Law Commons^™

Shutting Down The Government, Alan L. Feld

Faculty Scholarship

Actions of the federal government cost money. Legislative processes that specify the amounts and purposes of governmental expenditures control the scope and content of government actions.¹ To paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall, the power to withhold spending involves the power to destroy.²

Those involved in the legislative process ordinarily do not engage in wholesale or sudden dismantling of government activities through unheralded failures to provide funds. While disputes over funding constitute a regular part of the nation's political activity, these controversies usually concern adjustments in the level of spending and of agency operations. A decision to terminate an agency …

The Line Item Veto: Hearing Before The Subcommittee On The Constitution Of The Committee On The Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, First Session, Paul Simon, Arnold Cantor, Neal Devins, Louis Fisher

Congressional Testimony

No abstract provided.

Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons From History, Harold J. Krent

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Publish And Perish: Congress's Effort To Snip Snepp (Before And Afsa), Michael J. Glennon

Michigan Journal of International Law

Over three million present and former federal employees, of the Executive as well as the Congress, are parties to so-called "pre-publication review agreements," which require that they submit any writings on topics related to their employment for Executive review prior to publication. In Section 630 of the Omnibus Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1988, Congress attempted to restrict the use of funds to implement or enforce certain of those agreements. On May 27, 1988, however, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in American Foreign Service Association v. Garfinkel ("AFSA "), struck that section down, …

A Two-Tiered Theory Of Consolidation And Separation Of Powers, David S. Yassky

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This Note explores the jurisprudential implications of the New Deal watershed and elaborates a post-New Deal theory of allocation of governmental power. Part I begins with a discussion of the Federalist theory of separation of powers. For the Federalists, two conditions ensured an effective separation. First, governmental branches must be institutionally independent; each must be free from control by the others. Second, the branches must be functionally specialized; each must wield a distinct component of governmental power, so that the assent of all three is required for government action.

Until the New Deal, the Supreme Court incorporated this theory into …

Political Questions In International Trade: Judicial Review Of Section 301?, Erwin P. Eichmann, Gary N. Horlick

Michigan Journal of International Law

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 ("Section 301") has become an increasingly potent and widely-used tool in the U.S. arsenal of trade policy measures. The past few years have seen a proliferation of Section 301 cases, affecting the trade of goods and services in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Even so, in the debate over the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("Omnibus Trade Act"), Congress expressed impatience with the President's discretion in not undertaking more Section 301 retaliations. But while much attention has focused on the politics and policy aspects of Section 301, little has been …

Independent Agencies - Independent From Whom?, Sally Katzen, Edward Markey, James Miller, Joseph Grundfest, R. Gaull Silberman, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Presidential Management Of Agency Rulemaking, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

A Comment On The Rule Of Law Model Of Separation Of Powers, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality Of Arbitration In Federal Programs, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Spite Nominations To The United States Supreme Court: Herbert C. Hoover, Owen J. Roberts, And The Politics Of Presidential Vengeance In Retrospect, Peter G. Fish

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.