lekha Gopalakrishnan
Vanderbilt Law Review
In this Article David Spence and Lekha Gopalakrishnan pro- pose a new understanding of regulatory bargaining. Economists and others have long argued that the American regulatory system is unnecessarily inefficient. Critics charge that the system is both substantively inefficient, in that it sometimes mandates the use of inefficient means for achieving a regulatory goal, and procedurally inefficient, in its over-reliance on rules. These arguments have led to a wave of regulatory reform experiments in the federal bureaucracy, many of which seek to promote positive-sum changes in regulatory policy through bargaining among private- and public-sector stakeholders. As several commentators have noted, …