Law Commons^™

Management Buyouts, Efficient Markets, Fair Value And Soft Information, James R. Repetti

James R. Repetti

Two Models Of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle And Means, Lynne L. Dallas

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article introduces a new model of corporate governance, which challenges, as did Berle and Means, the conclusions drawn from the traditional ownership model. Rather than focusing upon the inefficiencies of the large complex firm resulting from the separation of share ownership and control, however, this new model, which I call the power model, focuses upon the political nature of decision making in the large corporation, which exists regardless of the identity of the entrepreneur.

The New Business Corporation Act: The Basics, Office Of Continuing Legal Education At The University Of Kentucky College Of Law, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., David W. Harper, Stephen B. Catron, Keith G. Hanley

Continuing Legal Education Materials

Handouts provided at the UK/CLE seminar on the New Business Corporation Act on October 1, 1988.

Corporate Auctions And Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Third-Generation Business Judgment Rule, Steven G. Bradbury

Michigan Law Review

This Note proposes a rationale and a methodology for applying the business judgment rule when directors resist a hostile bid during the auction phase of a control contest. Part I examines the changes that occur in the responsibilities of target directors when a corporate auction is initiated. This Part describes the Unocal business judgment rule test and discusses its usefulness in the auction phase of a takeover. While the test requires modification if it is to complement effectively the auction-phase duties announced in Revlon, this Part suggests that the business judgment rule continues to be relevant and important during …

Insurance Life Insurance: Grant To Publicly Owned Corporations An Insurable Interest In Employees, A. Butts-Cater

Georgia State University Law Review

The Act amends the Code by granting to publicly owned corporations an insurable interest in their directors, officers, and employees, permitting employers to deduct as business expenses premiums paid for employees' term life insurance.

Reciprocal Altruism As A Felony: Antitrust And The Prisoner's Dilemma, John Shepard Wiley Jr.

Michigan Law Review

This essay is about the idea of cooperation in antitrust law. At the outset, ·I clarify my terminology. Biologists often refer to reciprocal altruism. "Reciprocal altruism" in the antitrust context has an odd semantic ring. There is nothing altruistic or self-sacrificing about the cooperation that antitrust rules outlaw: cartel price fixing. Firms do it strictly for the money. I prefer the term reciprocity to describe a firm's strategy to pursue behavior that will profit it only if competing firms engage in similar behavior. This usage can create confusion in the present context, however, because reciprocity is also an antitrust term …

The Closely Held Corporation: Its Capital Structure And The Federal Tax Laws, William J. Rands

West Virginia Law Review

The labyrinthine provisions of the Internal Revenue Code make a decision on whether or not to incorporate a closely-held business astoundingly complex. To decide properly, one must understand the terms "C corporations," "S corporations," a partner's "distributive share," and a host of other cryptic concepts.' Even those initiated into the inner sanctums of Subchapters C2, K3 and S4 must advise their clients that their counsel.is based on the enterprise's projected revenues and expenses, estimates that may prove to be far off the mark. Moreover, changes in the Internal Revenue Code have been so constant that no one can feel confident …

The Promise Of State Takeover Statutes, Richard A. Booth

Michigan Law Review

The purpose of this article is, first, to describe the problems associated with two-tier tender offers and the closely related, and perhaps still more coercive, partial tender offer. Second, the article will address the natural question why such offers have not already been banned, suggesting a better view of what coercion means in the context of a tender offer. Third, the article will offer a management-oriented view of coercion, explaining the legitimate interests of managers (and other groups) in resisting takeovers, as well as how greenmail and poison pills, though subject to abuse, can be used quite properly to combat …

Adventures In Finance, Deborah A. Demott

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Finance and Industrial Performance in a Dynamic Economy: Theory, Practice, and Policy by Merritt B. Fox

Corporations And Society: Power And Responsibility, Sara Anne Engle

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Corporations and Society: Power and Responsibility edited by Warren J. Samuels and Arthur S. Miller

The D & O Insurance Crisis: Darkness At The End Of The Tunnel, John A. Cottingham

South Carolina Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Micro-Microeconomic Approach To Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, Harry S. Gerla

Michigan Law Review

If we are to gain an accurate perspective on the impact of antitrust laws and policies on the behavior of firms in the real world, we must adopt a micro-microeconomic approach which focuses not on how rational, profit-maximizing firms will theoretically behave, but upon how late twentieth-century American managers and executives actually behave. This article attempts to begin that task.

Part I of this article examines the justifications for focusing on individual managers rather than profit-maximizing firms as the key actors in antitrust law. Part II looks at contemporary management mores and practices and develops some generalized "rules of the …

Labor Law's Alter Ego Doctrine: The Role Of Employer Motive In Corporate Transformations, Gary Alan Macdonald

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines the differing judicial approaches for reviewing NLRB alter ego findings, and concludes that a fundamental problem with all of the current approaches is the unwarranted consideration of motive in varying degrees. This Note proposes a modified "reasonably foreseeable benefit" standard which does not depend in any degree on the employer's motive for changing its corporate form. Part I discusses the origin and evolution of the alter ego doctrine, including its genesis in Southport Petroleum, the well-settled Crawford Door factors, and the related "successorship" doctrine. Part II analyzes the conflict among the federal courts of appeals over …

The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement - The Latest In Maginot Lines To Save Capitalism, H J. Glasbeek

Dalhousie Law Journal

The modem corporation bad a battle to be accepted as a legitimate institution. In England it was initially seen as a device which might lead to the undermining of individual responsibility, in the United States as subjugating the individual and individualism to the needs of the organization, and in Canada as offending the dignity of labour and endangering the political entente. In 1932, Berle and Means showed that most of the wealth in the United States was in the hands of corporations and a large proportion of that corporate wealth was controlled by a relatively small number of dominant corporations. …

Conflict Of Interest In The Board Room - Misconduct "Market Discipline" Cannot Kill, Jayne W. Barnard

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Where Have All The Directors Gone: Corporate Director And Officer Liability And Coping With The Insurance Crisis, Richard A. Myers Jr.

Cleveland State Law Review

Smith v. Van Gorkom set in motion a trend of increased exposure for directors and officers of American corporations....Directors and officers insurance may be either unavailable or unaffordable,...As a general rule, the best way to cope with the change in the business environment and the insurance crisis is to plan in advance for it. Through careful corporate structuring and planning, while remaining flexible, a small company can maximize their protection from liability. The factors to consider range from a careful drafting of the corporate articles and bylaws to the creation of captive insurance companies.

Executives Raiding The Corporate Cookie Jar, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.